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The changing landscape of youth and young adulthood

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Introduction

Youth and young adulthood are phases in the lifecourse that involve significant changes as new statuses are negotiated and old ones abandoned. Ties of dependency to the family weaken or take new forms and young people gain new freedoms and are expected to accept greater responsibilities. The study of transitions from youth to adulthood has long formed an important theme in youth studies; some would argue to its detriment (e.g. Cohen, 2000). Moreover, there is a general acceptance that transitions from education to work, from dependence to independence and from co-residence with parents or carers to co-residence with partners or friends or to solo living has become much more protracted as changes that once occurred in the late teens or early 20s are now frequently delayed until the late 20s or 30s. Indeed, for some this protraction cannot be understood within the parameters of youth but forces us to recognise a new phase in the lifecourse variously referred to as young adulthood (EGRIS, 2001) or emerging adulthood (Arnett, 2004).

Transitions have also become much more complex and are frequently non-linear (Furlong et al., 2003). Whereas traditional sequences often involved a move from education to work,
followed by leaving home and then marriage and family formation, today these events may occur in irregular sequences. Young people may leave education for work, only to return to education on later occasions. While young people may leave the parental home for education, employment or to move in with a partner, moves are frequently reversed, sometimes on several occasions (Jones, 1995). These complex, non-linear, patterns have earned the description of yo-yo transitions (EGRIS, 2001), while some have suggested that for many, in the absence of anything resembling fixed states, the whole idea of transition may be irrelevant (Furlong).

For social scientists youth and young adulthood are especially important and interesting phases of the life course because it is here that we can explore and understand the ways in which inequalities are reproduced across generations. Given that we live in societies that are constantly changing, at times undergoing very significant and rapid transformations, the focus on youth and young adulthood often provides an opportunity to understand the ways in which the lives of a generation are being transformed (Woodman and Wyn, 2006) and gives us a vantage point on which we can observe the emergence of new trends and social transformations.

In this handbook, as in the previous edition, the contributing authors are given the opportunity to account for the ways in which modern youth life is played out in a wide range of contexts and to highlight significant changes in their life experiences. Since the last edition, some of the trends previously identified have accelerated while events with global significance, especially the Great Recession that affected many countries in 1997/98 and the subsequent period of financial austerity, have had (and continue to have) a powerful (even transformative) impact on the lives of young people. As such, there is a real need to draw
attention to the ways in which young people are making their lives under these new conditions.

**The changing world of work**

Finding employment that offers a degree of security and provides the means to sustain independent living still forms the bedrock upon which other transitions are built. Without employment it is difficult to become independent and make a life. Employment, though, is being transformed, drawing in its train a string of changes that impact on virtually all aspects of young people’s lives. In the post-war era, some of the most significant trends reached a watershed in the late 1970s. In the UK and in a number of other countries, significant sectors of manufacturing employment were decimated in the early 1980s, resulting in the loss of many of the apprenticeships that had been particularly sought after by male school-leavers. The decline of manufacturing also had an impact on the economic and political socialisation of young people: the shift from employment in large scale, unionised, industrial units to small scale service units led to a more individualised experience of work and a significant reduction in union membership.

In the post-GFC environment, young people’s opportunities are restricted and employment is often insecure and fragmented. Underemployment is rife and new work forms, such as zero hours contracts, undermine basic securities and make it difficult for young people to build their lives. At the same time, it is important to recognise that changes have been brought about over a relatively long period of time: the precarious conditions eloquently described by Standing (2011) are not products of the Great Recession but have deep roots. Indeed, in the 1970s, the French sociologist Rene Lenoir (1974) was already writing about labour market precarity, and, by the mid 1980s, French academics were arguing that there had been a
significant increase in the numbers of ‘ordinary’ people experiencing adverse labour market conditions.

In the UK, Goodwin and O’Connor (2005) convincingly argued that young people’s experiences of employment in the 1950s and 1960s often involved frequent changes of employer and occupation and conditions were often poor. In some sectors of the economy, such as the textile industry, employees’ wages were frequently determined by personal productivity. In West and Newton’s (1983) study carried out in the late 70s, more than three in ten females were paid on a piecework formula. A long hours culture was also common, with many young people working regular overtime in order to secure reasonable wages levels.

While from the 1970s young people were being squeezed out of a declining manufacturing sector and pushed towards a service sector that offered quite different conditions, a number of other contemporary trends have roots in the same era. Participation in post-compulsory education, including higher education, was increasing and fuelling aspirations. New programmes were being developed for unemployed young people which, during the 1980s recession, had become a normal part of youth transitions. With much training provision outsourced to the private sector, a whole new industry providing training for workless youth was established, much of it poor quality and resented by those conscripted to participate (e.g. Stafford, 1981, Raffe and Smith, 1987; Roberts and Parsell, 1989). The 1980s also marked a punitive turn in welfare provision involving a shift from thinking of unemployment as a social issue to one that began to think of it as linked to personal shortcomings.
Significant trends that characterised young people’s transitions and work experiences included the continued growth of post-compulsory and higher education so that by the 1990s the vast majority of young people remained in education until the age of 18 and almost one in two experienced some form of higher education. Linked to this expansion, advanced qualifications came to be a requirement for a range of occupations that were once secured on the basis of an average performance at school and degree entry started to be required for a range of semi-professional jobs, such as nursing. The increase in well-qualified workers, however, outstripped the demand for highly educated and skilled employees, resulting in a growth in underemployment. Consequently, graduates increasingly had to settle for non-graduate jobs; they frequently spent time unemployed after university or opted, for further study to try and increase their chances of ‘suitable’ work.

During this period the labour market started to ‘hollow out’ and commentators drew attention to the establishment of a dichotomy between ‘lovely’ and ‘lousy’ jobs (ref). The ‘lousy’ jobs included a growing variety of atypical forms of employment: agency working, fixed term contracts, zero hours contracts and short-hours employment. Once largely the preserve of women with family responsibilities, part-time working has become increasingly common among young people, some of whom try to juggle a number of part-time jobs in order to secure the equivalent of a full-time wage and many of whom express a desire to work more hours than currently available to them (Bell and Blachflower, 2013).

Where young people have their working lives fragmented between a number of jobs or have unpredictable hours, it has been shown that social lives come under pressure. In this context Woodman (2012) has argued that, pressure to work unsocial hours and with the lack of control over hours worked, young people find it difficult to synchronise their lives with those
of their friends and relatives, leading to greater social isolation and distancing them from support networks. Although Woodman does not make the link explicitly, other evidence suggests that the increased complexity and unpredictability of lives, together with reduced support, have fuelled the deterioration in mental health that is currently manifest in a wide range of countries. Eckersley (2011), for example, argues that mental disorders are now ‘the biggest contributor to the burden of disease and suffering in young people’ (2011: 4, a statistic he attributes to ‘over-engagement’ as young people struggle to manage the competing demands of education and employment.

Standing (2011) is perhaps the best known commentator on the growth of insecure work forms and their implications. Although he doesn’t focus specifically in young people, he acknowledges that they are suffering disproportionally from the changes. Moreover, Standing also makes the link between the changes taking place in the labour market and negative subjective consequences such as an increase in anxiety, alienation and anomie. Standing refers to those affected by these changes as the ‘Precariat’ and he argues that they constitute ‘the new dangerous class’.

For Standing it is the unemployed, the groups such as the unemployed, the insecurely employed and the working poor who constitute the precariat. While he is clear that they are a diverse group, he argues that they are unified by the common experience of insecurity of work and living conditions. One of the attractions of Standings’ work is that he attempts to capture new work trends that are affecting large numbers of young people within a class framework. On an objective level he recognises that we inhabit a class society with class membership being one of the most powerful determinants of life chances. On a subjective level he also recognises that, as a result of a growth in precarious conditions, people often
lack work-based identities and find it difficult to sustain a coherent narrative to connect their disjointed lives. Overall, this analysis comes very close to what Furlong and Cartmel termed the ‘epistemological fallacy’ (1997: 2) under which social structures become increasingly obscure despite great continuities in the extent to which social class shapes life chances.

Furlong and colleagues (2016) attempted to operationalize Standing’s precariat through the use of the UK Household Longitudinal Study (also known as Understanding Society), focusing on respondents between the ages of 18 and 25. Through detailed analysis it became clear that the group Standing referred to as the precariat were too diverse to treat as a homogenous group in any empirically or theoretically meaningful way or to think of as constituting a class. Given important sources of internal differentiation sustained by the ownership of various forms of capital, it was argued that any idea that post-recession realities involved a ‘democratisation of insecurity’ (Brown, 20**) was seriously flawed.

Within the precariat there are clear differences between workless young people with neither skills nor qualifications and graduates working in part-time or temporary form of employment. Such differences, as Weber recognised, relate to the ways in which education and skills are commodities of value that can be traded in the labour market. Furlong and colleagues (2016) argues that if one wanted to suggest that the precariat constituted a class, the implication is that a qualified pilot working through an agency (who may command relatively high wages and have a strong work-based identity) occupies the class position as an unqualified burger flipper on a zero hours contract.

Subjective accommodations
There is an abundance of literature on the mental health of young people, a substantial proportion of which claims causal links between the changing social and economic conditions of young people and a range of psycho-social maladies (e.g. Rutter and Smith, 1995; Furlong and Cartmel, 1997; Eckersley, 2011). Research showing causal links between unemployment and poor mental health outcomes has a long history (e.g. Pilgrim Trust, 1938; Banks and Ullah, 1988; Viner et al., 2012). More recently, studies are beginning to show that students can suffer a decline in mental health due to money worries and concerns about performance (Rowbotham and Julian, 2006) while young people in precarious and temporary forms of employment may experience depression (Vives et al., 2013) and face social isolation (Woodman, 2012).

Clearly young people have to negotiate a set of uncertainties that were less prominent in the lives of previous generations, may worry about future security and may suffer in terms of psychological well-being. Using a nationally representative sample of 18-25 years olds in the UK, Furlong and colleagues (2016) discovered that while around one in two survey respondents reported feeling optimistic about the future, almost one in five said that they rarely or never felt optimistic. Similarly, while around one in two reported that they never felt downhearted and depressed, less than one in ten said that they felt this way all or most of the time. These feelings varied according to their position in the labour market: optimism was lowest and depression highest among those without work while the opposite was true of those in relatively secure forms of employment.

However, while it is clear that a section of the young population are suffering, especially those who are without work or hold insecure forms of employment, it is also evident that many are able to maintain a positive outlook in the face of adverse conditions and show no
evidence of suffering psychologically. Indeed, there are Australian studies that suggest significant proportions of the youth population are unconcerned about employment insecurity and that ‘many young people embrace flexibility as a way of life’ (Stokes, 2012: 78). In a similar vein, Wierenga (2009) argued that young people stress the importance of a work-life balance and do not place an emphasis on work as a central source of meaning.

In this context it is important that older youth researchers do not try to impose their own work-related norms onto a generation making their lives under very different circumstances. Indeed, the work-related trends that we highlighted have deep roots and young people are likely to have gradually built the changing realities into their expectations. In other words, young people have not suddenly found themselves having to cope with a radically altered set of realities. In other words, today as in the 1960s, the realities encountered by young people more or less confirm their expectations. Moreover, with parents of contemporary youth likely to have experienced high levels of unemployment themselves as school-leavers in the late 1970s and 1980s, it is also likely that families help reinforce the view that transitions can be difficult to accomplish.

**Adjusting to new realities**

Prolonged educational careers, labour market insecurities and, in many areas, difficulties in accessing affordable housing mean that young people are finding new ways of living which impact on relationships, patterns of sociability and on approaches to work. While family and friends can provide a crucial source of stability in a context where lives are in flux, the ability of parents to provide credible advice may be compromised given their different experiences of education and employment. While this may increase the need for peer support, the individualised nature of pathways and the difficulties in maintaining regular contact with
friends who also lead busy and complex lives can make it difficult to share experiences and learn from fellow travellers (Furlong and Cartmel, 1997; Woodman, 2012). Despite these difficulties, friends, especially girlfriends and boyfriends, do have an influence on key decisions and can both constrain and facilitate social and geographical mobility (Henderson et al., 2007).

While young people develop strategies to maintain friendship networks and build and revise associations as statuses and proximities change (Henderson et al., 2007), there are some who loose connections and become isolated and unsupported. In Japan, for example, there are concerns about the number of people who struggle to manage the complexities of modern life and, as a response, withdraw from social life altogether. Referred to as hikikomori, those suffering from acute withdrawal have no contact with anyone outside of their family for long periods of time. The hikikomori phenomenon, which exists but is under-researched in the West, has been linked to the rapid loss of opportunities associated with the recession that began in the early 1990s (Furlong, 2008). In Japan, ‘the hikikomori phenomenon highlights the extent to which patterns of sociability among young people and their connections to peer networks can be profoundly affected by processes of change in contemporary societies’ (Furlong, 2013: 105).

Clearly there are some young people who will attempt to make lives under traditional parameters while others seek alternative ways of living. In a study of young people in the Netherlands du Bois Reymond (1998) identified a group she referred to as the trendsetters who attempt to avoid commitment to a career and prefer non-standard forms of employment. The trendsetter, who du Bois acknowledges are often culturally privileged, hold ‘post-materialist values, such as self-actualization and communication, which make nine-to-five
jobs appear unattractive’ (1998: 65). For du Bois Reymond, the trendsetters’ illustrate a shift from what she refers to as normal biographies towards choice biographies and they ‘strive to redefine the constraints created by flexiblization and rationalization of labour and the requirements of lifelong learning; they aim to incorporate their personal lifestyles into their working lives’ (1998: 67).

In more recent work undertaken against a backdrop of declining opportunities in the post-GFC world, Howie and Campbell (2015) argue that young people are constructing new forms of engagement that they refer to as guerrilla selfhood which allow them to thrive through resistance in an uncertain world. For Howie and Campbell, ‘the guerrilla self is ravaged by uncertainty and doubt. But it is hopeful. As such, stories of guerrilla selfhood are themselves about ambivalence, doubt and hope’ (2015:2). Operating in the ‘interstices of neoliberalism’, the guerrilla operates in the spaces where firms with larger overheads would avoid: examples provided include mobile street food operations and gardeners growing food on public land such as traffic roundabouts. Howie and Campbell say that they

‘want our metaphor of guerrilla selfhood to capture something that embodies survival and resistance in hostile environments, but not revolution. Resistance to being locked into an unchosen, undesirable future. ... A guerrilla does not wish to replace the system. A guerrilla wants to use the weapons of the system against the system. This involves finding other uses for people and things, alternative forms of life, and ways of turning the strengths of the powerful into weaknesses that make the powerful vulnerable. The key ingredient is perhaps something that all young people can possess – imagination’ (2015: 13)
In a study of young people in urban Australia, Threadgold (2015) identified young people who made strategic decisions to live in relative poverty in order to provide themselves with the space to follow more creative passions. These young Australians were consciously choosing to keep their overheads low and restrict the hours they worked in order to follow their interests and spend time with others who shared their philosophy on life. As one of Threadgold’s respondents put it:

‘My main modus operandi is just to keep the overheads low, keep the overheads very low. Like my work studio where I screen print, it’s all at my house so my rent is my studio rent and go to the markets and buy food for like two weeks at once, you know? ... You’re just afforded more freedom to do the stuff that makes you happy’ (‘Fanny’, quoted by Threadgold, 2015).

In essence, the guerrilla self and those young people adopting ‘strategic poverty’ are subsets of what Kelly (2013) refers to as the entrepreneurial self under which the self is constructed as an enterprise which is shaped and re-shaped in order to be successfully marketed as a commodity in the precarious labour markets of flexible capitalism. Beck uses the term ‘Me & Co’ (2000:3) to describe the biographical projects that people develop ways in in order to package and sell themselves in markets characterised by insecurity. Kelly summarises the contradictions between freedom and constraint that underpin the self as enterprise.

‘The self as an enterprise is a self that is capable of both continuing to engage in the enterprise of the self, and in the enterprises of production and consumption. The self is required to develop a certain self-awareness, a particular self-understanding, a type, form and level of reflexivity that equips it to exercise a well regulated autonomy. This form of selfhood
should also have the capacity to exercise, on a continual, ongoing basis, practices of freedom that require the exercise of choice, and the acceptance of the responsibilities for the consequences of choices made, or not made’ (2013: 14).

Adjustments to the new realities that confront young people are clearly complex and varied. Some develop mental health problems and experience a decline in well-being, others withdraw or may struggle to maintain supportive relationships with peers. Many manage identities in ways that allow them to perform successfully within the marketplaces of flexible capitalism: some thrive in this liquid modernity (Sennett, 2000), others internalise the stresses of modern life. Among the thrivers are those who develop alternative forms of living such as the guerrillas who have learnt to operate effectively in hostile environments using forms of resistance in ways that allow new forms of autonomy rather than as processes highlighted by Willis (1977) that secured their futures in low paid, unskilled and unrewarding occupations.

**Divided landscapes**

With the lives of young people, especially those entering the labour market during and after the Great Recession, being different to the lives of their parents’ generation, the new landscape is marked by a generational divide that permeates a broad waterfront of experiences. Across this divide there are a number of potential lines of conflict, especially in those arenas where benefits open to older generations are removed from the younger generation. Whereas a strong line in the literature on youth relates to the ways in which changes are internalised leading to stress or psychological disturbance another, less prominent, theme has focused on the ways in which young people make positive adjustments and create new ways of living in circumstances that some may construe as challenging, there also a literature on political responses.
Although many researchers highlight the extent to which young people are disengaged from mainstream politics and often fail to turn out to vote in elections, there is agreement that young people are more active in single issue politics and the politics of protest. Notable protests involving large numbers of young people that were particularly visible in the period following the Great Recession were the Occupy Movement who, using the slogan ‘we are the 99%’ were protesting about gross disparities of wealth and the ways in which the wealthy one per cent had passed on the social and economic costs of the crash to the majority 99% while largely able to insulate themselves from the fall-out.

In his analysis of the growing precariat, Standing (2011) argued that anger was likely to be one of the responses of those trapped in insecure forms of employment. Certainly with significant rises in unemployment across Europe following the recession the unemployed engaged in protests in cities across the world. There were also a wide range of protests against various austerity measures and their impact on services as well as against rises in student fees. While some protests were very focused with clear aims, such as reducing or abolishing student fees, others were more about raw anger and frustration. In the UK there were disturbances in a number of cities, most notably in London in which groups of young people looted shops, burnt buildings and engaged in street battles with the police. While researchers argued that racist policing and inappropriate use of ‘stop and search’ powers were one of the triggers more general frustration about poor opportunities were also causes (Guardian et al., 2011).

Many of the groups of young people suffering in the post-GFC world, do so silently, blame themselves for their predicament and direct anger inwards, or engage in individualised
actions that attempt to address personal predicaments. Workfare approaches to unemployment that are common in a wide range of countries are a source of hostility among many of those conscripted into work programmes, not because they object to working, but because such schemes frequently provide few benefits for individual participants yet are a source of enormous profits for providers and employers who accept placement. In the UK there have been several high profile cases where individuals have gone to the courts to attempt to have benefits sanctions declared illegal due to the ‘inappropriate’ work experiences provided.

In one of these cases, Cait Reilly, a 24 year-old graduate was forced to give up voluntary work in a museum in order to undertake unpaid work experience in Poundland. Reilly scored a partial victory over her claim that mandatory labour breached the forced labour convention. Under the Forced Labour Convention (1930, No.29), forced labour is defined as ‘all work or service that is extracted from any person under the menace of any penalty and for which the said person has not offered himself voluntarily’. Many approaches to workfare would appear to be in breach of this convention.

Divisions among young people and between generations have long been acknowledged and is seen by some as a struggle that is central to social dynamics (Mannheim, 1952). Building on these ideas, Woodman and Wyn (2015) argue for the need for a repositioning of what they refer to as ‘social generations’ as part of an enriched understanding of new landscape of youth and young adulthood life patterns and emerging divisions that, in many ways, set aside the experiences of young people today from those of earlier generations.
References


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