Against swamping

Carter, J. A. and Jarvis, B. (2012) Against swamping. Analysis, 72(4), pp. 690-699. (doi: 10.1093/analys/ans118)

Abstract

The Swamping Argument – highlighted by Kvanvig (2003; 2010) – purports to show that the epistemic value of truth will always swamp the epistemic value of any non-factive epistemic properties (e.g. justification) so that these properties can never add any epistemic value to an already-true belief. Consequently (and counter-intuitively), knowledge is never more epistemically valuable than mere true belief. We show that the Swamping Argument fails. Parity of reasoning yields the disastrous conclusion that nonfactive epistemic properties – mostly saliently justification – are never epistemically valuable properties of a belief. We close by diagnosing why philosophers have been mistakenly attracted to the argument.

• Item Type: Articles
• Additional Information: Benjamin Jarvis would like to acknowledge the Association of Commonwealth Universities and the British Academy (CC100095) for supporting his research on knowledge.
• Status: Published
• Refereed: Yes
• Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: Carter, Professor J Adam
• Authors: Carter, J. A., and Jarvis, B.
• Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
• College/School: College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy
• Journal Name: Analysis
• Publisher: Oxford University Press
• ISSN: 0003-2638
• ISSN (Online): 1467-8284
• Published Online: 09 September 2012
• Copyright Holders: Copyright © 2012 The Authors
• First Published: First published in Analysis 72(4): 690-699
• Publisher Policy: Reproduced in accordance with the publisher copyright policy