Feasible sets, comparative risk aversion, and comparative uncertainty aversion in bargaining

Driesen, B., Lombardi, M. and Peters, H. (2016) Feasible sets, comparative risk aversion, and comparative uncertainty aversion in bargaining. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 67, pp. 162-170. (doi:10.1016/j.jmateco.2016.06.003)

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Abstract

We study feasible sets of the bargaining problem under two different as- sumptions: the players are subjective expected utility maximizers or the players are Choquet expected utility maximizers. For the latter case, we consider the effects on bargaining solutions when players become more risk averse and when they become more uncertainty averse.

Item Type:Articles
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Lombardi, Dr Michele and Driesen, Dr Bram
Authors: Driesen, B., Lombardi, M., and Peters, H.
College/School:College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics
Journal Name:Journal of Mathematical Economics
Publisher:Elsevier
ISSN:0304-4068
Published Online:30 June 2016
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2016 Elsevier
First Published:First published in Journal of Mathematical Economics 67:162-170
Publisher Policy:Reproduced in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher

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