Group knowledge and epistemic defeat

Carter, J. A. (2015) Group knowledge and epistemic defeat. Ergo, 2(28), pp. 711-735. (doi: 10.3998/ergo.12405314.0002.028)

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If individual knowledge and justification can be vanquished by epistemic defeaters, then the same should go for group knowledge. Lackey (2014) has recently argued that one especially strong conception of group knowledge defended by Bird (2010) is incapable of explaining how it is that (group) knowledge is ever subject to ordinary mechanisms of epistemic defeat. Lackey takes it that her objections do not also apply to a more moderate articulation of group knowledge—one that is embraced widely in collective epistemology—and which she does not challenge. This paper argues that given certain background premises that are embraced by orthodox thinking in collective epistemology, the more moderate account of group knowledge cannot make sense of either psychological or normative epistemic defeaters. I conclude by offering some suggestions for how the more moderate proposal might avoid this result.

Item Type:Articles
Additional Information:This article was written as part of the AHRC-funded ’Extended Knowledge’ (AH/J011908/1) research project that is hosted by the University of Edinburgh’s Eidyn research centre.
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Carter, Dr J Adam
Authors: Carter, J. A.
Subjects:B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
College/School:College of Arts > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Journal Name:Ergo
Publisher:Michigan Publishing
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2015 The Author
First Published:First published in Ergo 2(28): 711-735
Publisher Policy:Reproduced under a Creative Commons License

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