Optimal impartial selection

Fischer, F. and Klimm, M. (2015) Optimal impartial selection. SIAM Journal on Computing, 44(5), pp. 1263-1285. (doi: 10.1137/140995775)

Abstract

We study a fundamental problem in social choice theory, the selection of a member of a set of agents based on impartial nominations by agents from that set. Studied previously by Alon et al. [Proceedings of TARK, 2011, pp. 101--110] and by Holzman and Moulin [Econometrica, 81 (2013), pp. 173--196], this problem arises when representatives are selected from within a group or when publishing or funding decisions are made based on a process of peer review. Our main result concerns a randomized mechanism that in expectation selects an agent with at least half the maximum number of nominations. This is best possible subject to impartiality and resolves a conjecture of Alon et al. Further results are given for the case where some agent receives many nominations and the case where each agent casts at least one nomination.

• Item Type: Articles
• Status: Published
• Refereed: Yes
• Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: Fischer, Dr Felix
• Authors: Fischer, F., and Klimm, M.
• College/School: College of Science and Engineering > School of Computing Science
• Journal Name: SIAM Journal on Computing
• Publisher: Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics
• ISSN: 0097-5397
• ISSN (Online): 1095-7111
• Published Online: 20 October 2015
• Copyright Holders: Copyright © 2015 Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics
• First Published: First published in SIAM Journal on Computing 44(5): 1263-1285
• Publisher Policy: Reproduced in accordance with the publisher copyright policy