Funding global public goods: the dark side of multilateralism

Bayer, P. and Urpelainen, J. (2013) Funding global public goods: the dark side of multilateralism. Review of Policy Research, 30(2), pp. 160-189. (doi: 10.1111/ropr.12013)

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Abstract

The funding of global public goods, such as climate mitigation, presents a complex strategic problem. Potential recipients demand side payments for implementing projects that furnish global public goods, and donors can cooperate to provide the funding. We offer a game-theoretic analysis of this problem. In our model, a recipient demands project funding. Donors can form a multilateral program to jointly fund the project. If no program is formed, bilateral funding remains a possibility. We find that donors rely on multilateralism if their preferences are relatively symmetric and domestic political constraints on funding are lax. In this case, the recipient secures large rents from project implementation. Thus, even donors with strong interests in global public good provision have incentives to oppose institutional arrangements that promote multilateral funding. These incentives have played an important role in multilateral negotiations on climate finance, especially in Cancun (2010) and Durban (2011).

Item Type:Articles
Additional Information:Funded by: ERP fellowship of the Studienstiftung des deutschen Volkes. This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: [Bayer, P., and Urpelainen, J. (2013) Funding global public goods: the dark side of multilateralism. Review of Policy Research, 30(2), pp. 160-189.], which has been published in final form at [10.1111/ropr.12013]. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving."
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Bayer, Dr Patrick
Authors: Bayer, P., and Urpelainen, J.
College/School:College of Social Sciences > School of Social and Political Sciences > Politics
Journal Name:Review of Policy Research
Publisher:Wiley
ISSN:1541-132X
ISSN (Online):1541-1338
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2013 The Policy Studies Organization
First Published:First published in Review of Policy Research 30(2):160-189
Publisher Policy:Reproduced in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher

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