Robust virtue epistemology as anti-luck epistemology: a new solution

Carter, J. A. (2016) Robust virtue epistemology as anti-luck epistemology: a new solution. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 97(1), pp. 140-155. (doi:10.1111/papq.12040)

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Abstract

Robust Virtue Epistemology (RVE) maintains that knowledge is achieved just when an agent gets to the truth through, or because of, the manifestation of intellectual virtue or ability. A notorious objection to the view is that the satisfaction of the virtue condition will be insufficient to ensure the safety of the target belief; that is, RVE is no anti-luck epistemology. Some of the most promising recent attempts to get around this problem are considered and shown to ultimately fail. Finally, a new proposal for defending RVE as a kind of anti-luck epistemology is defended. The view developed here turns importantly on the idea that knowledge depends on ability and luck in a way that is gradient, not rigid, and that we know just when our cognitive success depends on ability not rather, but more so, than luck.

Item Type:Articles
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Carter, Dr Joseph
Authors: Carter, J. A.
Subjects:B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
College/School:College of Arts > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Journal Name:Pacific Philosophical Quarterly
Publisher:Wiley
ISSN:0279-0750
ISSN (Online):1468-0114
Published Online:26 May 2014
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2014 The Author. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, University of Southern California and John Wiley and Sons Ltd
First Published:First published in Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97(1): 140-155
Publisher Policy:Reproduced in accordance with the publisher copyright policy

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