De re modality, essentialism, and Lewis's Humeanism

Beebee, H. and MacBride, F. (2015) De re modality, essentialism, and Lewis's Humeanism. In: Loewer, B., and Schaffer, J. (eds.) A Companion to David Lewis. Series: Blackwell companions to philosophy (57). John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.: Oxford, pp. 220-236. ISBN 9781118388181 (doi:10.1002/9781118398593.ch14)

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Modality is standardly thought to come in two varieties: de dicto and de re. De re modality concerns the attribution of modal features to things or individuals, and enshrines a commitment to Aristotelian essentialism. This chapter considers how David Lewis's conception of de re modality fits into his overall metaphysics. The hypothesis is that the driving force behind his metaphysics in general, and his adherence to counterpart theory in particular, is the distinctly Humean thought that necessary connections between distinct existences are literally unintelligible. Lewis's appeal to counterpart theory in his account of truthmakers is explicitly aimed at delivering a truthmaker principle that eschews necessary connections. Lewis's attitude towards several well-rehearsed debates in contemporary ontology and the reasons underlying that attitude closely mirror Hume's incendiary verdict on "divinity and school metaphysics." Finally, de re modality is connected with his adherence to the doctrine of "Humean supervenience".

Item Type:Book Sections
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Macbride, Professor Fraser
Authors: Beebee, H., and MacBride, F.
College/School:College of Arts > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Publisher:John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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