Openmindedness and truth

Carter, J. A. and Gordon, E. C. (2014) Openmindedness and truth. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 44(2), pp. 207-224. (doi: 10.1080/00455091.2014.923247)

132392.pdf - Accepted Version



While openmindedness is often cited as a paradigmatic example of an intellectual virtue, the connection between openmindedness and truth is tenuous. Several strategies for reconciling this tension are considered, and each is shown to fail; it is thus claimed that openmindedness, when intellectually virtuous, bears no interesting essential connection to truth. In the final section, the implication of this result is assessed in the wider context of debates about epistemic value.

Item Type:Articles
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Gordon, Dr Emma and Carter, Dr J Adam
Authors: Carter, J. A., and Gordon, E. C.
Subjects:B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
College/School:College of Arts > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Journal Name:Canadian Journal of Philosophy
Publisher:Taylor & Francis
ISSN (Online):1911-0820
Published Online:03 July 2014
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2014 Canadian Journal of Philosophy
First Published:First published in Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44(2): 207-224
Publisher Policy:Reproduced in accordance with the publisher copyright policy

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