Levy, Y. (2013) Discounted stochastic games with no stationary Nash equilibrium: two examples. Econometrica, 81(5), pp. 1973-2007. (doi: 10.3982/ECTA10530)
|
Text
129890.pdf - Accepted Version 540kB |
Abstract
We present two examples of discounted stochastic games, each with a continuum of states, finitely many players, and actions, that possess no stationary equilibria. The first example has deterministic transitions—an assumption undertaken in most of the early applications of dynamics games in economics—and perfect information, and does not possess even stationary approximate equilibria or Markovian equilibria. The second example satisfies, in addition to stronger regularity assumptions, that all transitions are absolutely continuous with respect to a fixed measure—an assumption that has been widely used in more recent economic applications. This assumption has been undertaken in several positive results on the existence of stationary equilibria in special cases, and in particular, guarantees the existence of stationary approximate equilibria.
Item Type: | Articles |
---|---|
Additional Information: | The copyright to this article is held by the Econometric Society, http://www.econometricsociety.org/. It may be downloaded, printed and reproduced only for personal or classroom use. Absolutely no downloading or copying may be done for, or on behalf of, any for-profit commercial firm or for other commercial purpose without the explicit permission of the Econometric Society. |
Status: | Published |
Refereed: | Yes |
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: | Levy, Dr John |
Authors: | Levy, Y. |
College/School: | College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics |
Journal Name: | Econometrica |
Publisher: | Wiley |
ISSN: | 0012-9682 |
ISSN (Online): | 1468-0262 |
Published Online: | 18 September 2013 |
Copyright Holders: | Copyright © 2013 The Econometric Society |
First Published: | First published in Econometrica 81(5):1973-2007 |
Publisher Policy: | Reproduced in accordance with the publisher copyright policy |
University Staff: Request a correction | Enlighten Editors: Update this record