On the epistemology of the precautionary principle: reply to Steglich-Petersen

Carter, J. A. and Peterson, M. (2016) On the epistemology of the precautionary principle: reply to Steglich-Petersen. Erkenntnis, 81(2), pp. 297-304. (doi: 10.1007/s10670-015-9740-3)

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In a recent paper in this journal (2014), we proposed two novel puzzles associated with the precautionary principle. Both are puzzles that materialise, we argue, once we investigate the principle through an epistemological lens, and each constitutes a philosophical hurdle for any proponent of a plausible version of the precautionary principle. Steglich-Petersen (Erkenntnis 1–9, 2014) claims, also in this journal, that he has resolved our puzzles. In this short note, we explain why we remain skeptical.

Item Type:Articles
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Carter, Dr J Adam
Authors: Carter, J. A., and Peterson, M.
Subjects:B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
College/School:College of Arts > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Journal Name:Erkenntnis
ISSN (Online):1572-8420
Published Online:05 June 2015
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2015 Springer Science+Business Media
First Published:First published in Erkenntnis 81(2): 297-304
Publisher Policy:Reproduced in accordance with the publisher copyright policy

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