Carter, J. A. and Pritchard, D. (2015) Knowledge-how and cognitive achievement. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 91(1), pp. 181-199. (doi: 10.1111/phpr.12094)
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Abstract
According to reductive intellectualism, knowledge-how just is a kind of propositional knowledge (e.g., Stanley & Williamson 2001; Stanley 2011a, 2011b; Brogaard 2008, 2009, 2011). This proposal has proved controversial because knowledge-how and propositional knowledge do not seem to share the same epistemic properties, particularly with regard to epistemic luck. Here we aim to move the argument forward by offering a positive account of knowledge-how. In particular, we propose a new kind of anti-intellectualism. Unlike neo-Rylean anti-intellectualist views, according to which the possession of knowledge-how is just a matter of possessing certain abilities, we submit that knowledge-how is a particular kind of cognitive achievement attained just when cognitive ability is connected in the right way with successful performance.
Item Type: | Articles |
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Status: | Published |
Refereed: | Yes |
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: | Carter, Professor J Adam |
Authors: | Carter, J. A., and Pritchard, D. |
Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) |
College/School: | College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy |
Journal Name: | Philosophy and Phenomenological Research |
Publisher: | Wiley |
ISSN: | 0031-8205 |
ISSN (Online): | 1933-1592 |
Published Online: | 18 March 2014 |
Copyright Holders: | Copyright © 2014 Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LLC |
First Published: | First published in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91(1): 181-199 |
Publisher Policy: | Reproduced in accordance with the publisher copyright policy |
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