Bargaining, conditional consistency, and weighted lexicographic Kalai-Smorodinsky Solutions

Driesen, B. (2016) Bargaining, conditional consistency, and weighted lexicographic Kalai-Smorodinsky Solutions. Social Choice and Welfare, 46(4), pp. 777-809. (doi: 10.1007/s00355-015-0936-x)

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We reconsider the class of weighted Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions of Dubra (Econ Lett 73:131–136, 2001), and using methods of Imai (Econometrica 51:389–401, 1983), extend their characterization to the domain of multilateral bargaining problems. Aside from standard axioms in the literature, this result involves a new property that weakens the axiom Bilateral Consistency (Lensberg, J Econ Theory 45:330–341, 1988), by making the notion of consistency dependent on how ideal values in a reduced problem change relative to the original problem.

Item Type:Articles
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Driesen, Dr Bram
Authors: Driesen, B.
College/School:College of Social Sciences > School of Social and Political Sciences > Sociology Anthropology and Applied Social Sciences
Journal Name:Social Choice and Welfare
ISSN (Online):1432-217X
Published Online:09 December 2015
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2015 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
First Published:First published in Social Choice and Welfare 2015
Publisher Policy:Reproduced in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher

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