Pareto optimal matchings in many-to-many markets with ties

Cechlárová, K., Eirinakis, P., Fleiner, T., Magos, D., Manlove, D., Mourtos, P., Ocel’áková, E. and Rastegari, B. (2016) Pareto optimal matchings in many-to-many markets with ties. Theory of Computing Systems, 59(4), pp. 700-721. (doi:10.1007/s00224-016-9677-1)

[img]
Preview
Text
118138.pdf - Published Version
Available under License Creative Commons Attribution.

633kB

Abstract

We consider Pareto optimal matchings (POMs) in a many-to-many market of applicants and courses where applicants have preferences, which may include ties, over individual courses and lexicographic preferences over sets of courses. Since this is the most general setting examined so far in the literature, our work unifies and generalizes several known results. Specifically, we characterize POMs and introduce the Generalized Serial Dictatorship Mechanism with Ties (GSDT) that effectively handles ties via properties of network flows. We show that GSDT can generate all POMs using different priority orderings over the applicants, but it satisfies truthfulness only for certain such orderings. This shortcoming is not specific to our mechanism; we show that any mechanism generating all POMs in our setting is prone to strategic manipulation. This is in contrast to the one-to-one case (with or without ties), for which truthful mechanisms generating all POMs do exist.

Item Type:Articles
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Manlove, Dr David and Rastegari, Dr Baharak and Cechlarova, Professor Katarina and Fleiner, Dr Tamas
Authors: Cechlárová, K., Eirinakis, P., Fleiner, T., Magos, D., Manlove, D., Mourtos, P., Ocel’áková, E., and Rastegari, B.
College/School:College of Science and Engineering > School of Computing Science
Journal Name:Theory of Computing Systems
Publisher:Springer Verlag
ISSN:1432-4350
ISSN (Online):1433-0490
Published Online:30 April 2016
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2016 The Authors
First Published:First published in Theory of Computing Systems 59(4): 700-721
Publisher Policy:Reproduced under a Creative Commons License

University Staff: Request a correction | Enlighten Editors: Update this record

Project CodeAward NoProject NamePrincipal InvestigatorFunder's NameFunder RefLead Dept
607071Efficient Algorithms for Mechanism Design Without Monetary Transfer.David ManloveEngineering & Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC)EP/K010042/1COM - COMPUTING SCIENCE