1. Introduction

Of the two portraits of Francis Hutcheson that hang in Glasgow University’s Hunterian Art Gallery one was painted by Allan Ramsay sometime during the period 1745–1746. The other, to a significant extent a copy of the first, and probably painted during the same period, was from the studio of Ramsay. It is however uncertain whether many (if any) of the brush strokes in the later portrait were Ramsay’s.\(^1\) In that portrait, though not in the earlier one, Hutcheson holds a copy of Cicero’s *De finibus bonorum et malorum*, a text in which Cicero provides a detailed exposition, accompanied by critique, of Stoicism, Epicureanism and the philosophy of the Academy, the three schools of philosophy that were most prominent in Cicero’s own day. The book that Hutcheson holds is surely no casual prop in this carefully staged performance here portrayed; it must have been chosen to represent the philosophical tradition within which Hutcheson saw himself as rooted. And while it is not from the *De finibus* that Hutcheson takes the lengthy passage we find on the title page of his first and most important book, *An Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue*,\(^2\) the passage quoted in that most conspicuous position is from a Ciceronian work very closely related to the *De finibus*, namely the *De officiis*:

And as regards the things sensed by sight, no animal other than man senses their beauty and elegance, and the harmony of the

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\(^1\) For comment on the two portraits in the Hunterian Art Gallery, Glasgow University, see Mungo Campbell (ed.), *Allan Ramsay: Portraits of the Enlightenment* (Munich, 2013), 19–22. My thanks to Mungo Campbell and Anne Dulau for discussion of the portraits.

parts of those visible things; while by nature and reason, man, transferring these qualities from the eye to the mind, considers that beauty, consistency, and order should much more be preserved in our purposes and deeds. From these elements that which is moral (*honestum*), which is the object of our inquiry, is composed and created; and even if this be not ranked among the noble, it is nevertheless moral (*honestum*) and, even if no one praise it, by its nature it is worthy of praise. You perceive indeed the very form and, so to say, the face of the moral (*faciem honesti*), which, were it seen by the eyes, would produce a wondrous love of wisdom.

This quotation explains the order of the two treatises that constitute Hutcheson’s *Inquiry*, the first treatise being on beauty and the second on virtue. For Cicero first refers to our sense of beauty, elegance and harmony in the visible world, then to their analogues in the world of spirit, and finally he notes that moral goodness (*honestum*) is ‘composed and created’ (*conflatur et efficietur*) from the spiritual analogues of visible beauty, elegance and harmony. On this account, the beautiful and the moral are very similar and in some respects identical, and when, as happens from time to time, Hutcheson speaks of the beauty or loveliness of virtue, he is fully in harmony with the position that Cicero presents in the *De officiis*.

In section two of this paper I shall highlight the formidable closeness of beauty and virtue that emerges from Hutcheson’s analysis. Then, in the third section, I shall focus on a very different way in which he represents their relationship, a way directly linked to a cosmic moment in the Scottish Enlightenment. To help us get our bearings permit me first to indicate the territory that I shall be occupying in the third section. Regarding the second of the aforementioned portraits of Hutcheson, it represents a professor of moral philosophy, garbed in what appears to be the gown of Glasgow University’s dean of faculties, and displaying

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3 At this point Hutcheson omits a sentence in Cicero’s text: ‘and he is watchful lest he do anything unseemly or effeminate, and watchful too in all his judgments and actions lest he either do or think anything licentious (cave quod indecorum effeminatum faciat tum in omnibus et opinionibus et factis ne quid licitius aut faciat aut cogitat).’

4 The translation is mine. The Latin passage that Hutcheson quotes is in Cicero, *De officiis*, bk. 1, ch. 4. Hutcheson’s transcription is incomplete. The longest and most significant passage that is omitted is reproduced in footnote 3 above.

5 However, aside from this portrait no evidence has yet come to light that supports the claim that Hutcheson was ever dean of faculties.
Francis Hutcheson, George Turnbull and the Intersection of Aesthetics and Morals

one of the great writings of the Roman Republic on the question on how a life should be lived; and he is portrayed as exercising the art of rhetoric, for he is in lecturing mode, his subject being that most practical of issues: how one should live. Hutcheson was indeed a highly skilled orator, a fact highlighted by one of his students, Alexander Carlyle:

As his [Hutcheson’s] elocution was good, and his voice and manner pleasing, he raised the attention of his hearers at all times; and when the subject led him to explain and enforce the moral virtues and duties, he displayed a fervent and persuasive eloquence which was irresistible.6

The portrait is therefore a fitting symbol of that singular event when Francis Hutcheson and David Hume in effect disagreed on the question of the role of the moral philosophy professor.7 In brief, Hutcheson had an answer to this question which would naturally incline him to the opinion that Hume was ill-fitted for the role of moral philosophy professor. I shall be discussing their disagreement, while at the same time noting the support for Hutcheson’s position that is to be inferred from the writings of Hutcheson’s contemporary, George Turnbull, sometime regent in Arts at Marischal College, Aberdeen, and author of one of the most interesting works on aesthetics to have been produced during the Scottish Enlightenment.

2. Some ways in which our ideas of beauty and virtue are alike

Explicitly or otherwise, Hutcheson indicates at least three respects in which our ideas of beauty and virtue are alike.

First, perceptions of beauty and of virtue are products of our faculties, one of them a faculty of inner sense and the other a faculty of moral sense, and these faculties are constituents of ‘the frame of our nature’. Our earliest perceptions of things as beautiful and as virtuous

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6 Alexander Carlyle, Autobiography of the Rev. Dr. Alexander Carlyle, Minister of Inveresk (Edinburgh, 1860, 2nd edn), 70.
7 It may be conjectured that the disagreement between Hutcheson and Hume created the opportunity for the earlier of the two Ramsay portraits of Hutcheson. For it could have been painted in Ramsay’s studio while Hutcheson was in the capital seeking to persuade town councillors and others to reject Hume’s application.
are accomplished by a natural necessity, and thus without the intervention of either an act of discursive reason or an act of will. These earliest perceptions are of course by their nature uncultivated, but they are none the less in place and available for cultivation. Hutcheson has a good deal to say both about the naturalness of our perceptions of beauty and virtue and also about the integral or concomitant element of pleasure that wells up by nature when we perceive beautiful things and virtuous acts. Something of this line of thought is visible in his affirmation that: ‘from the very Frame of our Nature we are determin’d to perceive Pleasure in the practice of Virtue, and to approve it when practis’d by our selves, or others.’ And without resiling from the doctrine that there is a rational element, even a very large rational element, in aesthetic and moral perception, he does seem to downplay reason’s role when he writes:

But must a man have the Reflection of Cumberland, or Puffendorf, to admire Generosity, Faith, Humanity, Gratitude? Or reason so nicely to apprehend the Evil in Cruelty, Treachery, Ingratitude? Do not the former excite our Admiration, and Love, and Study of Imitation, wherever we see them, almost at first View, without any such Reflection; and the latter, our Hatred, Contempt, and Abhorrence?

Hutcheson’s curious phrase ‘study of imitation’ that he uses here requires comment because of the part that it plays in the larger picture that Hutcheson paints. The Latin term ‘studium’ signifies, among other things, zeal or enthusiasm, and in eighteenth-century English the term ‘study’ also signifies zeal and enthusiasm as well as signifying study in the usual modern sense of the term. By our nature we respond to a generous or humane act not only, as Hutcheson says, with admiration and love, but also with a ‘study of imitation’, that is, an enthusiastic desire to imitate such behaviour. This interpretation is supported by the fact that Hutcheson here contrasts ‘study’ with ‘reflection’, though ‘study’, in the usual modern sense of the term, is clearly a reflective activity. ‘Study of imitation’, as I have interpreted the phrase, will have a significant role in my interpretation of Hutcheson’s criticism of Hume.

8 Hutcheson, Inquiry, 110.
9 Ibid., 94.
Secondly, the ideas of both beauty and virtue are inseparable from the idea of disinterest (as contrasted with self-interest). Regarding the perception of virtue, Hutcheson’s doctrine that benevolence is the moral motive – I think the sole moral motive – depends on his conceptual point that an agent acts benevolently in willing jointly (1) the happiness of another person and (2) the other’s happiness for the sake of the other and not for the sake of the agent himself. This is not to exclude the possibility that the agent who wills benevolently also has a self-interested motive for performing that same act. The point is that if, having both a benevolent motive and also a self-interested motive, the agent would not have performed the act if the benevolent motive had not been in place, then the act is virtuous because the performance of the act is not determined by the presence of the self-interested motive.

As regards the parallel point relating to disinterest and the perception of beauty, Hutcheson has a good deal to say that is highly consonant with the Lockean doctrine that our power of association of ideas is a cause of corruption, and in particular Hutcheson focuses on our power of association of ideas as cause of corruption of our perceptions of beauty no less than of virtue. In that context he presents a prominent case for the claim that our ownership of certain objects poses a threat to our ability to make sound aesthetic judgments about those objects. He discusses the connoisseur who derives pleasure from his ownership of an object, and whose pleasure at ownership becomes so entwined with his pleasure at the sight of the beautiful object that what he takes to be an unadulterated aesthetic perception of the object is in fact a perception adulterated by its association with his ownership. The outcome is that a connoisseur of art may no more be capable of a disinterested perception of an objet d’art than is a miser who has, in Hutcheson’s words: ‘all Ideas of Good, of Worth, and Importance in Life confounded with his Coffers’.

Thirdly, though Hutcheson emphasises the fact that our inner sense and moral sense are parts of the original frame of our nature, parts which can deliver up aesthetic and moral perceptions without the

10 Ibid., 103.
11 Ibid., 103–4.
exercise of either our will or our discursive reason, he none the less ascribes an immense role to reason in the task of reaching aesthetic and moral judgments, not reaching them tout court but reaching better ones after starting from ones that we believe to be contestable. In short, Hutcheson believes both that as regards aesthetics and morals we are all on a learning curve, and also that reason is an invaluable means to propel us along the curve. It is an invaluable means because, as regards our perceptions aesthetic and moral, we are led into error by our unfortunate tendency to associate with our aesthetic and moral ideas other ideas that are inappropriately associated with them, and reason helps us both to identify inappropriate associations that we have made, and also suggests means to nullify the damage that the associations have done.

Regarding the similarity of beauty and virtue, there are further lines of investigation that could be explored, for example those relating to the fact mentioned earlier that aesthetic and moral perceptions include or give rise to perceptions of pleasure that are by no means accidentally related to the perceptions of beauty and virtue. But enough has been said to show that formally aesthetic and moral perceptions are close. Of course one should not leap to the conclusion that they are simply identical, for the beauty of an object is declared to be a function of its uniformity amidst diversity whereas our assessment of the moral value (bonestum) of an act depends on whether we judge the agent to be acting benevolently. But there is none the less a single, rather thick concept under which aesthetic and moral perceptions can be brought. Arguably far more unites than divides those two sorts of perception, and indeed given that Hutcheson speaks of the beauty or loveliness of virtue, he surely believes virtuous dispositions and virtuous acts to be characterised by a certain kind of uniformity amidst diversity.

Having noted these ways in which Hutcheson brings our aesthetic and moral perceptions under a unifying concept, I shall now turn to a consideration of a further way in which he links beauty and morality.

3. Hutcheson, Turnbull and Hume: warmth in the cause of virtue

In January 1739 David Hume published books 1 and 2 of *A Treatise of Human Nature*. At a date unknown, but it must have been in 1739, he sent a draft of book 3 to Hutcheson who duly replied. The reply seems
Francis Hutcheson, George Turnbull and the Intersection of Aesthetics and Morals

not to be extant, though we do know something of its content from
Hume’s own response to Hutcheson’s letter. Hume writes:

What affected me most in your Remarks is your observing, that
there wants a certain Warmth in the Cause of Virtue, which, you
think, all good Men wou’d relish, & cou’d not displease amidst
abstract Enquiries. I must own, this has not happen’d by Chance,
but is the Effect of a Reasoning either good or bad. There are
different ways of examining the Mind as well as the Body. One
may consider it either as an Anatomist or as a Painter; either to
discover its most secret Springs & Principles or to describe the
Grace & Beauty of its Actions.13

The implication of this response is that Hutcheson had found fault
with book 3 of the Treatise because of Hume’s failure to promote, or
to motivate people towards, virtue. Hume’s response, that there is more
than one way to be a moral philosopher and that one is to be a painter
and another is to be an anatomist, involves the deployment of two reso-
nant figures of speech, to which he returns in the Enquiry Concerning
Human Understanding, where he notes the importance of the anatomist’s
way while not at all decrying the painter’s. Far from it, for he points out
in the Enquiry, as he does also in his letter to Hutcheson, that the painter
is all the better as a painter for knowing what the anatomist teaches:

The anatomist presents to the eye the most hideous and disa-
greeable objects; but his science is useful to the painter in deline-
ating even a Venus or an Helen. While the latter [the painter] em-
loys all the richest colours of his art, and gives his figures
the most graceful and engaging airs; he must still carry his atten-
tion to the inward structure of the human body ... Accuracy
is, in every case, advantageous to beauty, and just reasoning to
delicate sentiment.14

I should say in passing that it is hard to see what Hutcheson would

1, 32.
14 David Hume, Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of
or even could object to in this distinction of Hume’s, since Hutcheson himself was no less an anatomist in his moral philosophy than Hume was, no less sensitive than Hume to the fact that just reasoning can supply support for the exercise of delicate sentiment. But Hutcheson’s objection was not to Hume’s being an anatomist of virtue; it was to Hume’s ‘want of warmth in the cause of virtue’ in a book in which such warmth might reasonably have been expected. My main concern here however is to note the fact that, in his responses to Hutcheson, both in the letter of 1739 and in the first Enquiry Hume is acknowledging the existence of a discourse, which he knew to be central to Hutcheson’s thinking, in which virtue is conceptualised as a kind of beauty; and in which it is recognised that just as we are by our nature attracted to beauty so also are we therefore attracted to virtue, with an implication that part of the moral philosopher’s task is to win people to virtue by displaying or representing virtue in all its beauty.

By the time Hume was writing about the moral philosopher in so far as he is, metaphorically speaking, a painter, the idea of morality as having an aesthetic dimension was already at home in the Scottish Enlightenment, not only through the work of Hutcheson, but also through Hutcheson’s considerable hinterland, which included Shaftesbury’s writings and Addison’s essays in the Spectator on the pleasures of the imagination, while these various writings themselves reached back to classical philosophers, including Cicero, whose ideas on the beauty of virtue were part of the stock in trade of the Enlightenment scholar. So the disagreement between Hutcheson and Hume is locatable within an already richly endowed discourse.

Though Hume was speaking figuratively, a question might yet be raised whether one way to be a moral philosopher might be to be a painter in a non-figurative sense. It may be conjectured that Allan Ramsay was being a moral philosopher of the kind here at issue when he painted Hutcheson, tranquil, kindly, and with an open, honest gaze. In support of this approach I wish to note the judgment of George Turnbull. Book 3 of Hume’s Treatise was published in November 1740 and shortly before, in that same year, George Turnbull published A Treatise on Ancient Painting in which he argued that one way to be a moral philosopher is to be a painter in the literal sense of the term. So far as Turnbull is known at all today this is principally because he was the teacher of Thomas Reid.
at Marischal College, Aberdeen, for at least two of the years between 1723 and 1726. I should like here to take seriously some thoughts that he presents in his *Treatise on Ancient Painting* on the subject of the moral philosopher as painter in the literal sense of the term. I shall also deploy insights that we find in Turnbull’s *Principles of Moral and Christian Philosophy* likewise published in 1740 and in his *Observations upon Liberal Education, in all its Branches*, published in 1742.\(^\text{16}\) My comments are intended to locate Turnbull in relation to the Hutcheson/Hume disagreement.

Turnbull’s *Treatise on Ancient Painting* is as much a treatise on the liberal arts as it is on ancient painting. He does have something to say about ancient paintings, but the focus of the *Treatise* is on the fact that many leaders of society send their sons on the Grand Tour, and he raises a particular question regarding the purpose of Grand Touring – a question he must have pondered often in a professional capacity, for after resigning from his regency at Marischal College in 1727 Turnbull spent most of his time until 1743 as a private tutor, traveling with his tutees in the Low Countries, France, Germany and Italy.

His reply to the question about the purpose of the Grand Tour is that it is to facilitate the Grand Tourist’s education, where the education is so slanted as to help prepare him for civic leadership; and the chief thesis of the book is that an appreciation of paintings can facilitate this educative activity. The youthful Grand Tourist, we learn, should be accompanied by a tutor whose main purpose is to deliver this education, and who has, amongst tasks constitutive of his role, that of using paintings as a means to instil in his young tutee knowledge of human nature, manners, virtue,


and the public good.¹⁷ The ancients, we are reminded, used paintings as teaching aids for the promotion of virtue and, in Turnbull’s opinion, we could hardly do better than imitate them in this matter. In order that the reader should have some idea of what ancient paintings looked like, the *Treatise on Ancient Painting* ends with a set of fifty four plates, some of which were based on drawings by Camillo Paderni, plates acquired by Turnbull partly through the services of Allan Ramsay.¹⁸

Regarding Turnbull’s reply to the question of the purpose of the Grand Tour, he is not claiming that the study of painting would be sufficient to instil qualities required for civic leadership – such a claim would be unbelievable – but rather that in the context of a properly delivered liberal education the Grand Tourist’s study of painting would provide considerable added value. The very fact of travelling can deliver up huge benefits. Turnbull reminds us that often when the ancients journeyed abroad they took the opportunity to observe and reflect on the various governments, laws, customs and policies, they met with, and to observe also the consequences of these things for the happiness or misery of the inhabitants of the countries in which they were journeying, all this with a view to bringing the benefits of this knowledge to their home countries.

Among the things they observed en route were examples of the visual arts. Some ancient philosophers judged certain works of visual art to be impactful in a very practical way. Turnbull reports that the philosophers spoke of the fitness of the visual arts:

to teach human Nature; to display the Beauties of Virtue and the Turpitude of Vice; and to convey the most profitable Instructions into the Mind in the most agreeable Manner. Accordingly they employ’d [the visual arts] to that noble Purpose, frequently taking the Subjects of their moral Lessons from Paintings and Sculptures with which public Porticoes at Athens, where the Philosophers taught, were adorned.¹⁹

¹⁸ Though the plates possibly convey some remote idea of what the originals looked like, they surely do not in the least convey what was, for Turnbull, the most important thing about them, namely their impactfulness. Their presence in the book is in any case puzzling given that, with a couple of exceptions, they do not figure in Turnbull’s discussion.
Francis Hutcheson, George Turnbull and the Intersection of Aesthetics and Morals

The reference to the porticoes, the *stoa*, of Athens is clearly meant to put us in mind of a particular philosophical school where paintings were used to instil the beauty of virtue and the turpitude of vice, though Turnbull was aware that it was not only the Stoics who were using such teaching aids. Socrates is also recorded as having lectured on human nature to painters and sculptors, and, reports Turnbull: ‘often making use of those Arts, for instructing the Youth in Virtue, correcting their Manners, and giving them just Notions of moral Beauty.’

An art form can be considered in isolation and it can be considered in conjunction with another art form. This distinction prompts Turnbull to note the fact that art forms do in fact often occur in combination, and when in combination they are often mutually supportive or confirmatory. Especially he writes of painting and poetry as strengthening each other in their effectiveness at forming moral character. So in considering the education of the youthful Grand Tourist we are to think not of the impact that a painting has by itself, but of the impact it has on someone who has literary knowledge as well, someone who has, for example, learned from his reading of Homer the story of resolution, courage or cowardice that is represented in the painting he is looking at, and who is the more responsive to the painting because of its association in his mind with the powerful verses. By the same token his antecedent knowledge of the painting might enhance his response to the verses. Under the guidance of a tutor the two art forms can become jointly a powerful force for persuasion.

Whether the story being represented by the painter is factual or fictional does not greatly matter; the crucial point is that virtue should be represented in such a way as to secure the spectator’s moral approval. As regards the foregoing distinction between fact and fiction, the point may be put in terms of a comparison between landscapes and narrative paintings. A painter may paint a landscape that is a product of his imagination, in the sense that he has never seen a single landscape which his painting accurately represents. So in a sense the painting is a fictional work. Yet all the same it may be believable, and this because even if the cloudscape, the quality of light, the kind of plant-life present, the windswept look of the vegetation, and so on, have not previously been seen in precisely this configuration, they nevertheless form a unity that is consist-

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20 Ibid., 14.
ent with the laws of nature. Hence, though the painting is perhaps false at the level of the individual it is true at the level of the universal. Indeed, on this basis paintings could be used to give lessons in natural philosophy. The pictures become, in a favoured phrase of Turnbull’s, ‘samples and experiments’ of laws of nature;\(^2\) they represent universal natural law contracted, as Duns Scotus would say, to the level of the individual.

From the point of view of giving and receiving an education, the conveyance of universal truth can count for no less than the conveyance of individual truth, and it may count for more because knowledge of the universal can be deployed as a universal major premiss in a syllogism that allows extrapolation to an indefinite number of cases falling under that universal. Knowledge of universal truths about nature means that we must have an idea of what to expect or at least of what not to be surprised at.

Turnbull believes that a similar account can be given of narrative painting, painting of such a kind as to be no less ‘samples and experiments’ than well-painted landscapes are, though in the case of the narrative paintings they are samples and experiments useful for educating people about human nature and moral philosophy. Turnbull affirms:

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\text{Moral pictures, as well as moral poems, are indeed mirrors in which we may view our inward features and complexions, our tempers and disposition, and the various workings of our affections. 'Tis true, the painter only represents outward features, gestures, airs, and attitudes; but do not these, by an universal language, mark the different affections and dispositions of the mind?}\]

The reference in this context to ‘universal language’ reminds us of Turnbull’s rather wide sense of the term ‘language’, namely ‘the various manners of making truths understood and felt’.\(^2\) This account of language is offered, not in his Treatise on Ancient Painting but in his Observations upon Liberal Education. Nevertheless the account works perfectly in respect of the Treatise, as might be expected given that in

\(^2\) Turnbull also uses the terms ‘sample’ and ‘experiment’ of Christ’s miracles, certain of which may be ‘proper samples or experiments of the powers, or knowledge claimed’ by Christ’s assertions regarding a future state. See Stewart, ‘George Turnbull and educational reform’, 99.

\(^2\) Turnbull, Treatise, 147.

\(^3\) Turnbull, Observations, 382.
the Observations Turnbull includes under the heading ‘language’ the arts of sculpture and painting. Part of his intention is to mark the fact that certain paintings not only speak, in a figurative sense, of virtues and vices, by displaying people engaged in acts that embody moral values, but speak in such a manner as to motivate acquisition of the virtues and rejection of the vices. In this context Turnbull reminds us that in Athens the statues, paintings and monuments of the city’s soldiers: ‘conduced exceedingly to enhance the merit of their valour, and of the services they rendered to their country, and to inspire the spectators with emulation and courage, and thus to cultivate and perpetuate a spirit of bravery and public zeal in the people...’

The paintings at issue are therefore being regarded as pieces of rhetoric, not simply as accounts of virtues but as exercises in the promotion of virtue and the denigration of vice. The Grand-Touring tutor is to use as teaching aids those pictures in which the painter is warm in the cause of virtue.

It is appropriate to recall here Turnbull’s reference to Socrates ‘frequently giving lessons to painters on the knowledge of human nature, that is requisite, in order to imitate Manners, and giving them just notions of moral Beauty’. On the basis of this and other passages it seems plausible to suppose that Turnbull believes that the painter of paintings helpful to the Grand Tourist must himself be not only a painter of, but also an anatomist of virtue, a painter therefore who is also a rounded moral philosopher, knowledgeable about the nature of virtue and warm in its cause. For Turnbull the paintings on which the tutor should focus are moral philosophical texts, insightful about morality and effective as pieces of rhetoric, in the Platonic sense of ‘rhetoric’, that is, ‘the art of persuasion by speech’.

I conclude that, as regards the disagreement between Hutcheson and Hume, Turnbull is on the side of Hutcheson. The fact that the Turnbullian moral philosophy texts are paintings does not affect the point. Whether using one language or another, whether English or painting, the moral philosophy expounded in the text should be not only well argued but presented in such a way as to educate the reader or spectator into a virtuous way of life. I acknowledge that Turnbull admires Hutcheson the anatomist no less than he does Hutcheson

24 Ibid., 399.
the painter, an acknowledgement surely sanctioned by Turnbull's description of Hutcheson as ‘one whom I think not inferior to any modern writer on morals in accuracy and perspicuity, but rather superior to almost all.’ But it is particularly in respect of the painter’s warmth in the cause of virtue that the rhetorical dimension of painting comes into its own as a contribution to the preparation of the Grand Tourist for the noble role of civic leadership that awaits him.

I return finally to my point of departure, the fact that the passage from Cicero’s De officiis that appears on the title page of Hutcheson’s Inquiry contains a justification for the order of the two treatises in the Inquiry. It is out of aesthetic properties, such as beauty, elegance and harmony, that moral goodness is composed and created, a claim that surely permits us to ascribe a certain kind of primacy to aesthetic properties on the basis of a primacy of dependence. In the absence of aesthetic qualities, there cannot be morally good acts. Nevertheless, in his account of the role or, dare I say, the officium, of the moral philosophy professor, the painting that the professor is required to do – his bright, lively, ingratiating and seductive account of the virtues, and the darkly hued, sinister, threatening and disturbing account of the vices – all this mastery of verbal painting is for the sake of moral virtue. In short, these painterly devices, emerging as rhetorical figures and other tricks-of-the trade of a silver-tongued orator, are at the service of the honestum. In that sense, we are dealing here not with the order of primacy in which matter precedes form, but the order of primacy in which an end precedes its means. The end here is the promotion of virtue, and the means is, or at least includes, the practice of the orator. There is no contradiction here; just two sorts of primacy.

In conclusion, for Hutcheson the aesthetic and the moral can be prised apart in the course of an analytic exercise, and indeed this is something that Hutcheson himself accomplishes when he analyses beauty in terms of unity amidst diversity and analyses moral motivation in terms of benevolence. But he believes that the loveliness of a moral act is not a mere accident supervenient upon the act, any more than the morality of a lovely act is accidental to it. If it is out of aesthetic properties that a moral act is composed and created, then where there is a moral act there also are aesthetic properties; and an act characterised

26 Turnbull, Principles, 14.
by beauty, consistency and order will be moral. In short, Hutcheson’s moral theory is essentially aesthetic.

University of Glasgow