Carter, J. A. (2016) Robust virtue epistemology as anti-luck epistemology: a new solution. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 97(1), pp. 140-155. (doi: 10.1111/papq.12040)
|
Text
132195.pdf - Accepted Version 333kB |
Abstract
Robust Virtue Epistemology (RVE) maintains that knowledge is achieved just when an agent gets to the truth through, or because of, the manifestation of intellectual virtue or ability. A notorious objection to the view is that the satisfaction of the virtue condition will be insufficient to ensure the safety of the target belief; that is, RVE is no anti-luck epistemology. Some of the most promising recent attempts to get around this problem are considered and shown to ultimately fail. Finally, a new proposal for defending RVE as a kind of anti-luck epistemology is defended. The view developed here turns importantly on the idea that knowledge depends on ability and luck in a way that is gradient, not rigid, and that we know just when our cognitive success depends on ability not rather, but more so, than luck.
| Item Type: | Articles |
|---|---|
| Status: | Published |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: | Carter, Professor J Adam |
| Authors: | Carter, J. A. |
| Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) |
| College/School: | College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy |
| Journal Name: | Pacific Philosophical Quarterly |
| Publisher: | Wiley |
| ISSN: | 0279-0750 |
| ISSN (Online): | 1468-0114 |
| Published Online: | 26 May 2014 |
| Copyright Holders: | Copyright © 2014 The Author. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, University of Southern California and John Wiley and Sons Ltd |
| First Published: | First published in Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97(1): 140-155 |
| Publisher Policy: | Reproduced in accordance with the publisher copyright policy |
University Staff: Request a correction | Enlighten Editors: Update this record
Altmetric
Altmetric