Against swamping

Carter, J. A. and Jarvis, B. (2012) Against swamping. Analysis, 72(4), pp. 690-699. (doi: 10.1093/analys/ans118)

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The Swamping Argument – highlighted by Kvanvig (2003; 2010) – purports to show that the epistemic value of truth will always swamp the epistemic value of any non-factive epistemic properties (e.g. justification) so that these properties can never add any epistemic value to an already-true belief. Consequently (and counter-intuitively), knowledge is never more epistemically valuable than mere true belief. We show that the Swamping Argument fails. Parity of reasoning yields the disastrous conclusion that nonfactive epistemic properties – mostly saliently justification – are never epistemically valuable properties of a belief. We close by diagnosing why philosophers have been mistakenly attracted to the argument.

Item Type:Articles
Additional Information:Benjamin Jarvis would like to acknowledge the Association of Commonwealth Universities and the British Academy (CC100095) for supporting his research on knowledge.
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Carter, Dr J Adam
Authors: Carter, J. A., and Jarvis, B.
Subjects:B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
College/School:College of Arts > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Journal Name:Analysis
Publisher:Oxford University Press
ISSN (Online):1467-8284
Published Online:09 September 2012
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2012 The Authors
First Published:First published in Analysis 72(4): 690-699
Publisher Policy:Reproduced in accordance with the publisher copyright policy

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