Meta-epistemic defeat

Carter, J. A. (2018) Meta-epistemic defeat. Synthese, 195(7), pp. 2877-2896. (doi:10.1007/s11229-016-1187-9)

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Abstract

An account of meta-epistemic defeaters—distinct from traditional (first-order) epistemic defeaters—is motivated and defended, drawing from case studies involving epistemic error-theory (e.g., Olson 2011, Reasons for belief; cf., Streumer 2012, J Philos 110:1–25) and epistemic relativism (e.g., MacFarlane 2005, Oxford Stud Epistemol 1:197–233; 2011; 2014, Assessment sensitivity: Relative truth and its applications). Mechanisms of traditional epistemic defeat and meta-epistemic defeat are compared and contrasted, and some new puzzles are introduced.

Item Type:Articles
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Carter, Dr Joseph
Authors: Carter, J. A.
College/School:College of Arts > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Journal Name:Synthese
Publisher:Springer
ISSN:0039-7857
ISSN (Online):1573-0964
Published Online:29 August 2016
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2016 The Author
First Published:First published in Synthese 195(7): 2877-2896
Publisher Policy:Reproduced under a Creative Commons License

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