Levy, Y. (2013) A cantor set of games with no shift-homogeneous equilibrium selection. Mathematics of Operations Research, 38(3), pp. 492-503. (doi: 10.1287/moor.1120.0573)
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Publisher's URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/moor.1120.0573
Abstract
We construct a continuum of games on a countable set of players that does not possess a measurable equilibrium selection that satisfies a natural homogeneity property. The explicit nature of the construction yields counterexamples to the existence of equilibria in models with overlapping generations and in games with a continuum of players.
| Item Type: | Articles |
|---|---|
| Status: | Published |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: | Levy, Dr John |
| Authors: | Levy, Y. |
| College/School: | College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics |
| Journal Name: | Mathematics of Operations Research |
| Publisher: | INFORMS |
| ISSN: | 0364-765X |
| ISSN (Online): | 1526-5471 |
| Published Online: | 20 September 2012 |
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