Is having your computer compromised a personal assault? The ethics of extended cognition

Carter, J. A. and Palermos, S. O. (2016) Is having your computer compromised a personal assault? The ethics of extended cognition. Journal of the American Philosophical Association, 2(4), pp. 542-560. (doi:10.1017/apa.2016.28)

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Abstract

Philosophy of mind and cognitive science (e.g., Clark and Chalmers 1998; Clark 2010; Palermos 2014) have recently become increasingly receptive to the hypothesis of extended cognition, according to which external artifacts such as our laptops and smartphones can—under appropriate circumstances—feature as material realizers of a person's cognitive processes. We argue that, to the extent that the hypothesis of extended cognition is correct, our legal and ethical theorizing and practice must be updated by broadening our conception of personal assault so as to include intentional harm toward gadgets that have been appropriately integrated. We next situate the theoretical case for extended personal assault within the context of some recent ethical and legal cases and close with critical discussion.

Item Type:Articles
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Carter, Dr Joseph
Authors: Carter, J. A., and Palermos, S. O.
Subjects:B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
College/School:College of Arts > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Journal Name:Journal of the American Philosophical Association
Publisher:Cambridge University Press
ISSN:2053-4477
ISSN (Online):2053-4485
Published Online:21 December 2016
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2016 American Philosophical Association
First Published:First published in Journal of the American Philosophical Association 2(4):542-560
Publisher Policy:Reproduced in accordance with the publisher copyright policy

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