(Anti)-anti-intellectualism and the sufficiency thesis

Carter, J. A. and Czarnecki, B. (2017) (Anti)-anti-intellectualism and the sufficiency thesis. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 98(S1), pp. 374-397. (doi: 10.1111/papq.12187)

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Anti-intellectualists about knowledge-how insist that, when an agent S knows how to φ, it is in virtue of some ability, rather than in virtue of any propositional attitudes, S has. Recently, a popular strategy for attacking the anti-intellectualist position proceeds by appealing to cases where an agent is claimed to possess a reliable ability to φ while nonetheless intuitively lacking knowledge-how to φ. John Bengson & Marc Moffett (2009; 2011a; 2011b) and Carlotta Pavese (2015a; 2015b) have embraced precisely this strategy and have thus claimed, for different reasons, that anti-intellectualism is defective on the grounds that possessing the ability to φ is not sufficient for knowing how to φ. We investigate this strategy of argument-by-counterexample to the anti-intellectualist’s sufficiency thesis and show that, at the end of the day, anti-intellectualism remains unscathed.

Item Type:Articles
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Carter, Dr J Adam
Authors: Carter, J. A., and Czarnecki, B.
Subjects:B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
College/School:College of Arts > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Journal Name:Pacific Philosophical Quarterly
ISSN (Online):1468-0114
Published Online:23 December 2016
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2016 The Author
First Published:First published in Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98(S1):374-397
Publisher Policy:Reproduced in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher

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