Knowledge-how and epistemic value

Carter, J. A. and Pritchard, D. (2015) Knowledge-how and epistemic value. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 93(4), pp. 799-816. (doi: 10.1080/00048402.2014.997767)

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A conspicuous oversight in recent debates about the vexed problem of the value of knowledge has been the value of knowledge-how. This would not be surprising if knowledge-how were, as Gilbert Ryle [1945; 1949] famously thought, fundamentally different from knowledge-that. However, reductive intellectualists [e.g., Stanley & Williamson 2001; Stanley 2011a; 2011b; Brogaard 2008; 2009; 2011] maintain that knowledge-how just is a kind of knowledge-that. Accordingly, reductive intellectualists must predict that the value problems facing propositional knowledge will equally apply to knowledge-how. We show, however, that this is not the case. Accordingly, we highlight a value-driven argument for thinking (contra reductive intellectualism) that knowledge-how and knowledge-that come apart.

Item Type:Articles
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Carter, Dr J Adam
Authors: Carter, J. A., and Pritchard, D.
Subjects:B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BT Doctrinal Theology
College/School:College of Arts > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Journal Name:Australasian Journal of Philosophy
Publisher:Taylor & Francis
ISSN (Online):1471-6828
Published Online:19 January 2015
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2015 Australasian Journal of Philosophy
First Published:First published in Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93(4): 799-816
Publisher Policy:Reproduced in accordance with the publisher copyright policy

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