Stochastic games with information lag

Levy, Y. (2012) Stochastic games with information lag. Games and Economic Behavior, 74(1), pp. 243-256. (doi: 10.1016/j.geb.2011.05.011)

Abstract

Two-player zero-sum stochastic games with finite state and action spaces are known to have undiscounted values. We study such games under the assumption that one or both players observe the actions of their opponent after some time-dependent delay. We develop criteria for the rate of growth of the delay such that a player subject to such an information lag can still guarantee himself in the undiscounted game as much as he could have with perfect monitoring. We also demonstrate that the player in the Big Match with the absorbing action subject to information lags that grows too rapidly will not be able to guarantee as much as he could have in the game with perfect monitoring.

• Item Type: Articles
• Status: Published
• Refereed: Yes
• Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: Levy, Dr John
• Authors: Levy, Y.
• College/School: College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics
• Journal Name: Games and Economic Behavior
• Publisher: Academic Press
• ISSN: 0899-8256
• ISSN (Online): 1090-2473
• Published Online: 12 June 2011