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Jaegwon Kim’s contributions to philosophy of mind have focused on trying to find a place for mental phenomena in the causal order of events in the physical world. For decades, he has argued that mental properties can’t be causally efficacious unless they are somehow reducible to physical properties—given the hypothesis that the physical world is causally closed. On this point, he has been an opponent of non-reductive physicalism (NRP), which accepts the broadly physicalist worldview but denies psycho-physical identities; according to NRP, mental properties are not identical with, but are realized by, physical properties. Kim’s latest position is that some form of reduction may be possible for intentional mental properties (such as desires, beliefs, and so on) because they are ‘functionalizable’. Yet, he thinks that qualia aren’t reducible to physical properties, because they are not functionalizable. In fact, for the last decade or so, Kim has accepted the limitations of physicalism with respect to qualia, and offered a form of property dualism about mental properties. Qualia and Mental Causation in a Physical World is an edited volume with contributions from some of the most distinguished philosophers in the literature who respond to Kim on pretty much every point mentioned in this paragraph.

Louise Antony (ch. 1) defends NRP against Kim’s objections. She argues that mental properties can be causally efficacious without being reduced to physical properties. One challenge that Kim has proposed against the type of view that Antony defends is that mental properties turn out to be nomologically coextensive with heterogeneously disjunctive physical properties, in which case they cannot be real, nomic, properties. Antony doesn’t agree with Kim. She suggests that instances of some disjunctive properties can resemble each other enough to be grouped together objectively. Our capability of grouping them together under mental concepts is evidence that they share epistemic powers, powers that are manifested in our recognition of them as mental properties. Sydney Shoemaker (ch. 6) argues for a similar conclusion by elaborating on the concept of realization. He revisits an account of realization whereby microphysical states of affairs realize properties of macro entities (such as mental properties of human beings). This account, according to Shoemaker, doesn’t rule out the existence of mental causation. He suggests that the causal profiles of mental properties are parts of the causal profiles of types that correspond to maximally determinate microphysical states of affairs, or ‘MSE-properties’ in Shoemaker’s own terminology. Although there is much to appreciate in both Antony’s and Shoemaker’s defences of NRP, these two chapters share the problem—in fact, with the rest of the volume—of being relatively unresponsive to the existing literature on these issues. In particular, the concept of ‘realization’ and realization-based solutions to Kim’s worries about mental causation have been widely discussed over the last couple of decades, and it is not very clear what Antony and Shoemaker are offering on top of what they have previously proposed. It would be nice to see what they make of this literature and how they would respond to criticisms that have been raised against these and similar views.

Frank Jackson (ch. 2) offers a hybrid physicalist view about mental properties. He divides mental properties into two groups: role properties, which are functional properties, and occupant properties, which realize functional properties. The occupant properties also happen to be physical properties. In response to Kim’s worries about mental causation,
Jackson holds that although role properties themselves are not causally efficacious, their occupants, which are still mental properties—but also happen to be identical with physical properties—are causally efficacious. Brian McLaughlin (ch. 4) offers a detailed discussion of Kim's position, and one of the points he makes echoes Jackson's claim that functional properties fail to be causally active, but that this is not because they are excluded, or 'preempted' by their physical realizers; instead, functional properties/events 'are not the sort of entity to figure in causal relations' (p. 84). Barry Loewer (ch. 3) suggests that Kim's causal arguments against NRP are not effective once a counterfactual theory of causation is accepted. Fred Dretske's posthumously published article (ch. 7) is the last one in this volume that responds to Kim's worries about mental causation for NRP. Dretske addresses an issue that concerns the causal roles of the contents of intentional mental properties. Assuming externalism about mental content, such properties are extrinsic properties. There is a question as to how an extrinsic intentional property $M$ can have any causal role over and above the causal roles of the intrinsic properties of $M$'s bearers. Dretske argues that the causal role of the extrinsic features of $M$ is that such features explain why the intrinsic properties of $M$'s bearers play the roles they do. For example, if you want to know why my neurons fire the way they do so as to cause my hand to grasp the bottle when I want to drink water, you need an explanation about how I happen to have evolved in such a way that I can represent 'water' as content of my desire.

Ned Block's article (ch. 5) stands out in the volume as the only chapter that puts Kim's philosophy of mind in a very contemporary context. He does this by arguing that Kim's (and others') view of reduction neglects the metaphysical aspect of reduction. It should be noted that Block employs a narrow usage of the term 'metaphysical'; he takes metaphysics to be the study of ground, which is a very topical notion these days. Block argues that physicalism in the metaphysical sense should show that phenomenal similarities are grounded in physical similarities, and he claims that no one has successfully shown that this can be done. (Similarly, a functionalist, according to Block, should show that phenomenal similarities are grounded in functional similarities.) My worry with this way of characterizing physicalism is that it makes physicalism very difficult, if not impossible, to defend. The reason for this is that Block, like many others in the grounding literature, takes grounding to be an asymmetric relation. This renders even reductive physicalism a non-physicalist view, as that theory would identify phenomenal properties with the physical ones, but identity is a symmetric relation.

Christopher Hill (ch. 8) and Michael Tye (ch. 9) argue for representationalism about qualia. It is usually thought that representationalism is one way of fitting qualia into a broadly physicalist worldview. It holds that the qualitative features of mental properties can be explained in terms of their representational contents. But Kim—although he would have liked to be a physicalist about qualia if he were convinced by physicalist solutions to the problem of qualia—doesn't think that representationalism is true, and opts for dualism when it comes to such properties. The careful reader will note that Hill's version of representationalism is different from Tye's version. Whereas Hill explicitly rejects the supervenience-based formulation of representationalism, Tye takes representationalism to be the view that qualitative features of experiences supervene on their representational content.

The last two chapters don't explicitly address the book's title. James Van Cleve (ch. 10) discusses and criticizes a view about experience according to which experience is ‘transparent’. On this view, the perceiver 'sees through' her experience and has direct
contact with its objects. The only mention of Kim is an attribution to him the view that qualia are intrinsic properties (p. 209). Lawrence Sklar’s article (ch. 11) isn’t on either qualia or mental causation. He discusses whether fundamental physics can do the things that he claims some philosophers—we don’t know who, because no one is mentioned—want it to do. One relevant point is the question of universality: Can fundamental physics apply to all systems, such as those that are invoked by the ‘special sciences’? Sklar expresses his scepticism.

I shall end this review with a note of caution for potential readers. The volume might give the impression that the literature on these issues, in particular Kim’s worries about qualia and mental causation, has not advanced significantly in the last decade. But such an impression is misleading. These issues are still subject to vigorous, ongoing enquiry. Both Kim’s and his critics’ contributions to the metaphysics of mind should be celebrated, but without neglecting what others have said on these issues recently.

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