On epistemic consequentialism and the virtue conflation problem

Carter, J. A. and Church, I. M. (2016) On epistemic consequentialism and the virtue conflation problem. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, 5(4), pp. 239-248. (doi: 10.1002/tht3.218)

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Addressing the ‘virtue conflation’ problem requires the preservation of intuitive distinctions between virtue types, that is, between intellectual and moral virtues. According to one influential attempt to avoid this problem proposed by Julia Driver (2003), moral virtues produce benefits to others—in particular, they promote the well-being of others—while the intellectual virtues, as such, produce epistemic good for the agent. We show that Driver's demarcation of intellectual virtue, by adverting to the self-/other distinction, leads to a reductio, and ultimately, that the prospects for resolving the virtue conflation problem look dim within an epistemic consequentialist approach to the epistemic right and the epistemic good.

Item Type:Articles
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Carter, Dr J Adam
Authors: Carter, J. A., and Church, I. M.
College/School:College of Arts > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Journal Name:Thought: A Journal of Philosophy
ISSN (Online):2161-2234
Published Online:06 October 2016
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc and the Northern Institute of Philosophy
First Published:First published in Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 5(4):239-248
Publisher Policy:Reproduced in accordance with the publisher copyright policy

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