Citizenship and Identity: 
Being Hungarian in Slovakia and Romanian in Serbia and Ukraine

Central and Eastern Europe is a perfect laboratory for the study of interaction between borders, identities and citizenship; and the relationship between minorities, the state they live in and their kin-state. These relations are constantly evolving and fluctuating. National minorities are spread across newly-established and nationalizing states, sometimes at the border of their kin-state, sometimes further away, following both the political and national reconfigurations after the fall of multinational empires like the Hapsburg, Ottoman and the Tsarist Empire after World War I, and multinational states like the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia after 1989. In this context, we aim to question the self-identification of national minorities living at the border of their kin-state that gives them a certain form of protection through various processes and legislation, like citizenship. Based on a field study made of interviews and focus-groups, we examine through a comparative framework the case of Hungarians living in Slovakia and Romanians living in Serbia and Ukraine to determine how minorities understand citizenship as a manifestation of their relations with their kin-state and the nationalizing host state. We look at how interpretations of citizenship relate to other community ties, how these are used to define the differences between ‘us’ and ‘them’, and whether and how they build into the self-identification of minority members, since we assume each individual has a multi-layered identity, where different identifications compete with each-other based on the context in which that identity is called upon.

Our fieldwork is multi-site with two different national minorities in three different countries. In October 2013, and February and March 2014, four focus-groups were conducted with Hungarians living in Slovakia and one in Budapest. The latter included people

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who moved and live in Hungary for a long time but who were born in Slovakia where their families remained. In March, May and June 2014, focus-groups and semi-structured interviews were conducted in Vojvodina and Central Serbia (17 interviews and 3 focus-groups) and in Bukovina in Ukraine in May and June 2014 (17 interviews and 4 focus-groups). The number of participants in each group was from five to twelve and the age-distribution of the groups was heterogeneous. Discussions were carried out with Hungarians and Romanians in their native language. The moderators of the focus-groups used the same set of questions but all of the groups had their own dynamic – different shifts of emphasis in the discussions occurred in each group. The discussions were anonymous and included both minority members with and without the citizenship of their kin-state.

Our paper proceeds as follows: first, we discuss the concepts of national identity and citizenship that are paramount for understanding citizenship policies in Central and Eastern Europe. Next, we present kin-state policies towards ethnic Hungarians and Romanians in order to establish the framework of reference for our later analysis of minority identity structures. The main part of our paper critically evaluates the discernible patterns and configurations of identity structures that different members of the minority groups exhibit in their dealing with everyday issues such as language use, defining the homeland or distinctions between ‘us’ and ‘them’. We pay special attention to citizenship and how minority members relate to the citizenship offered by the kin-state, whether this formal channel of identification translates into a new sense of belonging or remains a flexible and instrumental bond between the state and the individual. We seek to learn whether newly acquired kin-state citizenship changes the hierarchy of identity structures by making kin-state citizenship the most valued identifier among all others.

National Identity and Citizenship

National identity is a concept around which politics can be, and often is, organised. In our interpretation, the nation is a mentally constructed, imagined political community and we assume that national identity is a form of collective identity that is made up by selected cultural, ethnic, economic, political, legal and territorial

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components, which are interrelated with each other.\textsuperscript{5} As a system of cultural representation, national identity is closely connected to the feeling of uniqueness and the differentiation from the “others” – drawing borders between those who do and do not share the national values.\textsuperscript{6} Accepting this interpretation, we assume that national identity is not something stable and coherent but rather fragile and contextually changing.\textsuperscript{7}

Yet, as Brubaker highlights, the state is one of the most influential identifiers and in this sense the nation is not only an imagined community but also an important political project and a discursive frame of identification.\textsuperscript{8} Citizenship is the institutionalisation of the relation between the state and the individual. This relation is based mainly on legal principles; however, citizenship is not a formal, stable and universal concept but rather a “set of mutual, contested claims between agents of states and members of socially-constructed categories.”\textsuperscript{9} Citizenship laws in many cases include also what it means to be a member of the national community.\textsuperscript{10} In these cases, citizenship practices of the state can be interpreted as a channel or a tool through which the state defines who can be a member of the given community and who cannot. The state deals with individuals not as a group of people but as well-defined categories of citizens, often categorized on an ethnic/national basis rather than a civic one. This in turn blurs the distinction between the category of citizens that is not equal to the category of nationals.\textsuperscript{11}

In Central and Eastern European countries, (national) self-determination is often based on ethnic, cultural and linguistic criteria and this also determines citizenship policies and the practices of these states. As Culic argues, citizenship policies in this region are determined mainly by nation-building processes and are “shaped by elite and popular visions of the state [belonging to a titular nation] (...) as

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\bibitem{Tilly} Tilly, Charles: \textit{Citizenship, Identity and Social History}. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1996.
\end{thebibliography}
well as by perceived threats to its integrity and welfare.”\footnote{12} Offering citizenship for co-ethnics living abroad is common in Central and Eastern Europe. Nation-states in this part of the world often give quasi-citizenship, citizenship-related rights or external citizenship to their kin minorities abroad. This kind of proactive policy towards ethnic kin is not only based on historical ties or feelings of belonging but is based on the principle of responsibility on part of the kin-state, saying that the kin-state should protect its co-ethnics living in neighbouring countries.

Given that countries in the region are multi-ethnic, members of different ethnic minority communities often do not identify with the state of their citizenship but rather with their kin-state.\footnote{13} This could be the reason why they sometimes feel that they are outsiders in society – where the citizenship of the state and their nationality is different from the majority of that country. This feeling of being alienated is stronger in countries where minority communities have to face assimilation, discrimination or limitation of their minority rights. In these cases, the citizenship of the state in which they live has an empty meaning since they feel they rather belong to their kin-state.

**Kin-State Policies towards Ethnic Hungarians and Romanians Living Abroad**

For a better understanding of the current situation and the current processes of self-identification of the minorities under scrutiny, let us briefly describe relations between the Hungarians in Slovakia and the Romanians in Serbia and Ukraine and their respective relation to their kin-state. These relations translate into the content of respective state citizenship policies, as described by Iordachi, ‘as part of more generalized attempts at reconstructing the national ‘imagined communities’, against the background of post-communist socio-political and territorial reorganization’.\footnote{14}

For ethnic Hungarian communities, the changes of 1989 meant a new opportunity to reorganise the institutional, social and political framework of their minority societies on the territory of the nationalising states in which they were living. As such, the first and most important goal was to (re)create and sustain their own minority institutions, education and culture, strengthen minority language usage, and establish a strong network of civil and political representation. For these reasons, in the early times of regime transformation, diplomatic relations between Hungary and the host states of the Hungarian minority abroad had an important role in developing domestic relations between the minority and majority communities.\(^1\) This came to a stop with the acceptance of the Hungarian Status Law in 2001 that changed the whole character of relations between Hungary and its neighbours. The law combined ethnic, legal and territorial principles for granting benefits to the Hungarians abroad. These were perceived as controversial by the neighbouring states. While the law was softened in the following years, 2010 brought a new direction to Hungarian policy towards ethnic kin living in neighbouring countries: Hungary introduced preferential naturalisation together with voting rights as a new political-legal tool to serve its trans-border nation-building process to re-unite the nation. When the Hungarian government accepted the amendment of its citizenship law offering extra territorial citizenship for Hungarian kin-minorities living in neighbouring countries without residence requirements in Hungary, Slovakia was the only country that responded to this decision by legal means. On the day of the Hungarian decision, the Slovak government accepted an amendment to the Slovak citizenship law that outlawed dual citizenship.\(^16\) Albeit, Slovakia tolerated the practice of dual nationality and until 2005 also offered citizenship for ethnic Slovaks residing abroad.\(^17\) Hungarian preferential naturalisation was unacceptable for the Slovak govern-

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\(^17\) In 1997, the Slovak Republic passed Act No. 70/1997 on Expatriate Slovaks and was the first country in the region which offered extraterritorial citizenship for Slovak expatriates living abroad. After 2005 preferential naturalisation of Slovak expatriates is possible only after living at least three years permanently on the territory of the country.
Slovak political elites did not deny that the reason for this strict amendment was not only that one could question the loyalty of ethnic Hungarians opting for the citizenship but the fear that Hungarian preferential naturalisation would endanger the security and territory of the Slovak state itself.

When Romania was created as a state in 1859 and 1877-78, roughly 8 million ethnic Romanians were to be found outside the newly created country: mainly in the regions of Bucovina, Transylvania and Banat belonging to the Hapsburg Empire and in the region of Bessarabia belonging to the Tsarist Empire. After World War I, Transylvania, Eastern Banat, Northern Bucovina and Bessarabia were united what has since been known as Greater Romania. Greater Romania between the two world wars was the largest Romanian state. Romania within its current reduced borders emerged after World War II, losing Bessarabia, Northern Bucovina and Herta to the Soviet Union and Southern Dobruja to Bulgaria. Romanians can be found mainly along the borders of present-day Romania and they form minorities in various countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The exception to it is the Republic of Moldova where the identity of the majority of the population – Moldovan or Romanian – has been for long and is still much of a political issue. In Romania, these Romanians are considered “Romanians abroad” (“Românii de Pretutindeni”) and a department of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs is dedicated to handle them. The expression “Romanians abroad” includes Romanians in Serbia, Ukraine and Moldova, where they are autochthonous, as well as Romanians in Italy, France or Canada where they have recently emigrated.

Romanian authorities have long been proactive in giving some form of support and protection to Romanians abroad, and Traian Băsescu, for example, has been a strong support for Moldovans and a strong advocate of the unification between the two countries. For Romanians in Serbia and Ukraine, the support is mainly educational and cultural. Nevertheless, the most important Romanian policy towards its nationals abroad has been linked to its law on citizenship that was first passed after the fall of communism. It was later modified and is still sometimes discussed and raised in public debate.

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19 First time the principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia were united to form the Romanian United Principalities, which later became officially known as ‘Romania’.
20 When Romania was declared independent from the Ottoman Empire.
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Romanians in Bukovina, a region that was part of one of the historical provinces of Romania and that was a part of Greater Romania between the two World Wars can, just like citizens of the neighboring Republic of Moldova, “regain” Romanian citizenship. They can apply for Romanian citizenship if they are able to prove that one of their ancestors was a citizen of Greater Romania between the two World Wars. Nevertheless, Ukrainian citizens cannot hold double citizenship and have to give up Ukrainian citizenship if they want to be Romanian citizens. In Serbia, the situation is different, as citizens of Serbia are not included in this framework of regaining Romanian citizenship since Voivodina and Central Serbia have never been Romanian territories. Therefore, Romanians from Serbia need to follow the regular process of obtaining Romanian citizenship.

Community Ties and Identity Structures

We believe minority or ethnic identity is a construction that is not a given but is expressed in concrete situations. It is also a tool of self-representation of the individual. Focus-group discussions enabled us to follow and examine different social practices, how individuals identify themselves and also how they relate to other members of the community. To analyse the structure of minority identities our point of departure was Brubaker’s triadic model – we assume that ethnic kin living in neighbouring countries around Hungary and Romania have different attitudes towards the state in which they live, towards their kin-state, and towards their own minority communities. These multiple attachments and the fact that they are members of a minority community create a special, multi-layered identity structure that is also reflected well in the role they attribute to and the relations they have towards languages – both their mother tongue and the official language:

In Bukovina, cultural interferences are important. It’s a smaller version of Europe, between East and West, a model of interethnic harmony where people live as Europeans. (MUkr)

In our region we often mix Slovak with Hungarian. (...) In Gömör we have our own small world and we are closely connected to the Slovaks living here. It often happens that we start the sentence in Hungarian and end in the Slovak language... and we also borrow some expressions from the Romani language... (FG3Sk)

A historical region in the central part of Slovakia.
Importance of languages can also be found in the music written by a young Ukrainian student, the lyrics being “in three languages, in Russian, in Romanian and in Ukrainian” (FG1Ukr) because these are the three languages he is constantly in contact with and are the markers of his identity. But this construction of multiple (language) identity is the outcome of a necessity developed in the particular context of the place where those minorities live:

Each Romanian from Bukovina knows Romanian, because it’s their mother tongue, each also knows Ukrainian and Russian. Each does not really master Ukrainian but each speaks it, you have to. You turn on the TV and you see news in Ukrainian. (FDUkr)

It is not only multiple languages that minority members need to master but their self-identification is made harder by the fact that the borders of the homeland (the motherland) and the borders of the state in which they live are not the same. We asked participants to identify their homeland in order to examine how they conceptualize their bonds to the region where they live and also how they understand their relation to their kin-state and the state of their residence. From the responses of ethnic Hungarians living in Slovakia we learn that homeland is defined regionally – it is the region where they are living their everyday lives or where they were born. Participants do not name either Slovakia or Hungary as their homeland, some explicitly refuse to make the choice between the kin and the host-state. Moreover, for a minority of the participants, homeland is only a spiritual concept connected to the Carpathian basin or to the Hungarian nation itself.

It is also important that the feeling of “homelessness” was mentioned in all of the Hungarian focus-groups in Slovakia, pointing out that the minority identity structures are closely connected with feelings of insecurity – these Hungarian communities are involuntary communities that came into being as a result of a political decision, the Trianon Treaty. Some participants even go further and feel betrayed by their nation because of a failed referendum in Hungary that asked the population whether it supported citizenship for their kin abroad:

I think there are only a few people from our generation who identify themselves as Hungarians and Slovakia as their homeland. Hungary did not support us on the

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The situation is rather different for Romanians whose definition of the homeland is also often very regional, yet seems more secure. Both Romanian minorities in Serbia and Ukraine seem to share a strong identification to a sometimes idealized multilingual and multicultural model of the region in which they live. This is well exemplified by the case of Romanians in Voivodina, as expressed in this focus-group in Novi Sad, the capital of this Serbian region:

*I believe that Voivodina is particular, because there are many different minorities. They all live together. It’s a multicultural territory and we are proud of it. So many minorities living together, it’s something unique in Europe, I believe.* (FG2Ser)

Both in Serbia and Ukraine, the strong identification with the region is reinforced when people compare, spontaneously, their situation and feelings to those who have arrived and settled recently. The “outsiders” are seen as somehow breaking the tradition and the shared culture of the region. In Voivodina, for instance, refugees from the war in Bosnia were characterised as those who “throw their garbage out through their windows”, are “more impulsive” and often create “scandals” (FG1Ser). Romanians in Ukraine also characterise Galicians living in Bukovina as less tolerant and more “agitated” (FG3Ukr). In addition to this strong regional self-identification, Romanian minority members also feel an emotional attachment to their kin-state, but differently from what we have observed in Slovakia, feelings of loyalty towards their state of residence are often mentioned even though it is not part of the conception of their homeland.

‘Us’ vs. ‘Them’

As these last examples show, the construction of sameness is often linked to the definition of the ‘other’. Here we refer to Brubaker’s and Cooper’s arguments that “as a specifically collective phenomenon, identity denotes a fundamental and consequential sameness among members of a group or category. This sameness is expected to manifest itself in solidarity.”24 During focus-group discussions we also ask

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23 Referendum about extra-territorial, non-resident citizenship to ethnic Hungarians living outside Hungary on the 5th December, 2004.
participants what they think about Hungarians living in Hungary or about Romanians living in Romania in order to determine the existence of the assumed ethnocentrism that distinguishes culturally and mentally the Hungarians/Romanians living in Hungary/Romania from Hungarians/Romanians living outside the borders of Hungary/Romania.  

The responses show that there is little “sameness” for the minorities with the “majority Hungarians”. Even though some respondents share some positive sentiments about the Hungarians living in Hungary, negative prejudices are dominant. There is a deep structural division, an invisible mental barrier: belonging to the Hungarian nation is natural for those who are living in Hungary, but for Hungarians living in neighbouring countries, it is an emotionally, culturally determined question, which influences their everyday lives and practices. We can say that the most important differences become permanent, the cultural production of borders is continuous and is most intense when it comes to the links to the Hungarian nation and the meaning of national symbols.

XY, he just kissed his Hungarian identity card... He was so happy... He was a Hungarian citizen in 1912, when he was born, and for him spiritually... He showed all of his honours from World War II when he got the card and he was crying. So, you will not understand this symbol there in Budapest, here we appreciate it more... (FG2Sk)

We find that when Hungarian citizens identify themselves as members of a “majority” towards other ethnic Hungarians this affects self-identification of these people negatively. It is also a common experience of everyday life for the participants that Hungarian citizens in Hungary lack knowledge about them, about their conditions or basic characteristics as manifested in questions like:

When I was younger and I was in Hungary, some of the Hungarians asked me whether we have television at home or not. Because they thought we are poorer than they are. But they were also shocked because of my dialect. (FG2Sk)

We also have to add that Hungarians from neighbouring countries are often labelled as immigrants in Hungary or just called ‘Slovaks’ after their country of residence. This attitude is also observable in

their identity structures, however, it is conceptualised as a foundation for being different:

_For me the fact that I am Hungarian does not mean that I am “Hungarian Hungarian” – it is important for me to identify myself as “Hungarian from Slovakia”… Because it is totally different to be a Hungarian from Slovakia and that’s why we have to say from which country we are coming from._ (FG5Hun)

Even though some of the participants have had everyday contacts with Hungary or Hungarians living in Hungary for decades, the lack of knowledge of the other and stereotypes are distancing these two communities from each other mainly symbolically.

For Romanians, sameness seems to be more emphasized, both in Ukraine and in Serbia. Romanians living in Western Banat feel closely connected to those Romanians who are living in the Eastern Banat region in Romania. Those who belong to the majority are also part of this understanding of a regional identity, at least when it comes to how minority members think about it. General opinions about Romanians in Romania and about Romania are usually positive, even more since Romania entered the European Union, but the fact that they live in different states plays an important role in their identification structures, but not so dominantly, as in the case of ethnic Hungarians living in Slovakia. These differences were explained by a Romanian originally from Romania but who moved to Serbia:

_There are differences and similarities between Romanians here and there, as for any people, like between Serbs in Romania and Serbs in Serbia. I think this is logical because, for their whole life, they have been living here, and the mentality of peoples differs. But their mentality is closer to that of the majority. (…) A state shapes you._ (OPSer)

This reflects exactly what an older woman in Novi Sad said:

_Serbs are tough and they made me as I am. I cannot be soft like a pancake._ (VMSer)

This shows that even though sameness is emphasized, Romanians in Serbia and Ukraine, just like Hungarians in Slovakia, exhibit a ‘nuanced identity’\(^{26}\) compared to compatriots in the kin-state.

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Citizenship

We claimed citizenship can be interpreted as a flexible bond between the state and the individual\textsuperscript{27} and in the case of dual citizenship the value of the different citizenships may be unequal for their owners.\textsuperscript{28} We also analyse and compare different aspects of the already given Slovak/Serb/Ukrainian and the ‘new’, individually acquired Hungarian/Romanian citizenships and its ‘values’ for our participants. The aim is to understand how citizenship(s) can be integrated (or not) into the identity structures of participants, to see the relations between these categories, and explore the structure of identity/citizenship hierarchy built from these categories.

For Hungarians in Slovakia, almost everyone described Slovak citizenship as an empty link with the state. Citizenship by the state of residence is interpreted mainly as a legal bond only, a group of rights and obligations. The reason is – as participants explained – that they, as citizens who have other than Slovak nationality, feel themselves outsiders, whose community is not involved in the state-building process.

\textit{I hear the Slovak anthem for instance, every midnight on television. Just look at those photos shown in this short video. They show all of the important regions in Slovakia, except the Southern region. (…) This is a symbol for me that they think that we are not involved in their social and political systems, they think that we are just outsiders who live here, but that’s all… and we think that we are outsiders, too. (FGSk3)}

Such attitudes can also be observed in case of Romanians living outside of Romania whose only ‘true’ citizenship is Romanian, all other citizenships are less valuable:

\textit{I have the documents. They show that I was born in 1938, in this village, in this district, with the year, the hour, the day. And it’s written in Romanian. When the USSR came, they freed us, they occupied us, and they changed our citizenship. They took it, brutally, automatically, and wrote “citizen of the Soviet Union”. At independence, Ukraine made me a Ukrainian citizen. But did they all ask me? No. I remain the same as when I was born. (ABUkr)}

While we see that ethnic Romanians consider their Serbian and Ukrainian citizenships as mainly legal bonds, as the link to the terri-


tory and to the country where members of the minority were born – exactly as we observed in the case of the Hungarians in Slovakia – there is also an important difference because these citizenships are not on the whole considered empty shells. Going along with the regional identification that we described earlier, there is a sense of identification with and maybe even loyalty to the state that they live in because both in Serbia and in Ukraine, the Romanians we interrogated feel that they have a say in their country because they are ethnically ‘different’ but ‘equal’ in rights to the majority (FG1Ser):

I can tell you that we all have rights, we have schools, we have media, we feel like home, we’re from here. We don’t feel like a minority. Yes, we are less numerous, but we are autochthonous, our ancestors came here about 300 years ago. (AUSer)

I never felt that someone had not given me the right to speak, to sing, to… I don’t know. We have a radio, we have magazines, we have everything. (FG3Ukr)

Looking at kin-state citizenship, Hungarians from Slovakia who have acquired Hungarian citizenship describe this new relation as an emotional connection to the nation and not to the country itself.

For me, for example, it was really important that the Hungarian government accepted the amendment … finally. […] here is the compensation for 5th of December 2004. There is a historical continuity created with the people. I was smiling a lot when this came into my mind that finally we have this opportunity. (...) Finally there is a call from the kin-state towards the Hungarians living around Hungary. (FG5Hun)

The same emotion can be found for Romanians in Bukovina, where regaining Romanian citizenship is seen as a historical right after the minority was separated from the “historical motherland” (LCUkr) in a similar way that Hungary lost its territories:

[Those who have regained citizenship] have the right to such citizenship because their parents have never given up Romanian citizenship. They were dispossessed. Now Romania has adopted a civilised and rightful law, I would say, through which historical justice is restored. (NTUkr)

Citizens of Serbia are not included in this framework of regaining Romanian citizenship. Therefore, Romanians from Serbia need to follow the regular process of obtaining citizenship, and some of them do it (ECSer). In this situation, some feel frustrated and do not understand why some Romanians from Moldova or Ukraine can regain
citizenship while Romanians from Serbia have no such opportunity (IBSer) and feel that Romania does not care about them (NCSer) – a feeling we observed also among Hungarians in Slovakia when they talk about the failed referendum for extending Hungarian citizenship to them. That event is still considered by many as reminiscence of the nation abandoning them:

*I’ll die and we won’t have Romanian citizenship. Hungary gave citizenship to its citizens, Slovakia gave it, Bulgaria gave it, Macedonia gave it, and Croatia gave it. Everyone has given it. We are the only ones who haven’t got it from Romania. Our ancestors came from Romania 300 years ago and migrated here, we are Romanians, and we are parts of the Romanian people.* (NCSer)

The majority of Hungarian participants in Slovakia, however, did not accept ‘emotions’ as reason for acquiring Hungarian citizenship – they connect citizenship with the territory of the state in which they live and they do not step out from this framework. Without a “real” relation with Hungary, it was unimaginable for these ethnic Hungarians to acquire the citizenship:

*I think Hungarian citizenship is important only if I move to Hungary. Because after moving there I will not be called Slovak, like now, because now I’m Slovak there.* (FG2Sk)

It is also interesting to note that at the same time the majority of the participants assume that the aim of offering citizenship by the kin-state is to reinforce and support their Hungarian identity. However, they argue that Hungarian citizenship is not connected to their Hungarian self-identification:

*We can bring up the next generation here. We have our rights, our schools here. I do not feel I would have some benefits from Hungarian citizenship. I feel myself Hungarian without any Hungarian citizenship.* (FG4Sk)

Something similar is observable in case of Romanians living abroad, showing that the link to the ‘nation’ goes further than citizenship:

*How could a passport help? I am Romanian, my husband is Romanian, my parents... My children go to a Romanian school. I speak Romanian. Why would I need a Romanian passport? I feel Romanian here. And I don’t have a passport.* (FG2Ukr.)
Yet others opt for the citizenship for more instrumental reasons. Like in Slovakia, Ukrainian citizens cannot have double citizenship. However, individuals we met admitted that they have it, or confirmed it indirectly (DCUkr, VTUkr), or told that lots of people in Ukraine have it (NHUkr). Ukrainian citizens know that “it is not allowed” but that “it is not forbidden” (Fg2Ukr) and explain that Ukrainian authorities are suspected to have many different citizenships, sometimes even “four, five or six” different ones (FG2Ukr). Even border guards would understand when meeting Ukrainian citizens at the border with both Romanian and Ukrainian passports (VBUkr), even though “many have been punished” for having double citizenship “some time ago” (FG2Ukr). Gaining citizenship allows you to travel freely, when one is “sick of Ukraine” (ABUkr), or avoid working illegally in Europe:

> Lots of citizens say they are Romanian... Many go for citizenship ceremonies in Romania. This is a joke. They want to freely enter Europe, they want to be able to work. It is difficult to go to Europe, visas are expensive and, usually, you’re only considered as a tourist. Therefore, in Europe, you’re illegal and you hide. Until they catch you. If they catch you, you’re sent back. And here we go again if you don’t have a Romanian passport. (VBUKr)

Interpretation of second citizenship as an instrumental tool is also visible in the example of a participant in Voivodina. In this discussion not only citizenship offered by Romania was discussed but also the option of Hungarian citizenship. Citizenship offered by Hungary through preferential naturalization is also one of the options to go “West”, escape from the circumstances or make life easier. Again, citizenship from a European Union country is seen as a plus, allowing movement abroad and to see better things (FG2Ser) and some “do it” “only to leave” (VPSer) as it means having a “better life” (FG2Ser):

> I could obtain 15 times – and I probably will – Bulgarian citizenship. But I have to go twice to Sofia and this is quite bothersome as it is quite far. (NCSer)

This shows that, for some, if Romania has not given citizenship to Romanians from Voivodina, they can try to obtain Hungarian citizenship, or Bulgarian citizenship like in the last example, because this is their legal right (FG2Ser).

Nevertheless, along with these instrumental forms of attachment to Romanian identity, other non-instrumental attachments to national identity have been often identified during our field research. In Serbia and Ukraine, the persons we talked to all showed loyalty to
the state they live in but showed at the same time a strong Romanian identity (MMSer, TUSer, OMUkr, VTUkr), even if they have never been to Romania (DSSer) or even if sometimes some feel some shame when speaking Romanian in public (MMSer, FG1Ser, FG1Ukr, FG2Ukr, FG3Ukr). When asking if they would apply for Hungarian citizenship, some Romanians from Serbia answer that they “would feel strange” as they “wouldn’t know the language” (ECSer) or that it would mean “selling” themselves (DSSer).

**Conclusion**

Despite diverse background and motivation of kin-state policies of Hungary and Romania, we can explore some similarities within the effects of their citizenship practices. In both cases extending citizenship is a basic tool of kin-state policy to (re)build the nation. However, as we can see above, recipients of this citizenship have unequal valuation and differentiation of citizenship. The reasons are multiple because citizenships do not have equal “values” for the individuals. As Spiro argued, “dual citizenship will almost always include one citizenship that is dearer than the other,” and we observe that this choice is contextual, very much reflecting the individual circumstances for all of the minority members.

The most important difference between choices of the Hungarians in Slovakia and the choices of Romanians in Serbia and Ukraine seems to go hand-in-hand with EU membership. We have noted that in case of ethnic Hungarians living in Slovakia, Hungarian preferential naturalisation caused deep cleavages between participants – some saw it as a formal proof of their sense of belonging, a paper-based emotional tie, while others could not think of any reason to claim it. In case of ethnic Romanians in Serbia and Ukraine it was only a minority who agreed there was no need for Romanian citizenship to feel Romanian, the majority interpreted kin-state citizenship as an “exit ticket” giving them additional options in life. This clearly reflects an instrumental understanding of citizenship for the majority of ethnic Romanians we talked to, while only few of the ethnic Hungarians we talked to expressed such attitudes.

We can argue that preferential naturalisation by the kin-state is important for the self-identification of minority members even if it is

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so for various reasons. Emotional reasons, the feelings of belonging seem to come to the fore only when there are no practical, instrumental reasons to opt for the citizenship. However, the importance of preferential citizenship should not be overstated as we have seen regional identity seems to be a more fundamental identity factor for ethnic minorities living on the border of their kin- and host-state. We saw that ethnic minorities can feel being both unwelcome citizens and proud and equal members of the political community of their host-state, depending on how they perceive that their rights are respected.

While there are differences in how different the minority members perceive themselves from their ethnic kin, we must also note that both ethnic Hungarians and Romanians perceived themselves being different from citizens of Hungary and Romania. These feelings are only reinforced by the ignorance of kin-state majorities that often lack knowledge about their ethnic kin abroad or treat them as second class members of the nation. As such, the local/regional minority community seems to enjoy primacy over the larger nation and the primary interest of the minority people is to preserve their identity facing challenges of assimilation, migration, or high level unemployment.

It is the local/regional differences, the experience of the minority people of living together not with their ethnic kin but their co-nationals that seems to uphold the barriers between the ethnic kin living on the opposite sides of the borders. Preferential naturalization and newly gained citizenship of the kin-state can be very important either for emotional or instrumental reasons but only for some. Others will ignore it, claiming their identity depends much more in being able to maintain and develop their local/regional identity through rights and minority protection. All of the above suggests that what we witness is a continuous interplay of the different identities that each of the members of ethnic communities possesses, where each and every individual constructs and reconstructs his or her hierarchy of the different identities based on contextual circumstances.

The participants who supported preferential naturalisation offered by the Hungarian government connected citizenship to their national self-identification. For these participants Hungarian citizenship is equal to the feeling that they belong to the Hungarian nation and they have a real, “paper based” connection with the kin-state. For them, Hungarian citizenship is something that reinforces them “being Hungarian” and helps step out from minority circumstances that are connected with the feeling of insecurity.31 This kind of

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“emotional understanding” of citizenship was expressed differently by the ethnic Romanians living in Ukraine and Serbia. Participants living in Serbia were critical about the unfairness of Romanian kin state policy – but not because they connected citizenship with their national self-identification, but because of other, much more practical reasons. For participants in Ukraine, it was also a “right” that was taken away from them after World War II.

In case of ethnic Hungarians, the majority of the participants, however, did not connect citizenship with emotions. They conceptualised its meaning from their minority perspective mainly. First, Hungarian citizenship by itself does not solve the main problems of their own minority community such as assimilation, migration, and high level of unemployment. Second, citizenship is not able to strengthen their national self-identification, because these are separated from each other. Third, both Slovakia and Hungary are members of the EU and Hungarian citizenship does not offer practical or special benefits for them. From this point of view Hungarian citizenship is “just another piece of paper”. This kind of understanding is also observable among ethnic Romanians living in Ukraine and Serbia. However, for them this kind of ‘piece of paper’ is much more valuable because it has more potential than the original one. Citizenship offered by the kin-state is conceptualised as a bridge to Europe, through it they can find better options somewhere else, outside of Serbia or Ukraine. In both cases, the citizenship offered by the kin-state is not already given, so members of these communities can enjoy the freedom of choice and decide individually to acquire it or not. In both cases citizenship offered by the kin-state is conceptualised mainly instrumentally. While in Slovakia most of our participants think Hungarian citizenship is important only when someone is living in Hungary, most of the participants in Ukraine and Serbia think, Romanian citizenship is an exit ticket for them or a tool to find better circumstances somewhere else.

The most important common point in this research is, that according to discussions of the minorities, regional self-identification is reinforced when they think about the meaning of their citizenship(s). We have seen that minorities do not necessarily identify themselves with the other members of their home-state or with those who are living in their kin-state. Neither the majority of ethnic Romanians in Serbia or Ukraine nor the majority of ethnic Hungarians in Slovakia think that citizenship practices could influence their national self-identification. Instead they argue relations with their minority communities and regional identification are much more important.