Carter, J. A. and Pritchard, D. (2015) Knowledge-how and epistemic luck. Noûs, 49(3), pp. 440-453. (doi: 10.1111/nous.12054)
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Abstract
Reductive intellectualists (e.g., Stanley & Williamson 2001; Stanley 2011a; 2011b; Brogaard 2008; 2009; 2011) hold that knowledge-how is a kind of knowledge-that. For this thesis to hold water, it is obviously important that knowledge-how and knowledge-that have the same epistemic properties. In particular, knowledge-how ought to be compatible with epistemic luck to the same extent as knowledge-that. It is argued, contra reductive intellectualism, that knowledge-how is compatible with a species of epistemic luck which is not compatible with knowledge-that, and thus it is claimed that knowledge-how and knowledge-that come apart.
| Item Type: | Articles |
|---|---|
| Status: | Published |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: | Carter, Professor J Adam |
| Authors: | Carter, J. A., and Pritchard, D. |
| Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) |
| College/School: | College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy |
| Journal Name: | Noûs |
| Publisher: | Wiley |
| ISSN: | 0029-4624 |
| ISSN (Online): | 1468-0068 |
| Published Online: | 21 November 2013 |
| Copyright Holders: | Copyright © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. |
| First Published: | First published in Noûs 49(3): 440-453 |
| Publisher Policy: | Reproduced in accordance with the publisher copyright policy |
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