Carter, J. A. and Czarnecki, B. (2017) (Anti)-anti-intellectualism and the sufficiency thesis. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 98(S1), pp. 374-397. (doi: 10.1111/papq.12187)
|
Text
132396.pdf - Accepted Version 324kB |
Abstract
Anti-intellectualists about knowledge-how insist that, when an agent S knows how to φ, it is in virtue of some ability, rather than in virtue of any propositional attitudes, S has. Recently, a popular strategy for attacking the anti-intellectualist position proceeds by appealing to cases where an agent is claimed to possess a reliable ability to φ while nonetheless intuitively lacking knowledge-how to φ. John Bengson & Marc Moffett (2009; 2011a; 2011b) and Carlotta Pavese (2015a; 2015b) have embraced precisely this strategy and have thus claimed, for different reasons, that anti-intellectualism is defective on the grounds that possessing the ability to φ is not sufficient for knowing how to φ. We investigate this strategy of argument-by-counterexample to the anti-intellectualist’s sufficiency thesis and show that, at the end of the day, anti-intellectualism remains unscathed.
| Item Type: | Articles |
|---|---|
| Status: | Published |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: | Carter, Professor J Adam |
| Authors: | Carter, J. A., and Czarnecki, B. |
| Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) |
| College/School: | College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy |
| Journal Name: | Pacific Philosophical Quarterly |
| Publisher: | Wiley |
| ISSN: | 0279-0750 |
| ISSN (Online): | 1468-0114 |
| Published Online: | 23 December 2016 |
| Copyright Holders: | Copyright © 2016 The Author |
| First Published: | First published in Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98(S1):374-397 |
| Publisher Policy: | Reproduced in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher |
University Staff: Request a correction | Enlighten Editors: Update this record
Deposit and Record Details
Deposit and Record Details