Driesen, B., Lombardi, M. and Peters, H. (2016) Feasible sets, comparative risk aversion, and comparative uncertainty aversion in bargaining. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 67, pp. 162-170. (doi: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2016.06.003)
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Abstract
We study feasible sets of the bargaining problem under two different as- sumptions: the players are subjective expected utility maximizers or the players are Choquet expected utility maximizers. For the latter case, we consider the effects on bargaining solutions when players become more risk averse and when they become more uncertainty averse.
| Item Type: | Articles |
|---|---|
| Status: | Published |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: | Driesen, Dr Bram and Lombardi, Dr Michele |
| Authors: | Driesen, B., Lombardi, M., and Peters, H. |
| College/School: | College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics |
| Journal Name: | Journal of Mathematical Economics |
| Publisher: | Elsevier |
| ISSN: | 0304-4068 |
| Published Online: | 30 June 2016 |
| Copyright Holders: | Copyright © 2016 Elsevier |
| First Published: | First published in Journal of Mathematical Economics 67:162-170 |
| Publisher Policy: | Reproduced in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher |
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