Knowledge-how and epistemic luck

Carter, J. A. and Pritchard, D. (2015) Knowledge-how and epistemic luck. Noûs, 49(3), pp. 440-453. (doi:10.1111/nous.12054)

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Abstract

Reductive intellectualists (e.g., Stanley & Williamson 2001; Stanley 2011a; 2011b; Brogaard 2008; 2009; 2011) hold that knowledge-how is a kind of knowledge-that. For this thesis to hold water, it is obviously important that knowledge-how and knowledge-that have the same epistemic properties. In particular, knowledge-how ought to be compatible with epistemic luck to the same extent as knowledge-that. It is argued, contra reductive intellectualism, that knowledge-how is compatible with a species of epistemic luck which is not compatible with knowledge-that, and thus it is claimed that knowledge-how and knowledge-that come apart.

Item Type:Articles
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Carter, Dr Joseph
Authors: Carter, J. A., and Pritchard, D.
Subjects:B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
College/School:College of Arts > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Journal Name:Noûs
Publisher:Wiley
ISSN:0029-4624
ISSN (Online):1468-0068
Published Online:21 November 2013
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
First Published:First published in Noûs 49(3): 440-453
Publisher Policy:Reproduced in accordance with the publisher copyright policy

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