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Going for Gold? A Prospective Assessment of the Economic Impacts of the Commonwealth Games 2014 upon the East End of Glasgow

Abstract

Host cities have increasingly sought to combine the staging of a multi-sports event with the regeneration of run-down areas. Like London 2012, Glasgow has sought to use the Commonwealth Games (CWG) 2014 as a catalyst for the physical, social and economic renewal of its East End. This paper uses a theory-based evaluation framework to assess the likely economic impacts of the CWG upon Glasgow’s East End. After considering the scope for economic change, the feasibility of legacy developments and programmes being delivered as intended, and the plausibility that economic impacts might be achieved based on evidence from past events, it is concluded that economic impacts are likely in the short-term and possible in the medium-to-long-term. Key weaknesses in Glasgow’s approach which may limit these impacts are identified so that future host cities with similar objectives may learn from them.

Key Words: Regeneration, Multi-sports events, Legacy, Evaluation, Glasgow
Introduction: Multi-sports Events and Legacy

As multi-sports events have got bigger and more costly, so their legacy ambitions have grown and changed in nature over time. The notion of legacy has become both institutionalised from the international awarding body’s point of view, and sought after and expected by the host city. For organisations like the International Olympic Committee (IOC), concerns about ‘gigantism’, very high costs and the possibility of criticism for leaving ‘white elephants’ in cities (Gold and Gold 2009; Mangan 2008), has led to the revision of the Olympic Charter to state that leaving a positive and sustainable legacy to host cities is a ‘fundamental commitment’ (IOC 2012). Alongside this, host cities are now required to report on a suite of over 100 outcome indicators over a 12 year period in order that there be accountability for delivering on legacy promises. From the IOC’s point of view, institutionalising legacy aims helps the Olympic Movement to justify seeking such large public expenditures for a sporting event, whilst also encouraging cities to bid for future events if there are legacy expectations. This institutionalisation of legacy has spread beyond the IOC to other awarding bodies such as the Commonwealth Games Federation and FIFA.

Legacy ambitions have also changed in nature over the decades, characterised such that ‘the concept of sport as a means of spiritual renewal has given way to sport as a means of urban renewal’ (Chawkley and Essex 1999, p.202). Early events in the first half of the twentieth century were focused solely or mainly on sport, until the delivery of various infrastructure improvements were added in the 1960s for the Olympic Games in Rome (1960) and Tokyo (1964), including transport, water supply and street lighting. During the era of emerging globalisation in the 1980s and 90s, attracting multi-sports events became part of urban entrepreneurialism, both as a marker of urban performance and as a means to rebrand and sell the image of a city (Hall 2006). This was also the period when multi-sports events were first used to bring about the transformation of run-down parts of cities, including the old port area of Barcelona (1992) and a polluted bay area in the case of Sydney (2000). The Sydney Olympics shifted attention to sustainability issues, and the Commonwealth Games in Manchester in 2002 is said to be the first time a long-term social legacy was planned alongside a multi-sports event (Smith and Fox 2007).

At the same time, the financial costs to host nations and cities have become so great that staging a multisport event can only be justified to local taxpayers if the public expenditure is intended to leave a lasting legacy thereafter, and only if the economic impacts can be
identified and weighed against the investments in a cost-benefit analysis (Preuss 2004). The financial losses suffered by Montreal (1976) when contrasted with the profits made a few years later in Los Angeles (1984) has led to increasing commercial involvement in the delivery of multi-sports events, with escalating costs to be offset by revenues from sponsorship deals and broadcasting rights; multi-sports events have become big business. Despite the identification of five or six key legacy domains and the adoption of something similar by the IOC (Cashman 2002; Chappelet 2006; IOC 2012), it is still said, until recently at least, that economic issues dominate legacy ambitions and receive most attention in studies of multi-sports events (Kornblatt 2006; Smith 2009; McCartney et al 2010).

Social issues have tended to be discussed in debates about the spatial distribution of multi-sport event legacies, and their impacts upon host communities. Despite such events having been recently held in previously run-down or underused parts of cities, it has been argued that city centre locations benefit the most, for example from image enhancement (Preuss 2007), and that any employment gains would be enjoyed more outside than within the host communities (Kornblatt 2006). The notion that economic benefits from multi-sport events would ‘trickle down’ to the local community is contested (Raco 2004). These are important issues given that the IOC’s legacy aims include a ‘social inclusion’ objective covering benefits for ‘under-served populations’ (IOC 2012).

Critics of multi-sports events point out that positive economic benefits do not necessarily flow to host communities, and highlight potentially negative social and economic impacts including: displacement and dispossession of local residents to make way for event-related developments (Majunda and Mehta 2010); loss of place attachment due to a lack of connection between new developments and existing communities (Raco 2004); loss of identity and connectedness due to local transformation (Smith 2009); loss of affordable residential land and housing (Davis and Thornley 2010); and the diversion of resources away from local amenities and services to help pay for new games-related venues both during and after the event (Coalter 2004; Murphy and Bauman 2007; Mangan 2008). Where social legacy aims have been studied over time, as in the case of Vancouver (2010), it was found that social commitments made during the bidding period were gradually side-lined, watered down, or forgotten subsequently (Vanwynsberghe et al 2012), thus reinforcing the primacy of economic goals.

Key messages have emerged from the literature regarding how to increase the likelihood of achieving positive legacy impacts. Legacy is not only a post-event phenomenon (Weed et al 2009), but has to be planned for and worked towards in all stages of a multi-sports event
including the bidding, preparation, staging and post-Games periods. Legacy should be viewed as a ‘prospective concept’ (Girginov 2012), requiring prior planning, resourcing and political commitment (Smith 2009). Equally, the post-event period is seen as a crucial time to secure legacy benefits by capitalising on the goodwill, buoyant atmosphere, enthusiasm and interest generated by the event, rather than suffering a post-event depression (Cashman 2006), loss of staff and policy focus and under-utilised facilities. It is also argued both that legacy success is more likely where legacy aims are embedded within existing policies and programmes, and that supplementary, event-themed projects are required, particularly to secure social impacts (Smith and Fox 2007). Such ‘project effects’ from special initiatives, whilst not essential to the event, are nonetheless an integral part of the overall event programme in a legacy era (Weed et al 2009). This emphasis on the planning and embedding of legacy aims has led to an interest in whether or not multi-sports event might also leave a partnership legacy among local actors. At the same time, it has been pointed out that for the organising committee/delivery organisation of a multi-sport event, the key focus is successful delivery of the event itself, and that it will be constrained by its remit and finances and have little active interest in legacy aims (Agha et al 2012).

The Evaluation Challenge

The expansion of legacy ambitions and activities, the addition of event-themed projects around the Games itself, and the merging of the event with regeneration strategies, all add to the complexity of the situation and to the evaluation challenge. Regeneration itself, never mind allied to a multi-sports event, is considered a complex intervention comprising ‘multiple, interrelated activities... delivered in different ways to different people in different places at different time periods’ (Bond et al 2013, p.942). In these circumstances, it is noted that more usual research designs for studying the effectiveness of interventions, such as quasi-experimental designs (included in our study – see below), ‘fail to provide valid information when applied to complex and dynamic systems’ because they ‘do not identify in which conditions and through which configuration of factors the outcome is achieved’ (Marchal et al 2012, p.193; Sturmburg and Martin 2009).

Theory-based evaluation has been recognised as an alternative approach to address complex situations, complex interventions, and complex causal pathways, and overcome the limitations of before-and-after and input-output studies (Chen and Rossi 1983), and has been proposed as suitable where partnership structures deliver multi-sectoral programmes to tackle intractable problems (Blamey and Mackenzie 2007; Barnes et al 2003), as is the case with modern, multi-sports events. The main areas of attention in theory-based evaluation approaches - the two main ones being Theory of Change and Realist Evaluation -
are the effects of context, the operative mechanisms at work around the interventions, and the effectiveness of implementation.

With regard to context, realist evaluation seeks to develop context-mechanism-outcome configurations in order to answer the question ‘What works, how, in which conditions, and for whom?’ (Pawson and Tilly 1997). But in complex, open systems, context is not merely an external factor; context is both shaped by actors and constrains their activities (Barnes et al 2003). Blame and Mackenzie argue that ‘context...must be considered as part of the evaluation and can be key to uncovering the circumstances in which, and the reasons why, a particular intervention works’ (2007, p.441). For Marchal et al (2012) the key challenge is to identify the ‘those context elements that really matter’ – including norms, regulations, procedures, barriers and facilitators – and to track how they affect the intervention and outcome. If we consider communities as complex, dynamic systems with their own routines and norms, and their own stabilities and instabilities, then we can substitute the community for the organisation and apply insights from ‘theorising interventions as events in systems’ to examine to what extent interventions become integrated into routine practice, or ‘intrude’ into local sites, settings and events. As Hawe et al (2009) put it, ‘...the way an intervention comes to seep into or saturate its context becomes a way to view the extent of its implementation’ (p.270).

Mechanisms are the underlying entities, processes and structures which produce outcomes, and are thus not equivalent to programme or intervention activities (Weiss 1997; Astbury and Leeuw 2010). Some of these mechanisms are ‘situational’ because certain social situations and events in particular places alter people’s beliefs, desires and the opportunity structures for certain behaviours to occur, including ‘transformational’ mechanisms whereby group behaviours influence individuals (Hedstrom and Swedberg 1998). Context also has relevance here because ‘causal mechanisms reside in social relations and context as much as in individuals’ (Marchal et al 2012, p.195). As Astbury and Leeuw (2010) put it: ‘a realist understanding of mechanisms is that mechanisms are sensitive to variations in context, as well as to the operation of other mechanisms in a particular context’ (p.360); mechanisms are not context bound, but context matters to how they function.

For realist evaluators, ‘change occurs when interventions, combined with the right contextual factors, release the generative [causal] mechanisms’ (Marchal et al 2012, p.202). In theory of change - the other popular theory-based evaluation approach - there are two types of theory to be explicated: implementation theory and programme theory (Blamey and Mackenzie 2007). Implementation theory concerns ‘what is required to translate
objectives into ongoing service delivery and programme operation’ (Weiss 1995, p.58), or the links between intervention activities and outcomes. There is a cross-over here between theory-based evaluation and contribution analysis (Mayne 2011); in order assess the contribution that a programme made to an outcome, one needs to know that the intervention activities were implemented as per the theory of change. Further, strengthening ‘the plausibility of the contribution analysis narrative’ depends upon assessing what Leeuw (2012) terms ‘implementation fidelity’ – were similar interventions with similar causal mechanisms implemented successfully or not in other situations? Programme theory, on the other hand, ‘refers to the hypothesised causal links between mechanisms released by an intervention and their anticipated outcomes’ (Blamey and Mackenzie 2007, p.445), or the assumptions held by programme designers and implementers (Chen 2005). Despite their centrality to theory-based evaluation, a recent systematic review of published theory-driven evaluations found that these assumptions or ‘inductive theories' were not commonly stated or presented (Coryn et al 2011).

We adopt many of the above perspectives from theory-based evaluation to take a prospective look at the potential economic legacy from the Commonwealth Games 2014, a multi-sports event taking place in Glasgow in 2014, for the host communities of the East End of Glasgow. As argued by Marchal et al (2012), a theory-based approach, in our case allied to a prospective assessment, can help with three of the difficulties faced by conventional evaluations, namely by improving attribution claims (Weiss 1997), enhancing the transferability of findings to other settings (Kernick and Mannion 2005), and making the findings more relevant for policy-makers by highlighting how they are sensitive to context (Stame 2004; Kernick 2006).

The Glasgow Commonwealth Games (CWG) 2014

The CWG were awarded to Glasgow in November 2007 and took place in July-Aug 2014, after seven years of preparation. In competition terms the CWG can be considered to be around 60 per cent of the size of the Olympics with 6,500 athletes taking part as against 10,500 at the London Olympics 2012. But in economic terms the CWG is much smaller, around one-eighteenth the size of the Olympics: the London Olympics cost £9.3 billion, whereas the budget for the CWG 2014 is £5634 million (Audit Scotland 2013), with public sector costs split 80:20 between the Scottish Government and Glasgow City Council. Each of the two main funders has stated legacy ambitions for the CWG, with economic objectives to the fore in each case, as shown in Table 1. The economic goals cover business growth, employability, marketing for both inward investment and tourism, and regeneration.
Glasgow has been praised for its approach to legacy, and for learning from past experience, particularly with regard to legacy planning and management, and the embedding of the event into broader regeneration strategies, though at the same time it was said that success will depend upon economic impacts on the local community (Matheson 2010). The East End of Glasgow is where several of the new and refurbished Games venues are located and is the location for the newly built Athletes Village. As such, it can be considered the main location, or ‘host community’ for the Games. Economic and environmental/sustainable legacy objectives are particularly relevant here. Glasgow’s candidate city file to the CWG Federation emphasised the East End in its stated local legacy objective:

“For the city – a successful Games and significant regeneration of the East End of Glasgow, making effective use of otherwise derelict land and creating employment opportunities for local people.” (GCC 2007, p.8).

During the preparation period for the CWG, the plans for the East End of Glasgow were criticised both in principle and in terms of the local economic benefits. For Gray and Mooney (2011) there has been a process of ‘territorial stigmatisation’ to portray the East End as an ‘uncivil’ place that acts as a brake on the city economy. For them, ‘the discourse of regeneration [and]...the engineering of collective hyperbole around the Commonwealth Games...operate...as alibis for property-led regeneration activity and punitive labour market policy’ (p.19). They argue that there is an ongoing process involving ‘a steady lowering of the expectations and horizons of the local population in terms of work and income’ (p.18). This alleged modification of people’s ambitions and aspirations is in order to bring them into line with the ‘insecure labour market’ in the city. For Gray and Mooney, the most that can be offered to local people will be ‘low wage, flexible and casualised forms of employment for some’ (p.18), so that poverty cannot be reduced. Furthermore, they are sceptical about the promised number of jobs to be created through regeneration in the East End.

On the property development side, Gray and Mooney talk of ‘the transfer of public wealth to the private sector via the built environment’ (p.22), and the fact that a ‘promise of houses’, might still lead to people in the East End being ‘driven out’. Paton et al (2012) similarly describe the CG as ‘a form of urban restructuring borne out of neoliberalism’ (p.3). They depict developments in the East End as an example of state-led gentrification with speculative property rewards for the private sector alongside a tenure mix strategy that may result in new residential developments that are ‘likely to be unaffordable for low-income East Enders’ (p.14), whilst local families are displaced. They are pessimistic about the effects of such efforts, saying that ‘such localised, market-led regeneration projects are unlikely to offer the solution’ and that the CG ‘is simply the latest in a long-line of area-
based, market-led urban renewal projects designed to revitalise, modernise and renew the East End of Glasgow’ (p.9). Several years after these published critiques, we use a systematic approach to make a prospective assessment of the likely economic impacts of the CWG upon the host communities of the East End of Glasgow.

Study Methods

Study Area

Our study area is shown in Figure 1. The boundary was selected as being almost co-terminus with Glasgow City Council’s East End Local Development Strategy Area, declared in 2008 (GCC 2008), the year after the award of the CWG. Given the close alignment of CWG developments with regeneration aims in Glasgow, for all intents and purposes the selected study area constitutes an intervention area in evaluation terms. It should be noted however that some definitions of the East End of Glasgow would comprise an area stretching further east and north to encompass an area three times the size of our study area. The study area comprises 623 hectares and contained approximately 11,000 dwellings with a resident population of nearly 19,000 people in 2012. It contains the two main newly constructed Games venues, the Emirates Indoor Area and Sir Chris Hoy Velodrome, and has two other Games venues adjacent to its borders, the International Hockey Centre to the west and the Tollcross International Swimming Centre to the east. The study area is very deprived: of the 27 datazones comprising the area, 21 are in the group of 15% most multiply deprived in Scotland considered the primary target for many public policy programmes (Scottish Government 2012). Although we call the area the East End, it comprises six constituent communities: Bridgeton, Calton, Camlachie, Dalmarnock, Gallowgate and Parkhead (part).

Research Methods

Our methods comprise the collection of primary and secondary data through both quantitative and qualitative means. A household survey was conducted in the study area in summer 2012 in which a cohort of 1,015 adult householders was recruited via door knocking at randomly selected addresses; the respondents will be re-interviewed in 2014 and 2016. The survey collected information from respondents relevant to all legacy domains. Secondary data on the study area was obtained from both Glasgow City Council and Scottish Government. Further information on changes in the study area was gathered via feedback sessions held about the survey findings with local organisations and community groups. Details of the legacy programmes and regeneration developments have been obtained on a regular basis from the main agencies responsible: Glasgow City Council; Clyde Gateway, the Urban Regeneration Company operative in the area; and Glasgow Life, the city’s arms-length company responsible for the delivery and management of sport,
leisure and culture services. Discussions about the programmes have also been held with these organisations, and a workshop was held with all legacy stakeholders in September 2013. Further information has been obtained through attendance at, and access to the papers from, the main legacy forums which bring the responsible officers together within the city: the Glasgow Legacy Evaluation Board and theme-based legacy working groups.

**Prospective Assessment Framework**

Our approach is an adaptation of the theory of change methodology proposed by Connell and Kubish (1998) to ask whether an intervention and its theory of change are ‘plausible, do-able and testable’, and as Mackenzie and Blamey (2005) suggest, combining the theory of change with primary and secondary data. In essence we address the context-mechanism-outcome matrix by considering a set of questions relating to three areas: people and place; programmes; and plausibility. Our ‘3P’ framework is shown in Table 2.

First, we consider the context of the East End by asking questions about the people and the place. This is in order to find out how much room for improvement there is in the East End, and to establish whether there is local interest in the outcomes being sought, as well as whether there are identifiable barriers to change or impact. Our own primary research in the study area is a key source of information for this stage of the assessment.

Second, we look at the legacy programmes themselves. Both the Scottish Government and Glasgow City Council have established or identified legacy programmes operative in the pre-Games period, and intended (at this stage) to continue after the event. There are 50 national legacy programmes and 88 local ones, thus indicating the magnitude of the legacy effort and of the research task. Although legacy programmes are organised within the main legacy themes, many programmes are relevant to more than one theme and thus we have identified all those programmes which we consider to have relevance to economic impacts. We then categorise them by type (e.g. capital investment projects; labour market programmes), and consider a set of five questions about them as shown in Table 2, including whether they can be said to be attributable to the CWG, irrespective of being identified as such by the partners.

Third, we address the issue of plausibility through a review of the existing research evidence about the impacts of multi-sports events as a whole, including emerging evidence from London 2012, since many of Glasgow’s legacy programmes were informed by the London experience. We consider impacts upon key economic sectors and the business environment
and relate this evidence to what we know about Glasgow and the East End. Having considered all three areas, we come to a view as to the likelihood of economic impacts being achieved for the East End in the short, medium and long term, and the conditions necessary for success.

**People and Place: Economic Circumstances in the East End**

Here, we consider economic circumstances in the East End, the scope and appetite for change, and the barriers to advancement.

The economy in the East End has been relatively weak. Secondary data indicates that the number of business locations (employment sites) in the study area has been falling, from 1,070 in 2008 to 1,010 in 2013, a drop of 6 percent. Our 2012 survey found that the employment rate in the study area, at 48%, was much lower than in Glasgow (61%) or Scotland (71%). If we look at the employment status of all adult members of our survey households, we find that the rate of workless households in the East End is double the national average – see Figure 2. Adults in workless households often face difficulties in seeking to gain employment due to poor employment connections, lack of knowledge or experience about how to seek a job, and low expectations within the household about getting a job.

With regard to the appetite and scope for change in employment circumstances, we found high rates of dissatisfaction with current circumstances among unemployed and long-term sick householders, with half and two-in-five being ‘very dissatisfied’ with their current position, respectively – Figure 3. We also found that two-in-five (41%) householders aged 16-64 who were not in full-time employment had actively searched for work in the past year, and a third (33%) had applied for a job. Again, this indicates that there a large number of adults in the East End would be receptive to initiatives to boost employment in the area.

There are, however, barriers to increasing employment in the East End. Although generally the level of educational qualifications in the study area is comparable to that for the city as a whole, there are parts of the study area where education levels are low: in Camlachie and Parkhead, the north-east quadrant of the study area, the rate of degree level qualifications at 23% lags far behind the city average of 40%. However, health is a more limiting human capital factor than education. Of those adults aged 16-64 who are not in employment, full-time education or retired, three-in-five (63%) reported that they had a long-term illness, disability or infirmity. Alternatively, of the two-in-five (39%) adults of working-age who
reported that they had a long-term illness, disability or infirmity, only a quarter (26%) were in work. Affordable childcare may be an issue for some households; just over a fifth (22%) or workless households contain dependent children. But the largest group of workless households are single adults, comprising 52% of all workless households, higher than across the UK at 41%. We suspect that many of this group of workless adults living alone in deprived areas may have other mental health or health behaviour problems preventing them seeking or gaining employment.

**Projects and Programmes for Economic Legacy**

We identified 62 legacy projects and programmes relevant to economic impacts, as summarised in Table 3. We also identified five groupings of programmes as follows: the CWG and associated cultural festivals; business procurement networks; capital investment projects; business & employer support and employability programmes; and marketing and inward investment programmes. After identifying all the programmes within each grouping, we then considered each programme in turn in relation to the following issues: the nature of the activity; its scale in terms of resources allocated and/or outputs intended; the geographic focus, be it Scotland, Glasgow, or the East End specifically; its attribution to the CWG, categorised as: wholly attributable; partially attributable, including enhanced, safeguarded and accelerated programmes; and, not attributable, i.e. would have happened anyway; and whether there was any evidence that the programme had, or was, delivering benefits to the East End area or population. As can be seen from Table 3, two-thirds (43) of the economic-related legacy programmes can be identified as wholly or partly attributable to the CWG, i.e. they would not have happened were the Games not awarded to Glasgow, and just over half (36) have delivered, or are delivering, benefits to the East End.

**Games and Associated Festivals**

The CWG itself took place over three weeks, but allied to the Games were two cultural programmes comprising music and arts events: Festival 2014 occurred at the same time as the Games, and Culture 2014 took place throughout the year. The latter comprised 200 projects and 800 events, some of which happened in the East End under the title *East End Social*, including at venues in our study area. The three combined programmes were intended to attract visitors to the country and city, with economic benefits flowing from the business activity associated with putting on cultural events, as well as from tourist expenditures. Although evidence from London showed that visitors attending a Games event spent twice as much during their stay as other visitors to the city, we can expect the economic benefits in Glasgow’s case to be less, since fewer of the visitors were from overseas: over 95% of the first, main release of tickets for CWG 2014 were sold to UK
addresses. Nevertheless, one of the benefits of the CWG identified by local residents in our survey was the extra custom generated for local shops and businesses by the visitors.

**Procurement Networks**

Both the Scottish Government and Glasgow City Council set up procurement networks as support networks, forums for inter-firm collaboration, and as electronic portals for local firms to register and compete for Games-related works contracts. Business Club Scotland has 3,000 members and The Glasgow Business Portal has 20,000 members. There is evidence that these mechanisms are working to the benefit of local firms. Overall, via the local portal, 66% of all construction and business supply contracts (£183m in value) have been awarded to Glasgow-based firms. Although there is no means of encouraging East End firms in particular to get involved, five East End businesses have been identified as securing contracts relating to the new ore refurbished venues.

**Capital Investment Projects**

There are 21 capital investment projects allied to the CWG and regeneration in the East End, but only half of these are considered attributable to the Games. Many projects are being delivered by the URC as part of its regeneration strategy and were planned to happen irrespective of whether the CWG occurred. Capital projects include: new business premises, both offices and manufacturing units; new and refurbished sports facilities; transport infrastructure works including a new road and refurbished railway station; public realm improvement works including to streets, historical buildings and parks; and construction and refurbishment of cultural venues. A majority of these capital projects (17) are occurring in, and will directly benefit, the East End.

There are a number of ways in which capital investment projects might have positive economic impacts. First, jobs may be provided during the construction phase of projects, and both GCC and the URC utilise community benefit clauses requiring 10% of jobs in CWG-related contracts above a minimum size to go to local people and key target groups such as the long-term unemployed. There is evidence that this is having modest benefits for people in the East End: in our 2012 survey we found 2.2% of householders reported having paid employment related to infrastructure and sport-facility construction projects in the previous two years.
There may also be jobs for local people in new business premises in the area, either built directly by the URC or built privately on sites prepared by the URC. As firms relocate, some job opportunities may arise immediately, but are more likely to occur in due course through staff turnover. Again, we found some evidence of this: 5.3% of our respondents reported employment in the past two years working in the new facilities in the area. Clyde Gateway have an aspirational target that 10% of new business jobs be offered to local people and they are, overall, exceeding this. There is further evidence that local people are gaining employment in new facilities through staff turnover: for example, data indicate that thirty three more jobs have gone to local people at one of the URC’s developments in the study area - the Eastgate Centre - since it opened two and a half years ago.

But we should not underestimate the scale of the task. It looks likely that by 2015, after 8 years operation, the URC will have helped deliver 1,800 jobs into the area in new premises, a significant achievement during a period of economic downturn. Yet, this represents around 40% of the target under their regeneration strategy (Clyde Gateway 2013), so there is a long way to go. Allied to the provision of more jobs in local premises, there is an expectation that employees will spend money in the local economy, but for this to occur, improvements to the local shopping and services environment are needed. The vulnerability of small businesses in situations of regeneration (Raco and Tunney 2010) has proved true in this case, with loss of shops in some areas, so that in two of the six communities, 40-80% of our respondents rated the shops as poor.

Finally, there is an aim to attract more firms to the area in the future as a result of improved transport infrastructure and an enhanced public realm to make the East End an attractive business location. As Figure 4 shows, regeneration has had more success with the former than the latter: four out of five respondents in our survey considered public transport services to be good, but only half thought the same about the local environment. At the start of the regeneration process and preparations for the Commonwealth Games in 2007, 16% of study area comprised vacant and derelict land, and by 2013 this had been reduced by around a quarter: at this rate, it will take 30 years to remove the brownfield sites in the area, many of which are contaminated.

**Employer Support and Employability Programmes**

There are two dozen employer support and employability programmes in operation, most of which are attributable to the CWG. Many of these seek to offer opportunities for volunteering, training, apprenticeships or subsidised jobs to various target groups such as those aged 16-26, recent graduates, care leavers and the long-term unemployed. The
programmes face issues of inadequate scale, targeting and effectiveness. The suite of programmes called The Glasgow Guarantee had provided half its target 8,000 places by late 2013, but this included only 130 people in our East End study area. As for effectiveness, of the 17% of our study cohort of working age who had undertaken training, an apprenticeship or work experience in the past year, only 15% were in employment when interviewed.

Weak targeting to those who could benefit the most applies particularly to volunteering for the Games; this is probably because delivery is more important than legacy for the organisations responsible for the event. Initial findings from a study of CWG volunteers shows that only 13% of those who registered for volunteering were from Glasgow, with a quarter being people who had volunteered at the London Olympics (GCPH 2014). Our survey reinforces the need for targeting and support if volunteering programmes are to best serve as employability programmes. Figure 5 shows that volunteering is far more likely to be undertaken by those in further and higher education, or in employment, than by those out of work.

On the other hand, there is positive evidence emerging about the effectiveness of job brokerage work around the URC’s activities. A recent independent review of the Games lead-in period, 2007 to 2013, has reported that Job Seeker Allowance (JSA) claimants in the URC’s are of operation (the vast majority of the claimants being in the Glasgow part of the operational area, including our study area and surroundings) had increased by less than in comparator areas over the same period of general economic downturn, and had in fact fallen in the last two years of the period by more than elsewhere (McTier and McGregor 2014). Having considered a number of explanations for these trends, the authors’ conclusion was that the most likely cause of the relatively positive trends in the URC’s area were the constructive relationships developed between the URC, dedicated job brokerage staff working with the URC and located in local JobCentre Plus offices, and employers.

Marketing and Inward Investment Programmes

A dozen programmes exist to attract businesses, events and tourists to Scotland and Glasgow on the back of the CWG, and indeed Glasgow city’s marketing bureau has a good track record and has won several international marketing awards for attracting events. Much of the focus is international, and little of it specifically seeks to market the East End, but with several international-quality sports facilities now located in the East End, the area is expected to benefit from future events.
Glasgow is likely to avoid the ‘white elephant’ syndrome of empty post-Games venues, and in fact 25 national and international sports events were held in the CWG venues in the pre-Games period 2010-14. By September 2014, one month after the Games, a further ten such events had been secured for the venues, and bids for a further eleven events were in progress (Scottish Government 2014). Thus, claims of sustainable use of venues in the future seem credible. But the extent to which such events provide a direct economic boost to the East End depends on whether the participants stay in the East End and use the local area outside the venues. As already noted, this requires further improvements to the local environment, and to the local retail and consumption amenities, otherwise its proximity will mean the East End it is likely to lose out to the city centre in economic terms.

**Plausibility: Applying the Evidence for Economic Impacts**

The most commonly reported positive impacts of past events have been economic, including upon: employment, including in the case of the CWG in Manchester in 2002 (Newby 2003); economic growth; investment and stock market values; and development of business networks, particularly in the case of the Sydney Olympics 2000 (Giesecke and Madden 2007; Berman et al., 2000; O’Brien 2005) and the CWG in Melbourne 2006 (KMPG 2006). Economic impacts are often said to be either temporary (Spilling 1996) or greatest in the 3-5 year period around the event itself (Oxford Economics 2012). On the other hand, economic growth stimulated by public sector investment in infrastructure is said to have a potential opportunity cost in other areas of public and welfare spending (McCartney et al 2010), as found in the case of the Sydney Olympics (Searle 2002). Further, organisers of multi-sports events have a ‘tendency to overstate the potential economic...benefits’ (Horne 2007, p.86). These two issues, scale and opportunity cost, are related. Having noted that the Glasgow CWG provides a relatively small intervention from which to expect health and other impacts compared with other multisport events, McCartney et al (2013) also remark in more positive vein that the possibility of opportunity costs being felt in other spending areas was less, due to the fact that the amount of investment required in infrastructure for the Games is less than for other similar events, since many existing venues are to be used.

The meta-evaluation of the London Olympic Games has reported a ‘substantial boost’ to the UK economy of the order of £8bn Gross Value Added (GVA) in the Games year and up to £3bn a year over the next decade, translating into 600-900,000 years of employment up to 2020 (Grant Thornton et at 2013), but with the peak in 2012, and a sharp drop in the next three years. The London Olympics are reported to have created around 30,000 jobs in the pre-Games and Games periods, with over twice this number of workless people in London being assisted through training, employment an skills development (DCMS 2013; SQW
2013). The main routes to this economic benefit came from four sources: the construction of the Olympic Park; the development of the Westfield shopping centre beside the Park (a development that was accelerated by 5-7 years); the boost to inward investment and the opening up of overseas markets as a result of Games-related promotional activity, support to businesses, and the contacts made through Games-related contracts; and the boost to tourism. What is more, the business expansion and tourism boost are considered likely to continue into the medium-term.

Economic impacts from multi-sports events are identified as coming through a number of routes: through key sectors such as construction, events and tourism, as in the case of London (DCMS 2013), and through improvements to the business environment in the case of post-industrial cities such as Barcelona, Manchester and Turin (OECD 2100). All of these success factors apply to some degree to Glasgow, though sometimes to a limited extent to the East End.

In terms of sectors, construction in the period leading up to the event is an important economic contributor, including non-Games construction. In Glasgow, most of the Games venues already existed, and major retail development, though planned, did not transpire, thus lessening the construction impact. But business premises construction has been underway and may extend the construction impact into the post-Games period. The development of an events industry, particularly around sports events, is said to contribute to a longer-lasting economic impact, as in the case of Melbourne (Westerbeek and Linley 2011). Glasgow already fits the model of a successful events location, with several new or refurbished venues to help attract further sports events. But as noted above, without an on-site hotel or other amenities, the East End will not benefit as much as expected from such events. Two of the factors said to support a tourism gain following a multi-sports events, as projected for London (Oxford Economics 2012), apply to Glasgow: provision of additional tourism capacity (Smith 2012) and supportive campaigns allied to the event (UKTI 2013), such as Scotland’s ‘Homecoming’ campaign. But again, the impacts on our study area are limited by the fact that none of the city’s venues or tourist experiences marketed to visitors are located in the East End of the city.

Positive impacts upon place and the business environment also derive from several sources. A successful event can enhance the reputation of local organisations and businesses, whereas there is a risk of reputational damage if negative aspects of a place are exposed (Smith 2012). Glasgow has sought to learn from the organisers of London 2012 and together with its own past experience as an event location, this gives it a better chance of
reputational gain from the CWG. Allied to reputation, and as recommended in the literature, Glasgow has used the CWG as a chance to re-brand itself in accord with the city’s main qualities (Anholt 2007; Herstein and Berger 2013), changing is main brand from one focused on style to one focused on its citizens’ friendliness, as in ‘People Make Glasgow’.

Firms also gain from business networks developed around the Games (O’Brien and Gardner 2006). As in London, where small and medium sized enterprises gained a significant proportion of the Olympics contract work (Michael 2013), Glasgow has used its business portal to benefit local firms. The question now is whether inter-firm communications, learning and collaboration can be generated within this network. Glasgow has also focused a lot of its capital investment on transport infrastructure, and such investments have been identified as contributing to productivity gains after other multi-sports events (Smith 2010), notably Barcelona’s infrastructure works. But improvements to infrastructure and accessibility are only one component of the improved quality of the urban environment necessary to attract future firms with high quality jobs to a city (Begg 2002; Mega 2010; OECD 2004). This route to improved urban competitiveness requires further improvements to the environment and amenities in the East End to sit alongside the city’s accessibility and cultural assets.

Two other ingredients for post-Games economic success have been identified as a focused economic development strategy and partnership development. It is argued that multi-sports events allied to economic regeneration are more likely to be successful if specific sectors of the economy are identified for development (Smith 2012; Andersson et al 2008). In London, strong themes around media industries and sport have been identified for the Olympic Park, with relevant higher education institutions involved. In Glasgow, whilst there has been notable success in attracting firms to the East End in a time of recession, the economic development strategy remains pragmatic rather than sector-led, although there is a possible emerging theme around security industries, so far based solely on the public sector, though this could change in due course to include the private sector.

Studies also suggest that new and improved partnerships (a partnership legacy) can be developed around a multi-sports event to be the benefit of public policy and the economy in the future. Evidence for partnership development has been reported for regional partnerships in Manchester (Smith and Fox 2007), for physical activity partnerships in the case of London (Centre for Sport Physical Education and Activity Research 2013), and for business training partnerships in the case of Sydney (O’Brien and Gardiner 2006). In our own research, stakeholders in Glasgow reported improved partnership working between
public sector organisations leading up to the CWG. But better partnership working may be more the case in relation to legacy programmes and the management of legacy, than in relation to the regeneration and sustained economic development of Glasgow’s East End.

The main regeneration effort is being delivered by the URC with a strong focus on the East End for infrastructure works, the development of business premises, and public realm improvements. But the need for regeneration efforts in particular locations to span the operations of a wide range of agencies, not just those agencies responsible for physical regeneration, is one that has been commented on in relation to the social regeneration of other parts of the city (GoWell 2010). A more focused regeneration strategy, one which considered whether key sectors could be developed in the area, would require closer working between the URC and agencies responsible for other key elements such as workforce training and skills development, inward investment and business support services, and the improvement of the retail and consumption environments. The transformation of the East End is more likely, we would argue, if the area becomes a main focus of effort, indeed a priority, for other agencies in support of the URC’s efforts.

**Conclusion**

We have used a theory-based evaluation approach, akin to that proposed by Connell and Kubish (1998) and Mackenzie and Blamey (2005), to make a prospective assessment of the likely economic impacts of the CWG 2014 upon the East End of Glasgow, encompassing both tangible and intangible impacts on hard and soft economic structures (Preuss 2007; Dickson et al 2011). To do this we developed a 3-P framework for the assessment in three parts: people and place of the East End; programmes of intervention; and plausibility of economic impact. By taking a look at the prospects for economic impact, and looking towards the post-Games period, we hope our work can eventually help with issues of attribution of effects (Weiss 1997), transferability of conclusions to other Games sites (Kernick and Mannion 2005), and policy-relevance of findings from evaluations of multi-sport events (Stame 2004; Kernick 2006).

Our overall assessment is that the CWG and regeneration are likely to have a short term economic impact upon the East End of Glasgow, and that medium to long-term sustained economic impacts are also possible. The latter are more likely to come via regeneration than as a result of the CWG, with many relevant capital investment projects un-attributable to the CWG. The short-term potential economic benefits from the CWG are likely to be lessened in the East End due to a number of factors including: weak targeting of the employability programmes to residents of deprived areas or of the East End specifically;
health barriers to taking up or retaining employment for a large proportion of the workless group; and low numbers of overseas tourists, who tend to spend more than domestic or local visitors.

Glasgow has some of the key components required for deriving an economic benefit after a multi-sports event, such as a track record of successful event management, and a city marketing bureau well able to attract future events to the venues. But there are also a number of weaknesses in the city’s approach to the regeneration of the East End, for which the CWG has been a catalyst or accelerator. Identifying these weaknesses may help future host cities who similarly seek to ally a multi-sport event to regeneration objectives to avoid some obvious pitfalls. First, the approach to the economic development of the East End is pragmatic rather than strategic, with key sectors of development yet to be identified. This may be understandable and defensible given that the pre-Games period at least has coincided with the global financial crisis and subsequent economic downturn, but it is still a weakness compared with other Games cities and hinders the provision of suitable training and skills development among the local workforce in advance of job opportunities.

This relates to the second key weakness: an absence of strategic partnership working between the main regeneration agency in the East End, the URC, and other key public sector agencies who could work in support of a local regeneration and economic development strategy in the fields of public health, education and skills, business development, inward investment, marketing, culture and leisure. In Glasgow’s case at least, and in a note of caution of future host cities, there is a disconnection between two of the more recent objectives for multi-sports events, namely to achieve area regeneration in a specific location, and to leave a partnership legacy after the event. Whilst partnership working practices have improved around the planning and management of legacy programmes, these are not generally site-specific or targeted on the regeneration of the East End, for which the governance arrangements run in parallel rather than being integrated with the main legacy programmes. Leaving the regeneration legacy in the hands of a single agency, performing well as it may be, could ultimately be a weakness in our view, especially given the scale of the task in this case.

A third potential weakness is time. The regeneration task for the East End of Glasgow is only a little over a third complete (in some terms even less than this) after seven years of operation in the pre-Games period, so the most important challenge is to maintain the political commitment, public funding and organisational focus for another 15 years at least. Achieving sustainable economic regeneration is possible if those organisations with
responsibility for firms, people and place at national and local level are required, encouraged and supported to share a common policy focus and priority (or at least a degree of priority) on the East End, long after the Games leave town. Certainly, for regional and post-industrial host cities such as Glasgow, the theory that legacy must extend from the pre-Games to the post-Games period, has to be made a reality by the governance structures responsible for multi-sports events and their local legacy. ‘Policy and institutional drift’ has previously been reported after the event (Smith and Fox 2007), and in this regard, the IOC’s requirement for cities from London onwards to report on legacy indicators for up to three years after the event (ICO 2012) seems very inadequate.
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1 Source: Inter-departmental business register, ONS.
2 The employment rate is the percentage of adults aged 16-64 who are in paid employment. Comparative figures for Glasgow and Scotland come from NOMIS.
3 Source: CWG 2014 Organising Committee.