Epistemic perceptualism and neo-sentimentalist objections

Cowan, R. (2016) Epistemic perceptualism and neo-sentimentalist objections. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 46(1), pp. 59-81. (doi:10.1080/00455091.2015.1123037)

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Abstract

Epistemic Perceptualists claim that emotions are sources of immediate defeasible justification for evaluative propositions that can (and do) sometimes ground undefeated immediately justified evaluative beliefs. For example, fear can constitute the justificatory ground for a belief that some object or event is dangerous. Despite its attractiveness, the view is apparently vulnerable to several objections. In this paper, I provide a limited defence of Epistemic Perceptualism by responding to a family of objections which all take as a premise a popular and attractive view in value theory – Neo-Sentimentalism – according to which values are analysed in terms of fitting emotions.

Item Type:Articles
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Cowan, Dr Robert
Authors: Cowan, R.
College/School:College of Arts > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Journal Name:Canadian Journal of Philosophy
Publisher:Taylor and Francis
ISSN:0045-5091
ISSN (Online):1911-0820
Published Online:05 January 2016
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2015 Canadian Journal of Philosophy
First Published:First published in Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46(1): 59-81
Publisher Policy:Reproduced in accordance with the publisher copyright policy

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