Competitive provision of public services: cost savings over successive rounds of tendering

Angeles, L. and Milne, R. G. (2016) Competitive provision of public services: cost savings over successive rounds of tendering. Applied Economics Letters, 23(9), pp. 627-632. (doi:10.1080/13504851.2015.1093079)

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Abstract

We study the evolution of the cost of public service provision when subjected to a competitive tendering process. We add to the existing literature by analysing cost savings over successive rounds of tendering. Previous results in the literature show that initial cost savings tend to disappear over time with the age of the contract. Our findings suggest that each additional round of tendering will be followed by a renewal of cost savings. Thus, keeping competitive pressure via periodic tendering appears to address the problem.

Item Type:Articles
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Milne, Mr Robin and Angeles, Dr Luis
Authors: Angeles, L., and Milne, R. G.
College/School:College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics
Journal Name:Applied Economics Letters
Publisher:Taylor and Francis
ISSN:1350-4851
ISSN (Online):1466-4291
Published Online:01 September 2015
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2015 Taylor and Francis
First Published:First published in Applied Economics Letters 23(9):627-632
Publisher Policy:Reproduced in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher

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