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The Metaphorical Understanding of *Power* and *Authority*
Marc Alexander

For Hough, Anderson, and Bramwell, *English Metaphor Through Time and Semantic Space*

> Power is like Fire; it warms, scorches, or destroys, according as it is watched, provoked, or increased. It is as dangerous as useful. Its only Rule is the Good of the People; but because it is apt to break its Bounds, in all good Governments nothing, or as little as may be, ought to be left to Chance, or the Humours of Men in Authority […]
>
> Trenchard and Gordon 1737: 192

> Power is naturally active, vigilant, and distrustful; which Qualities in it push it upon all Means and Expedients to fortify itself, and upon destroying all Opposition, and even all Seeds of Opposition, and make it restless as long as any thing stands in its Way. It would do what it pleases, and have no Check.
>
> Trenchard and Gordon 1737: 260-261

1 Introduction

Metaphors of *Power*, *Authority,* and *Command* reveal across the history of English the ways in which people have conceptualized their complex bonds of obligation, control, and government. This chapter takes data from the University of Glasgow *Mapping Metaphor with the Historical Thesaurus* project, clusters it into seven major 'families' of metaphors, and through an analysis of these families argues that the concept of metaphor is better conceptualized as different phenomena working in an overlapping manner, rather than a single overarching concept of metaphor. This is particularly noticeable in the unusual area of the symbolic instantiation of a concept (such as that described in this chapter between *Power* and *Game*), which does not fit into normal descriptions of metaphor.

Whole volumes have been written about the definition of power – the general term, referring to the ability, as the *OED* says, to do or effect something or anything, refers to a wider sense than that which can be examined here. Instead, this chapter concerns itself with power in the sense which Michael Mann (1986: 6) identifies: 'the ability to pursue and attain goals through mastery of one's environment […] over third parties or over nature'. Mann's model, further developed over time, discusses 'four sources of social power: Ideological, Economic, Military and Political' (Hall and Schroeder 2005: 1), all of which are relevant in the concept's metaphorical realisations; this is returned to below. For the sake of space, the term *Power* will be generally used in this chapter to cover the domain of *Power, Authority* and *Command*.

These concepts are in the *Mapping Metaphor* database as section 3D, the fourth major section within the Social World. This mirrors the three-part division of its parent *Historical Thesaurus of English* database, although the *Mapping Metaphor* sections are broader and more inclusive than the *Thesaurus'* fine-grained categorization. The *Mapping Metaphor* database is the result of years of detailed manual coding and sifting through the results of an automated computational analysis of lexical overlap in the

Thesaurus; for 3D03 *Politics*, for example, this meant taking every word in that category and mapping it against the entirety of the remainder of the *Thesaurus* to see what concepts share words, on the basis that lexical overlap indicates shared conceptual structure. Manual coding then divided these results into meaningless noise, literal connections (such as that between 3D03 *Politics* and 2A27 *Philosophy*, covering the lexical overlap of political philosophy), and evidence for strong or weak metaphorical connections. These strong metaphorical connections in the 3D section of the database form the underlying data for the present chapter.

This data reflects that *Power* is most often discussed and conceived of in English and other languages as a particularly strong or mighty ability (see, for example, the epigraphs to this chapter, written during a period of particularly intense political tumult). Therefore, in a gradable 'scale' of power from powerlessness to powerfulness, the powerfulness end of the scale is the unmarked and default entry.[1] Consequently, much of the parent *Historical Thesaurus of English* categories of the *Mapping Metaphor* data focus on this notion of strength; as an example, subcategories 09 to 15 of 03.04.01 (n) *Power* focus on *great/supreme power, superior power, far-reaching power, excessive/overwhelming power, infinite power, sole/independent power,* and *executive power.* It is perhaps not surprising, then, that the metaphorical links between 3D and the rest of the *Mapping Metaphor* database focus primarily on the conceptualization of significant power.

In order to best demonstrate this metaphorical construction, I have combined the most prominent and most common of the 264 metaphorical strong links in the 3D category into seven larger *metaphor families*, following the model of Alexander and Struan 2013. These families are discussed below as *Large/strong, Position, Movement, Possession, Sight, Farming,* and *Game* (the order presented here is determined by the degree of theoretical complexity each shows, from simplest to most complex). This does not cover all categories in the data, and there are some various isolated and miscellaneous categories which do not fit the approach here of considering large-scale families of metaphor; however, the families represent by far the majority of power metaphors found in the data. I also use examples throughout derived from the *Hansard Corpus 1803-2005* (Alexander and Davies 2015) and *Semantic EEBO* (Alexander *et al* 2015), which allow concept-based searching using *Historical Thesaurus* codes. In conjunction with *Mapping Metaphor* links, the semantically-tagged data in these two corpora allow the analysis of large amounts of data for metaphorical patterns with relative efficiency. In the course of discussing and analyzing these families, issues have arisen which are considered and discussed in later sections.

2 Diachronic Power Metaphors
Power has varying metaphorical expansions throughout history; Buck, in his masterful *A Dictionary of Selected Synonyms in the Principal Indo-European Languages,* mentions that verbs for *rule* or *govern* 'are based upon such notions as "be first, have power, be master of, command, put in order, direct, guide, steer"' (1949: 1319). Buck's etymologies argue that the steer and rudder metaphors are common from proto-Greek onwards, and likely common across the whole western Indo-European region. One of the only metaphors not explicitly present in the *Mapping Metaphor* database but present in Old

English and through other links is that of narration being an act of exercising power (OE *reccan*) – but this is a deeper metaphor from before the OE period, of narration acting as guidance (present in *Mapping Metaphor* as a link between 3M06 *Literature* and 3J01 *Travel and journeys*). Overall, of the seven main metaphor families discussed below, *Sight, Farming*, and *Game* have no clear PIE lexical antecedents which can be derived from either Buck or the major sources of Pokorny or Watkins.[2] It is difficult, however, to believe that any of these are novel to the last few millennia; the Holocene – and the start of farming – began twelve thousand years ago, sight-as-control metaphors are found in the Hebrew bible,[3] and the earliest known games were played in the Near East in 2600 BC (further discussion of evidence for the likely historical spread of these is given later in this chapter).

The surviving evidence therefore shows that most – and probably all – of these are ancient metaphors of power which continue into to the present day from far older sources; this is unsurprising, as power is core to the experience of humanity in hierarchical, task-based, or cooperative societies. It does mean, however, that, unlike some of the other concepts discussed in this volume, it is difficult to set start dates for these metaphor families, although particular instances of the metaphors which make up the families have start dates within the ambit of the *Historical Thesaurus*.

In more recent times, occasional reference has been made to the ways in which power, as a wholly abstract phenomenon but with often-physical effect, is almost universally discussed with a conscious or unconscious use of metaphor; it is an ideal example of Lakoff's statement that 'as soon as one gets away from concrete physical experience and starts talking about abstractions or emotions, metaphorical understanding is the norm' (1993: 205). None of these discussions of power metaphors, however, have been data-driven or systematic, let alone comprehensive in the way the *Mapping Metaphor* project is. For example, Mitchell (1990: 545) says:

> Across the different disciplines of social science, studies of power and resistance continue to be dominated by [...] the distinction between persuading and coercing. Power may operate at the level of ideas, persuading the mind of its legitimacy, or it may work as a material force directly coercing the body.

This statement does not quite match with the data outlined below, obtained through the detailed and wide-ranging *Mapping Metaphor* methodology; as with many other areas where *Mapping Metaphor* has given us significant amounts of new and empirically-grounded data, it is known and described in the prior literature that power metaphors definitely exist, are common, and are interesting, but there is little as yet on their nature.

3 Metaphor Families
The seven main metaphor families described here – *Large/strong, Position, Movement, Possession, Sight, Farming,* and *Game* – are outlined below. These are formed, as discussed above, by clustering together metaphorical links across the 3D metaphor categories with regards to the concepts they link to. As also outlined above, each category is introduced by some quotes of that metaphor in use from *Semantic EEBO*, the *Hansard Corpus 1803-2005*, or other notable texts (most notably *Yes Minister*, a 1980s BBC TV comedy series which displayed a universally-acclaimed understanding of the nuances of

the exercise of power – to the extent where MPs, Ministers, and Prime Ministers provided material for it; for details see McCann 2014). Examples can be lengthy, either in order to give appropriate context for comprehension, or because the full quote is worth reading; the relevant terms have been <u>underlined</u> (some of these are examples from some metaphor families found in a quote which exemplifies another family, which demonstrates their interconnectedness). Other punctuation and formatting is in the original, except where noted by square brackets. Following these examples, there are provided lexical examples from each link, and where necessary some further definitions or *Historical Thesaurus* date ranges for clarity are given. Many lexical examples are taken from 3D01 *Command and control* and 3D05 *Authority, rebellion, and freedom*, which are the categories which focus on the nature and exercise of authority.

3.1 Large/strong
Power is *mighty, strong, large*:

> ISABELLA [...] Oh, it is excellent
>   To haue a Giants <u>strength</u>: but it is tyrannous
>   To vse it like a Giant.
>   Shakespeare, William. *Measure for Measure* II.ii.106-108 (unmodernized spelling)

> […] a happy multiplication of committals, prosecutions, convictions, and punishments, and a <u>mighty</u> congregation of constables, witnesses, prosecutors, criminals, juries, and magistrates, perpetually at work, adding new lustre to the glories of their country, and new energy to its productive efforts. Sir, I will not glance at the fallacious grounds of his exudations. I will not hint that there may have been more committals and prosecutions for picking pockets, because there have been more pockets picked […]
>   Mr William Frankland, *Parliamentary Debates (HC)* 29 March 1811 vol 19 c625

> So what have I learned after nearly six months in office? Merely, it seems, that I am almost impotent in the face of the <u>mighty</u> faceless bureaucracy. However, it is excellent that I realise this because it means that they have failed to house-train me. If I were house-trained I would now believe a) that I am immensely powerful, and b) that my officials merely do my bidding.
>   Lynn, Jonathan, and Antony Jay (1989). *The Complete Yes Minister*. London: BBC
>   Books. 162.

Examples:

> *large, strong, mighty, powerful, sturdy, substantial, constitution, weighty, temper* (1599–1707), *hard, strong, sturdy, mighty, fortify, rigorous, strict, puff up, force* (*a*1400–1876, 'a great quantity/amount'), *domine* (1474, 'to be superior in amount/degree'), *overest* (1481 + 1897, 'greatest in degree/extent'), *sovereign* (1749–, 'of the very highest degree'), *supreme* (1760/72–, 'highest/utmost/extreme degree')

This is perhaps one of the most natural of power metaphors – if power is coercion and the ability to force change, particularly where power is intimately connected with military abilities (as the Mann model above gives a focus on), it is natural for power to be intimately cognitively linked with strength. This is an excellent example of the *embodiment* turn in cognitive metaphor theory, which focuses on the view that 'reason is

not, in any way, a transcendent feature of the universe or of disembodied mind [but] is shaped crucially by the peculiarities of our human bodies' (Lakoff and Johnson 1999: 4). Lakovian metaphor theory proposes that there is a co-activation of neurons in the brain which deal with these concepts; the neurons which correspond to power and those which correspond to largeness and strength would both 'fire' when one conceives of power in this way, making a direct link to bodily experience (Gallese and Lakoff 2005).

In a crude way this can be seen in the metaphor *puffed up*, used to refer to someone with authority (however minor) making themselves physically larger by means of inflating their lungs and expanding their chest – rather like some birds and animals do – and in so doing making that direct link between the larger physical body and the exercise of power explicit:

> If ever there was a set of men <u>puffed up</u> with vanity – overcharged with the notion of their own importance – he would point his finger for an example at the political agents of the Indian government […]
> > Mr John Roebuck, *Parliamentary Debates (HC)* 8 February 1844 vol 72 c375

This explicit embodiment continues in the second metaphorical family of *Position,* below.

3.2 Position
Power is *upwards, elevated,* and *higher* – and the lack of power is *under:*

> The awful shadow of some unseen Power
> <u>Floats</u>, tho' unseen, amongst us.
> > Shelley, Percy Bysshe (2012[1816]). 'Hymn to Intellectual Beauty', in Donald H. Reiman, Neil Fraistat, and Nora Crook (eds.), *The Complete Poetry of Percy Bysshe Shelley*, vol 3*,* Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.

> […] saving the rare exceptions where rank or wealth command consideration, with what face, to use the native phrase, would a hapless Turk appeal to the <u>higher</u> powers, our ministers or our Parliament?
> > Burton, Richard F (1893). *Personal Narrative of a Pilgrimage to Al-Madinah and Meccah*. London: Tylston & Edwards. 50.

> The powerful, if they carry <u>oppression</u> beyond a certain point, necessarily end by making themselves *adored* by their slaves. For the thought of being <u>under</u> absolute compulsion, the plaything of another, is unendurable for a human being. Hence, if every way of escape from the constraint is taken from him, there is nothing left for him to do but to persuade himself that he does the things he is forced to do willingly, that is to say, to substitute *devotion* for *obedience* [...] It is by this twist that slavery <u>debases</u> the soul: this devotion is in fact based on a lie, since the reasons for it cannot bear investigation.
> > Weil, Simone (2002[1952]). *Gravity and Grace*. London: Routledge. 156-7.

> […] this morning I remembered that we have three by-elections pending in three marginal Scottish constituencies, as a result of the death of one member who was so surprised that his constituents re-elected him in spite of his corruption and dishonesty that he had a heart attack and died, and as a result of the <u>elevation</u> of two other members to the Lords on the formation of the new government. (*The Peerage and/or the heart attack*

are, of course, the two most usual rewards for a career of corruption and dishonesty–
Ed.)

> Lynn, Jonathan, and Antony Jay (1989). *The Complete Yes Minister*. London:
> BBC Books. 36.

Examples:

> *up, elevate, secure, higher, upper, sovereign* (aj 1388, 'High in position'), etc, supreme
> laws are *laid down, set down, placed,* etc

Continuing with embodiment, the idea of upwardness is perhaps one of the most well-known image schemas in the literature; *happy, health, more, good, virtue, rationality, status, life*, and more are all metaphorically embodied as *up* (see Johnson 1987 for details). In essence, those concepts which are culturally or physically constructed as positive are upwards, in a modification of the path-goal vertical schema – upwards is away from the perceiver, at the end of a path where a goal is located, and goals are axiomatically valuable and desirable (first discussed as a VERTICALITY IS A SOCIAL HIERARCHY metaphor, with different terminology, by Franz Dornseiff in 1954: 142-143).

3.3 Movement
Power is the ability to *guide, direct,* and *lead*:

> Ascend, I follow thee, safe guide, the path
> Thou lead'st me, and to the hand of heav'n submit.
>> Milton, John (1667; 1674). *Paradise Lost*, book XI, line 371.

> […] they forgot they had a country, to the development of whose vast resources, material and intellectual, if their vast united energies had been directed, there would be infinitely greater power, benefit, and honour, even to the ascendant party, than from the miserable monopolies and despicable domination for which they had been contending […]
>> Mr Dominick Browne, *Parliamentary Debates (HC)* 6 April 1846 vol 85 c621

> At the present time we have no power to direct industry. What we have got is authority to steer industry and influence it, and as far as we possibly can, we are endeavouring to steer industry into those areas where it is in the best national interest it should go […]
>> Mr Ellis Smith, *Parliamentary Debates (HC)* 18 December 1945 vol 417 c1255

> SIR HUMPHREY APPLEBY: Minister, a minister can do what he likes!
> RT HON JAMES HACKER: It's the people's will. I am their leader; I must follow them.
>> Lynn, Jonathan, and Antony Jay (1981). *Yes Minister* (16 March). Series 2, episode 4,
>> 'The Greasy Pole'. BBC.

Examples:

> *over, overcome, heading, usurp* (vt *a*1325–1622 rare + 1890, 'move people from a place/position/possession'), *hold, direct, convey, guide, revoke* (vt 1590–1644 'move/draw something backwards'), *ascendant, commanding* (aj 1703–1823 'impelling/driving'), *grip, hold, keep, take hold of, direct, director, misdirection, well-guided, steer, convoy* (Sc), *push, run, lead* (vt OE–1757, 'bring or take to a place'), *teach* (vt OE–*a*1500, 'lead back'), *lode* (n *c*1200–*a*1300, 'guiding/leading/showing the way'), *convoy* (vt 1513–1632 Scots + 1846 arch., 'accompany as a guide'), *conducting* (aj 1632–

, 'Guiding/leading/showing the way'), *direct* (vt 1632–, 'Direct one's course/steps, etc.'),
leader (n *a*1300–1548 also Scots + 1847– dial., 'Driver/operator of vehicle')

Furthering the braided overlapping of metaphor types found here, the *Direction* metaphor family makes explicit the goal-path structure which was implicitly underlying the up-is-a-goal image schema of the previous metaphor family (some concepts – such as *ascend* – also overlap with this family). The family of movement is somewhat less abstract, although it does retain image-schematic elements: in the literal sense, the person who has the ability to direct persons or things to one place or another has authority. This family, therefore, indicates what is described later in section 4 as symbolic instantiations, those situations where there is a metaphorical seeing-as relationship (seeing power as the ability to direct movement) which is also literal (power *is* the ability to direct movement), in contrast to 'classical' metaphors, which link conceptual domains otherwise disconnected apart from their metaphorical connection. Instead, *Direction* here has two connections to the domain of *Power*: one literal and one metaphorical.

3.4 Possession
Power is *had*; it is in a *grip*, in a *hold*, and is *wielded*:

He <u>hath</u> no power that <u>hath</u> not power to use.
> Bailey, Philip James (1839). 'A Visit'. *Festus.* London: William Pickering.

The first duty of such a governor was <u>hold</u> [*sic*] a <u>firm hand</u> over the Civil Service […]
> Mr Acton Ayrton, *Parliamentary Debates (HC)* 20 June 1861 vol 163 cc1333

But, possibly because of the peculiar genius of our Constitution, that continuity is a continuity which has been maintained under the control, and at times under the <u>hard grip</u>, of the State.
> Viscount Haldane, *Parliamentary Debates (HL)* 21 July 1913 vol 14 cc1130-1

Examples:

grip (n OE + 1450/70–, 'possession and power/clutches'), *wield* (n OE–1567, 'possession and control'), *hold* (n *c*1250–*c*1590, 'property held'), *lord* (n *a*1300–1697, 'landowner'), *master* (n *c*1400–1853, 'Possessor'), *command* (n 1642–, 'possession and control'), *monopoly* (n 1643– transf. & fig., 'exclusive possession')

Possession is somewhat more straightforward than *Direction*; the family shows the very common cognitive strategy of metaphorical reification in a prepositional sense. Once power is something which can be *had* and *held*, it can enter into the common metaphorical structures of containers (*hold on to power; wield power in an iron fist*, etc). As an extension of this, on the verges of the family, once power is a physical object, it can *flow* and *grow*:

That is sheer tyranny, and I hope that hon. Members will […] resolve, if not now, at any rate at some future time, to combine together to put an effective check on the <u>growing power</u> of the Executive and to set back the tide now <u>flowing with such overwhelming power</u>, and so make the House of Commons once again the home and citadel of free discussion

Lord Hugh Cecil, *Parliamentary Debates (HC)* 16 February 1911 vol 21 cc1314-5

One can be *in* and *out* of power – politicians especially – and if power can be *possessed* it can also be *taken*:

> This House and the country will have to face the fact that at all stages of history different groups have sought to <u>take power unto themselves</u>. If we have to deal with these <u>power forces</u>, as Henry VII and others throughout history dealt with them, it will be too bad.
> Mr John Pardoe, *Parliamentary Debates (HC)* 24 July 1974 vol 877 c1646

All of these metaphorical strategies, common enough that their types (CAUSES ARE FORCES, etc) are listed by Kövecses (2005: 35ff) as metaphorical universals. *Power* fits into these universals neatly and with ease.

3.5 Sight
Power is the ability to *oversee, inspect, look on:*

> Not to <u>oversee</u> Workmen, is to leave them your Purse open.
> Franklin, Benjamin (1758[1839]). 'Poor Richard's Almanack: The Way to Wealth', in *The Life and Miscellaneous Writings of Benjamin Franklin*. Edinburgh: Chambers.

> […] he proposed to carry his purpose into effect by applying the provisions of the act 3rd and 4th William 4th, ch. 90, making it compulsory on those parishes to light the roads according to the provisions of that act, and that the <u>inspectors</u> should be empowered to call on the <u>overseers</u> of the poor to make a rate for that purpose.
> Mr Peter Borthwick, *Parliamentary Debates (HC)* 14 April 1842 vol 62 c491

> The committee proposed the setting up of a statutory data protection authority with powers to <u>inspect</u> computer systems and to conduct <u>spot checks</u> to ensure that all personal data were handled with due regard for security and for accuracy […] Alas! those major recommendations have been ignored and, indeed, rejected in the Government's Bill.
> Sir Elwyn Jones, *Parliamentary Debates (HL)* 20 January 1983 vol 437 cc1538

Examples:

> *oversee, look on, advisement* (n 1330–1600, 'looking at/beholding'), *overseer* (n 1551–*a*1656, 'beholder/spectator'), *inspector, overlook* (n 1861–1884, 'place where view from a height obtained')

This metaphor family is an extension of *Possession* above, and carries on the reification phenomenon found there. Once authority and power are seen as physical items, they can also enter the realm of the senses – and when combined with POWER IS UP from the *Position* family, the *oversee, look on, overlook*, etc instances are easily derived. Lakoff (1987: 437), in a chapter concerned with the image schema of *over*, discusses the particular sense of *oversee* when compared with its conceptual reverse, *overlook* in the sense of 'ignore'; the *over* morpheme relies on two different image schemas in these two words, and Lakoff argues that there is a metonymy in the case of *oversee* of SEEING SOMETHING DONE STANDS FOR MAKING SURE THAT IT IS DONE. The core point of Lakoff's – that image schemas can explain the motivation, if not the etymology, of the differing

meanings of *over* in these compounds – is not significant here, but the metonymous relation he describes as an aside is an important insight to the *Sight* family of power metaphors.

One other key input is the SEEING IS TOUCHING metaphor, which is widely discussed in terms of its input as a primary metaphor, but which also carries with it the notion of having sight of a person being metaphorically akin to a violation of their physical personal space. The important point here is that personal space – 'a body-buffer zone […] that can be used for such protective purposes. This applies to threats to one's self-esteem as well as to the threat of bodily harm' (Dosey and Miesels 1969: 93) – is something which intrusion into implies a relationship either of control or of intimacy. To *inspect*, *oversee*, or *look on* a person with whom we are not in a personal relationship is to enter into their metaphorical personal space, and so exert upon them influence, and arouse in them 'stress conditions' (*ibid*).

3.6 Farming
Power involves *shepherding, taming, stabling*, and *reining in*:

> Found in the Fire, and foster'd in the Plains;
> A <u>Shepherd</u> and a King at once he reigns,
> And leads to Turnus Aid his Country Swains.
> Dryden, John (1697). *The works of Virgil containing his Pastorals, Georgics and Aeneis: adorn'd with a hundred sculptures*. London: Jacob Tonson. 428.

> In this Queen's Speech, there should have been effective proposals to <u>rein in</u> the tendency of Whitehall to regulate, plan and control, and to put a brake on the engine that drives the expansion of the burgeoning bureaucracy. However, to do that the Chancellor would have to admit that the culture of the open wallet and of total control have established themselves in Whitehall under this Government, and he will not do that.
> Mr Oliver Letwin, *Parliamentary Debates (HC)* 4 December 2003 vol 415 c677

> Walter Fowler was the Lobby Correspondent of the *Express* [a British newspaper]. This meant that he would probably have been their political editor or head of the paper's political staff. The Lobby was a uniquely British system, the best way yet devised in any democracy for <u>taming</u> and <u>muzzling</u> the press. This is because it is hard to censor the press when it wants to be free, but easy if it gives up its freedom voluntarily.
> Lynn, Jonathan, and Antony Jay (1989). *The Complete Yes Minister*. London: BBC Books. 209.

> At the time, the delegation attested that the Taiwanese Administration had no fears about reprisals from or action by the British Government. They must have felt that the British Government were a pretty <u>tame</u> animal. They must have thought that the British lion had had its <u>claws clipped</u> and its <u>teeth pulled</u> if they could take a parliamentary delegation round their factories and could openly and fraudulently broadcast the fact that they were copying British goods.
> Mr Barry Sheerman, *Parliamentary Debates (HC)* 19 December 1980 vol 996 c726

Examples:

shepherd, tame, stable, grip, lead, rein, master, steer, govern (vt 1572–1669, 'Cultivate plants/crops')

The *Farming* metaphor family bears all the hallmarks of transferred experience from the physical domain; from precise concept to precise concept, rather than via fundamental and more diffuse image-schematic phenomena. The exercise of political authority – commanding movement in a particular direction, coercing payments, tribute and taxes, waging war, commanding ideological allegiance – is fundamental to society, but it is also the activity of a minority in society, often disconnected from the activities of the majority. For speakers throughout the history of English who worked for a living and were ruled by a 'minority who lived off the labour of the majority' – that is, the 'peasantry', 'labourers', or 'working class', who are generally 'left out of history' (Harrison 1984: 13-15) – an everyday view of the exercise of power was not to be found at Court or Manor, but rather in the fields where they worked alongside domesticated and working animals. The *Farming* metaphor family therefore reflects the most immediately-perceived concrete exercise of authority experienced by the majority of people in the history of the language.

If not found in the early history and linguistic heritage of English, this metaphor is nonetheless evident and pervasive in many cultures; Psalm 23 (22 in the Septuagint numbering) of the Hebrew Tanakh and Christian Old Testament famously states that the Judeo-Christian god acts as a shepherd, and guides the faithful (this is also introduced earlier, for example in Genesis 49:24, as well as in the Christian New Testament). In earlier Babylonian mythology, in the legend of Etana the shepherd metaphor appears and is explicitly linked to kingship and divinity:

> Scepter, crown, tiara, and <u>shepherd's</u> crook
> Lay deposited before Anu in heaven
> There being no counseling for its people.
> (Then) kingship descended from heaven.
>   Pritchard, James B. (1969). *Ancient Near Eastern Texts Relating to the Old Testament*,
>   3rd edn. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 114.[4]

Agriculture and farming, as phenomena which involve an exercise of power as well as a metaphorical conceptualization of it, are therefore clearly connected to the abstract concept of authority through a long association, both temporal and divine.

This dual connection, whereby the invocation of one domain is a necessary condition for the exercise of another is what I here call an *instantiation metaphor*. This is a relatively straightforward subtype of metaphor, but one which has to my knowledge not been described before. Farming involves the exercise of power; they are not the same domain, but the concept of *Farming* has a somewhat generic relationship with the domain of *Power*, which exists alongside the metaphorical mapping between the two – Farming is a domain in its own right, but it is also an instance of the literal exercise of power, and hence is an instantiation.

This point also importantly links with the next and final major family under discussion – that of *Game*.

3.7 Game
Power is a *game*, where one *scores points*, has *trump cards*, and so on:

> Such was the mode in which, according to his learned Friend, the Solicitor-general, the

Court of Chancery, at a remote period, obtained its power of injunction. Could that <u>game</u> be <u>played</u> over again in these times? Surely it was more consistent with the justice, the dignity, and the character of that House, to legislate on the subject than to promulgate its authority merely by putting attornies, sheriffs, and bailiffs into prison […]
<div align="center">Sir Frederick Pollock, Parliamentary Debates (HC) 7 February 1840 vol 52 c37</div>

We on these benches do not believe in the decadence of Democracy. It is a <u>trump card</u> of the Fascist Powers that Democracy is decadent. we still believe that Democracy, imperfect it may be in its development and imperfect it may be in its expression, is still the dominating spiritual and intellectual force in the world […]
<div align="center">Mr Arthur Greenwood, Parliamentary Debates (HC) 4 April 1938 vol 334 c 42</div>

It must be appreciated that a political <u>game</u> is played here, sometimes, unfortunately, to the disadvantage of Scotland. When in opposition one moves Amendments to embarrass the Government, but when in power one resists exactly the same Amendments. Do not let us try to <u>score points</u> or party <u>advantage</u> which are not in the best interests of Scotland: I deprecate the whole atmosphere of Scottish debate, and of parliamentary debates generally, when they are based on a <u>game</u> of 'Let's pretend' I often think of the old saying, 'The more we change, the more we remain the same'.
<div align="center">Mr William Baxter, Parliamentary Debates (HC) 26 July 1965 vol 717 c125</div>

RT HON JAMES HACKER: Europe is a community of nations, dedicated towards <u>one goal</u>.
SIR HUMPHREY APPLEBY: Oh, ha ha ha.
HACKER: May we share the joke, Humphrey?
SIR HUMPHREY: Oh Minister, let's look at this objectively. It's a <u>game</u> played for national interests, and always was. Why do you suppose we went into it?
HACKER: To strengthen the brotherhood of free Western nations.
SIR HUMPHREY: Oh, really. We went in to screw the French by splitting them off from the Germans.
<div align="right">Lynn, Jonathan, and Antony Jay (1981). Yes Minister (23 March). Series 2, episode 5, 'The Devil You Know'. BBC.</div>

This attitude sees the United States and the Soviet Union as just as bad as each other; it dismisses super power rivalry as a futile <u>game</u>, which Britain and Europe should opt out of as quickly as possible: The leader of the Labour Party seemed to be subscribing to that view when he said, shortly after the last election, that the Soviet Union and the US presented 'an almost miserable equality of threat' to Britain.
<div align="center">Baroness Young, Parliamentary Debates (HL) 25 March 1987 vol 486 c201-2</div>

Examples:

> *play, point, score, trump* (vt 1598–), *leader* (n 1742, 'leader of specific [card] suit'), chess metonymies, *captain* (n 1823–, 'leader of side/club'), *power* (aj 1958–, 'other actions/types of play')

The earliest board game – *The Game of 20 Squares*, also known as the *Royal Game of Ur* – known is from 2600 BC, and over a hundred boards have been found in archaeological digs (Finkel 2008: 18).[5] Less formal small-scale games are harder to discover in antiquity, particularly if they used no physical pieces or repurposed existing items, and larger-scale games and sports are attested in all well-recorded ancient societies; the metaphor is not widely recorded in Old English textual sources, but this is much more

likely to be an effect of the nature of the early English corpus than a reversal of the apparently near-universal gaming in society. It is not too adventurous to conjecture, alongside limited archaeological evidence, that this metaphor family was securely present throughout the history of English and before.

In the broadest sense of metaphor – that one thing is 'seen as' another – the family of *Game* is clearly a metaphor for *Power*, on the evidence here. There are as many precise definitions of metaphor as there are books on the subject, and all generally amount to the simple seeing-as transfer of conceptual content and structure from one domain to another. The interesting challenge here is that of domain; if games are formalized social instantiations of power, is it wholly legitimate to consider *Game* a separate conceptual domain from that of *Power*? Alexander and Bramwell (2004: 12) distinguish metaphor from *hyperosemy*, where some domains – in that article, *Mapping Metaphor* categories – are generic abstractions above human scale that act as generic antecedents of other domains. The example we give in that article is that the domain of *Sufficient quantity* is a generic abstraction of the domain of *Wealth* (wealth being a sufficient quantity of money), rather than being metaphorical, an instantiation metaphor (which does not involve abstraction relationships), or to be discarded as 'noise'. *Game* could perhaps be thought of as hyperosemous to *Power*, although this is a difficult argument to make as it would be predicated on the idea that speakers do not consider this a metaphor, and it would place *Power*, a core concept across the history of English, in the same category as diffuse abstractions as *Sufficient quantity*. It would be very difficult, if not perverse, to read the Baxter or *Yes Minister* quotes above and argue they are not metaphorical, however the nature of the linked domains. Similarly, *Power* absolutely shows none of the hallmarks of being an abstraction operating above the level of normal human experience.

Absent a psycholinguistic study of the general perceptual content of that situation (in order to address the question of how much the domain of *Game* has independent structure and content from *Power* – introspection may suggest that it does), I propose that the *Game* family forms a separate type of metaphor, the *symbolic instantiation* (see 4 below). This sits on the edge of the instantiation category, somewhere between 'classical' metaphor and hyperosemy.

3.8 Overall
Overall, some metafamilies can also be identified in the overall shape of the data. The first three families share a core of embodied image-schematic basicness; the concepts of *bigger, upwards*, and *moving*, all universal concepts rooted in bodily experience. The

second two are focused on many metaphors identified in the early stages of cognitive linguistics; they operate on the concretization of an abstract concept as a non-specific physical object, spanning the abstract/concrete divide. *Farming* then inhabits a space of overlap between the fifth and seventh families, firstly classically linking the physical and social worlds and secondly being an instantiation metaphor of *Power*. Finally, another instantiation of a different type is that of *Game*, discussed in more detail below.

4 Symbolic Instantiations
Common metaphors discussed in the literature – STATES ARE CONTAINERS, EMOTIONS ARE FORCES, LIFE IS A JOURNEY – all involve disconnected domains. There is, crudely speaking, no plausible cognitive connection between *Life* and *Journey* other than the metaphorical; while the connection operates within the mapping constraints of image schemas, basic correlations, and culture-dependent evaluations (Ungerer and Schmid 2006: 120, 160), which rely on co-found structure, there is no content similarity. When the domains are connected enough that they could plausibly be a single domain, the phenomenon of metonymy comes into play. However, the rather more plastic confluence between metaphor, metonymy and hyperosemy, with a far greater volume of correlations beyond the 'basic correlations' normally studied, has been described above as an *instantiation metaphor*. Within this concept, the more complex connection between *Game* and *Power* is a subtype of this, which I call a *symbolic instantiation*.

　　The key aspect of this subtype is that the metaphorical connection *symbolically* enacts the relationship between the two domains, where symbolism here cannot be conflated with the concept of iconicity in cognitive linguistics. Following Kenneth Burke's work into the sociology of ideology, culminating in his key 1966 book *Language As Symbolic Action*, the consideration of metaphors in the areas of magic, ritual, history, games, and religion are likely to be best considered as symbolic instantiations. Games are not themselves power, and they are not quite just a way of understanding the concept *Power* through analogy, but rather they have been deliberately created by society in order that people cannot just comprehend power, but *enact* and *experience* it. In this way they are different from *Farming*, wherein while power exists by way of its nature, the exercise of that power is a requirement for a goal, rather than a main purpose in its own right. Similarly, the situations of historical enactment, dramatic performance, religious and culturally-magic ritual, or psychiatric treatment have similar status as symbolic instantiations which sit between the distance of metaphor and the intimacy of metonymy; they are not seemingly disparate in the way metaphorical domains classically should be, and yet it would be incorrect to assume they are similar to those metaphors which reconcile divergent conceptual structure and content. They rely on the embodiment of metaphor to enact a link between their domains – and so they *are* the embodiment of a domain – all while being in a more intimate relationship than the typical metaphorical domains.

5 Conclusion
One of the great virtues of the *Mapping Metaphor* project is its inclusiveness; by its very nature, it requires resolute attention to be paid to areas of conceptual mapping which have previously been ignored, skimmed, or not given attention equal to its neighbours. As a

consequence, as a researcher I often find there are phenomena which can be described under the umbrella of metaphor but which are substantially different when one comes to examine the data in detail and in context. In fact, when using the *Mapping Metaphor* data amongst other sources of empirical data, bearing in mind there is no such thing as a metaphor out of context, we are normally faced with a range of connections which can be broadly categorized as metaphor under the transference or 'seeing-as' definition but which exhibit distinctly different situations and connections. Over and over again the briefest examination of *Mapping Metaphor* hints to us that metaphor, as with other aspects of linguistics, is perhaps best seen as a form of Wittgensteinian Familienähnlichkeiten, or family resemblance, sharing a chain of non-universal common features just as 'the strength of the thread does not reside in the fact that some one fibre runs through its whole length, but in the overlapping of many fibres' (Wittgenstein 2001 [1945]: 28).

This is particularly prevalent in the varieties of metaphor style found in the *Power* category, unsurprisingly, given that power itself is a key focus of the social lexicon and the experience of society. *Games*, tokenistic representations of power which symbolically instantiate power relationships through deliberate design, exhibit a metaphorical relationship by the means of transferring the attributes of power onto countable physical phenomena designed for the sole purpose of that transfer: trump cards, coins, Monopoly houses, pawns on a chessboard, and so on. The *Position* image schema of POWER IS UP, conversely, does not rely on any such instantiations as *Game* does, but rather, alongside *Large/strong* attributes to power an overarching embodiment shared at the very foundations of human conception; over and over again, the natures of upwardness and largeness are transferred almost by default across many domains. *Possession* and *Sight* focus on the conceptualization of an abstract concept as a non-specific physical object, a well-discussed classical metaphorical phenomenon which often centres in English around the preposition system. The *Farming* metaphor family displays a key relationship between the everyday lives of English speakers across history and their abstract concepts of social bonds and ties, and is an ideal example of links between pre-existing concepts in order to increase understanding. The lexically-weaker literary metaphors not discussed here, such as the well-known KNOWLEDGE IS POWER, show inventive metaphorical connections, often for the creation of *ostranenie*, the Russian Formalist term for an aesthetic estrangement desired as the result of style. These phenomena have similar origins, but like all linguistic phenomena they span different intents, different effects, and different surface features.

In each of these, a separate strand of the Familienähnlichkeiten of metaphor is shown; it is clear from analyses here and elsewhere in this volume that there is a strong case that the best advances we can make in metaphor theory will be when we divide these metaphorical connections up into their component and constituent parts – the fibres of the common thread – and so understand, interpret, and analyse each as separate phenomena linked by their common mapping. This chapter has aimed to demonstrate some of these separate phenomena in the area of *Power*. For the future, there can be no better place to begin to understand the complex and multifarious nature of the phenomena we currently compress under the title *metaphor* than the *Mapping Metaphor* data.

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[1] This concept of unmarkedness was first described by Jakobson 1932[1971]: 3-4.

[2] There is the root *dher-*, which results in both *farm* and *throne* in English, but its etymological history is twisted and ultimately not metaphorical.

[3] Gen 13:14-15, Num 27:12-13. See also Avrahami 2011: 150.

[4] See also Langdon, Stephen (1931). 'The Legend of Etana and the Eagle', *Babyloniaca* 12:s 1-56.

[5] Finkel 2005, a less scholarly work than the 2007 volume, is very highly recommended in order to experience some of these early games.