Random assignment: redefining the serial rule

Bogomolnaia, A. (2015) Random assignment: redefining the serial rule. Journal of Economic Theory, 158(A), pp. 308-318. (doi:10.1016/j.jet.2015.04.008)

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Abstract

We provide a new, welfarist, interpretation of the well-known Serial rule in the random assignment problem, strikingly different from previous attempts to define or axiomatically characterize this rule. For each agent i we define ti(k) to be the total share of objects from her first k indifference classes this agent i gets. Serial assignment is shown to be the unique one which leximin maximizes the vector of all such shares (ti(k)). This result is very general; it applies to non-strict preferences, and/or non-integer quantities of objects, as well. In addition, we characterize Serial rule as the unique one sd-efficient, sd-envy-free, and strategy-proof on the lexicographic preferences extension to lotteries.

Item Type:Articles
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Bogomolnaia, Professor Anna
Authors: Bogomolnaia, A.
College/School:College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics
Journal Name:Journal of Economic Theory
Publisher:Elsevier B.V.
ISSN:0022-0531
ISSN (Online):1095-7235

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