Extended cognition and propositional memory

Carter, J. A. and Kallestrup, J. (2016) Extended cognition and propositional memory. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 92(3), pp. 691-714. (doi:10.1111/phpr.12157)

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Abstract

The philosophical case for extended cognition is often made with reference to ‘extended-memory cases’ (e.g. Clark & Chalmers 1998); though, unfortunately, proponents of the hypothesis of extended cognition (HEC) as well as their adversaries have failed to appreciate the kinds of epistemological problems extended-memory cases pose for mainstream thinking in the epistemology of memory. It is time to give these problems a closer look. Our plan is as follows: in §1, we argue that an epistemological theory remains compatible with HEC only if its epistemic assessments do not violate what we call ‘the epistemic parity principle’. In §2, we show how the constraint of respecting the epistemic parity principle stands in what appears to be a prima facie intractable tension with mainstream thinking about cases of propositional memory. We then outline and evaluate in §3 several lines of response.

Item Type:Articles
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Carter, Dr Joseph
Authors: Carter, J. A., and Kallestrup, J.
Subjects:B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
College/School:College of Arts > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Journal Name:Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Publisher:Wiley
ISSN:0031-8205
ISSN (Online):1933-1592
Published Online:10 January 2015
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2015 Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LLC
First Published:First published in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92(3):691-714
Publisher Policy:Reproduced in accordance with the publisher copyright policy

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