
This is the author’s final accepted version.

There may be differences between this version and the published version. You are advised to consult the publisher’s version if you wish to cite from it.

http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/108344/

Deposited on: 7 September 2015

Enlighten – Research publications by members of the University of Glasgow
http://eprints.gla.ac.uk
Abstract

For a reforming government intent on improving efficiency, a natural way to discriminate between alternatives is via optimal taxation. In light of this, we examine quantitatively the extent of progressivity or regressivity of optimal labour income taxation in a model with skill heterogeneity, endogenous skill acquisition and a production sector with capital-skill complementarity. We find that wage inequality driven by the resource requirements of skill-creation implies progressive labour income taxation. In particular, in the steady-state, skilled labour income is taxed about forty percent more than unskilled labour income. We further find that the optimal transition path from the exogenous to optimal policy steady-state also exhibits progressive labour income taxation. These results are explained by a lower work time elasticity for skilled versus unskilled labour which results from the introduction of the skill acquisition technology.

Keywords: optimal progressive taxation, skill premium, allocative efficiency
JEL Classification: E24, E32, E62
Corresponding author: jim.malley@glasgow.ac.uk

*We would like to thank Fabrice Collard, Guido Cozzi, Pedro Gomes, Charles Nolan, Apostolis Philippopoulos, Peter Rosenkranz, Peter Birch Sørenson, Ulrich Woitek, participants at the Crestasee Workshop, University of Zurich, July 2014 and the CESifo Workshop on Reforming the Public Sector, Venice, July 2014 for helpful comments and suggestions.
1 Introduction

An important way to reform the public sector with respect to how it affects the allocation of resources is via changes to its tax policy. For a government intent on improving efficiency, a natural way to discriminate between alternatives is via optimal taxation, taking into consideration policy restrictions that may apply to tax policy. Our aim in this paper is to first characterise the optimal tax policy in the long run, and then to analyse the optimal path of reform from the current economy to the optimal steady-state.

The literature on optimal taxation has examined extensively the question of the optimal progressivity of the tax system in environments with heterogeneous agents and income inequality (see e.g. Mirrlees (1971), Diamond (1998), Saez (2001) and Kocherlakota (2010)). This framework is mainly chosen to capture the key trade-off underpinning the choice of optimal progressive taxation, namely equity versus efficiency. On one hand, equity ambitions typically prescribe progressivity of the tax system, while, on the other hand, efficiency goals are generally associated with regressive tax structures.

In contrast to the studies referred to above, this paper examines quantitatively the optimal progressivity or regressivity of labour income taxation in a model without redistributive motives. To this end we employ a representative agent setup incorporating skill heterogeneity, capital-skill complementarity, endogenous skill acquisition and wage inequality. Our interest in this question is motivated by the empirical relevance of wage inequality. For example, following reductions in earnings inequality in the U.S. for most of the 20th century, this trend has reversed since 1980 such that the wage premium for skilled workers is at its highest level since 1910 (see e.g. Goldin and Katz (2008)). Alternatively, Goldin and Katz (2008) provide historical evidence for the 20th century demonstrating that wage inequality has developed within a production sector characterised by capital-skill complementarity.

As discussed above, optimal progressive taxation generally follows from equity considerations and may lead to increased efficiency in the presence of market failures. However, while we generally expect some form of regressive taxation for efficiency reasons, the implications of income taxation for resource allocation ultimately depend on the structure of the underlying economy and, in particular, on the effects of taxes on the optimal reactions of the private economic agents. Thus, in the context of the empirically relevant analytical framework sketched out above, this paper concentrates on

---

1Given the importance of these developments, an extensive literature has studied wage differentials between college and high school graduates (see e.g. Acemoglu and Autor (2011) Goldin and Katz (2008) and Hornstein et al. (2005) for reviews).
the efficiency incentives of optimal taxation by employing perfect capital and labour markets to derive the Ramsey plan that minimises tax distortions.\(^2\)

In light of the above, we calculate optimal factor income taxation in an environment embodying two types of labour services (skilled and unskilled), two types of capital (structures and equipment) and endogenous acquisition of skill. We employ the production technology in Krusell et al. (2000) and also used in e.g. Lindquist (2004), He and Liu (2008) and Pourpourides (2011), since this has been shown to provide a good match to the data. This technology specifies that equipment capital complements skilled labour more than unskilled so that changes in its accumulation are skill biased.

Our analysis of skill acquisition and capital-skill complementarity builds on and extends the model in He and Liu (2008).\(^3\) In particular, we assume that a representative household decides how to allocate its expenditure into investment in the two types of capital stock and into goods for creating skilled labour. Moreover, it decides how to allocate its time endowment into leisure, work time in skill and unskilled jobs, and in education or training for creating skilled labour. The technology assumed for the creation of skilled hours follows a standard Cobb-Douglas form, which allows the model to capture the goods and time opportunity costs of creating skilled labour services. The resource requirements associated with skill acquisition in turn imply that there is a wage premium accruing to skilled labour to compensate for these costs.

In other recent work, Angelopoulos et al. (2014), we analyse optimal tax smoothing under skill heterogeneity and capital-skill complementarity, when the government has access to state-contingent debt and a complete set of state-contingent tax instruments. This is carried out in a stochastic environment with endogenous and exogenous skill supply by different workers, under externalities in skill creation. In contrast, our interest here is in optimal factor return taxation in a deterministic environment with a representative worker, without market failures, both in the long-run as well along the transition to the Ramsey steady-state. In particular, by first focusing on the long-run under Ramsey policy, we examine the degree of optimal labour income tax progressivity. Second, by calibrating the model under exogenous

\(^2\)As is common in the public finance literature of Ramsey optimal taxation, the requirement to tax will be exogenously imposed on the government, which is assumed to have access to a commitment technology. Additionally, since we do not allow policy makers to have access to lump-sum policy instruments, we focus on the second-best Ramsey problem.

\(^3\)The model in He and Liu (2008) provides a useful framework in which they study policy reforms in the presence of wage inequality (see also Angelopoulos et al. (2013)). Since our aim here is to analyse optimal policy, we modify their model to allow for an endogenous labour-leisure choice, which is necessary when examining optimal labour taxes.
policy to data averages for the U.S., we calculate the optimal transition paths for policy and allocations from the exogenous policy economy to the Ramsey steady-state.

In contrast to general expectations, when only efficiency motives maintain, we find that wage inequality driven by the resource requirements of skill-creation implies progressive labour income taxation. In particular, in the steady-state, skilled labour income is taxed about 40% more than unskilled labour income. We further find that this is explained by the lower elasticity for skilled labour relative to that of unskilled. The intuition for this result is that the resources employed for creating skilled labour generates additional opportunity costs for the provision of skilled labour, which act to reduce the responsiveness of skilled work time when the tax on skilled labour income changes. When the model is calibrated to U.S. data, these effects, on balance, lower the skilled labour elasticity relative to that for the unskilled. Thus they create an incentive for the Ramsey planner to tax skilled labour income more than unskilled for efficiency purposes.

It should be noted that optimal progressive labour income taxation is obtained in this framework in the absence of market failures. This is important because the literature has already demonstrated that in some circumstances progressive taxation may improve resource allocation by correcting for an underlying market failure, thus creating efficiency incentives for progressive taxation. For instance, when lower income is related to market exclusion, redistributive taxation may increase economic growth by increasing participation and economic performance (see e.g. Drazen (2000)).

We next consider a reform of the tax system that leaves fiscal expenditure unchanged. In particular, we assume that the current policy regime is one where tax and debt policy are constant and given by an exogenous policy regime, calibrated to match the data averages. We then consider a change in the policy regime, such that the government optimally chooses the time path of taxes and debt. We find that the Ramsey plan over the transition period requires capital taxes to be set very high in the first period and then rapidly decrease towards zero, as is common in the literature on optimal capital taxation (see e.g. Chamley (1986) and Chari and Kehoe (1999)). By contrast, both labour income taxes turn into subsidies in the first period, before converging to their steady-state levels. Notably, the tax system becomes progressive from the first period. As is also common in the optimal taxation literature, the government runs big surpluses in the first period. This allows it to create a stock of assets, which is in turn used to finance primary deficits in the future. Finally, it is worth noting the Ramsey plan implies a sharp increase in wage inequality in the first periods, before the skill premium returns effectively to its initial level. However, the increase in tax progressivity

3
implies that net wage inequality is reduced under Ramsey policy.

Given the realistic difficulty of setting capital taxes to be very high in the very short-run and equal to zero in the long-run, we repeat the experiment above by not letting the government choose the capital income taxes, which are now constrained to remain fixed at the pre-reform, steady-state level. Hence, the government can choose the remaining tax/subsidies and debt to maximise welfare for the economy, starting from the current steady-state. We find that the labour income taxes remain optimally progressive in this case. However, the progressivity is lower because a lower skilled relative to unskilled income tax, which acts to increase skilled labour supply, also works to stimulate capital accumulation. Moreover, as the government is not able to generate big surpluses in the first period, because it cannot increase the capital tax, optimal policy now implies debt, as opposed to assets, in the long-run. Finally, wage inequality is reduced in both gross and net of tax terms.

The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical model. Section 3 first specifies the functional forms used for production, utility and skill acquisition, followed by the model calibration and the steady-state solution under exogenous fiscal policy. Section 4 solves the Ramsey model and discusses the steady-state results for optimal policy together with the transition paths of the optimal policy instruments and allocations. Finally, section 5 contains the conclusions.

2 The model

The economy is populated by a representative household which supplies skilled and unskilled labour services. Following He and Liu (2008) skilled labour requires the creation of skill, which is determined by time and goods. There is also a representative firm that uses two types of capital and two types of labour for the production of a homogeneous product. Following Krusell et al. (2000), skilled labour is assumed to be more complementary to capital equipment than unskilled labour. Thus, capital equipment accumulation is skill biased and tends to increase the skill premium, defined as the ratio of the skilled to unskilled wage. In contrast, increases in the relative supply of skilled labour tend to reduce the skill premium. Since provision of skilled labour comes at a cost to the household, a wage premium for skilled labour is required in equilibrium to maintain net wage parity. Finally, the government finances exogenous public spending by issuing debt, taxing all
sources of income and subsidising investment in skill acquisition.4

2.1 The representative household

2.1.1 Utility

The lifetime utility of the representative household is given by:

\[ U = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t u(C_t, l_t) \]  

(1)

where \( 0 < \beta < 1 \) is a constant discount factor and denotes the time preference of the individual; \( C_t \) and \( l_t \) are consumption and leisure respectively at period \( t \); and \( u(\cdot) \) is increasing in its arguments, strictly concave and three times continuously differentiable.

2.1.2 Constraints

The representative household faces the following time constraint:

\[ 1 = l_t + h^s_t + h^u_t + e_t \]  

(2)

where \( h^s_t \) and \( h^u_t \) denote skilled and unskilled labour work time respectively in period \( t \) and \( e_t \) is time devoted to education or other training for skills acquisition in period \( t \).

The skill acquisition function is given by:

\[ h^s_t = g(E^p_t, e_t) \]  

(3)

where \( E^p_t \) is expenditure on creating skills, and \( g(\cdot) \) is increasing in its arguments, strictly concave and three times continuously differentiable.

The law of motion for the two types of capital stock, \( i \in \{p, e\} \), where \( p \) and \( e \) denote plant and equipment capital respectively, is given by:

\[ K^i_{t+1} = (1 - \delta^i) K^i_t + I^i_t. \]  

(4)

---

4Given that we extend the benchmark neoclassical model to isolate the importance of capital-skill complementarity and skill-acquisition for optimal taxation, we retain the remaining modelling assumptions of the base model analysed in the literature following Chari et al. (1994). Therefore, we assume perfect competition in product and labour markets, do not consider the potential role of government tax and spending policies in the form of providing public goods and/or correcting for other market failures and choose functional forms for utility, skill-acquisition and production that are commonly employed in the dynamic general equilibrium tax literature.
The depreciation rate is denoted $0 \leq \delta_i \leq 1$ and $I_{t,t}$ is the investment in period $t$.

Finally, the household has the following budget constraint equating total expenditure with total income in period $t$:

$$C_t + P_t^t + I_t^e + (1 - s_t^g)E_t^g + \frac{b_t+1}{R_t^b} = (1 - \tau_{t}^s)w_t^s h_t^s +$$

$$+(1 - \tau_{t}^u)w_t^u h_t^u + (1 - \tau_{t}^p) r_t^p K_t^p + (1 - \tau_{t}^e) r_t^e K_t^e + b_t$$  \hspace{1cm} (5)

where, $\frac{b_t+1}{R_t^b}$ is the discounted value of bonds bought by the household at start of period $t$; $R_t^b \equiv (1 + r_t^p)$ is the gross return to bonds; $b_t$ is the payout value of bonds bought at period $t - 1$; $s_t^g$ is a subsidy for spending on goods for skill acquisition; $\tau_{t}^s$, $\tau_{t}^u$, $\tau_{t}^p$, and $\tau_{t}^e$ are the tax rates on skilled and unskilled labour income as well as plant and equipment capital income in period $t$ respectively.

### 2.1.3 First-order conditions

Using equation (4) for $i \in \{p, e\}$ to substitute out plant and equipment investment, the Lagrangian for the household problem is:

$$\mathcal{L} = \max \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \beta^j u(C_{t+j}, l_{t+j}) + \Lambda_{t+j}(C_{t+j} + K_{t+j+1}^p -$$

$$- (1 - \delta^p)K_{t+j}^p + K_{t+j+1}^e) - (1 - \delta^e)K_{t+j}^e + (1 - s_t^g) E_t^g +$$

$$+ \frac{b_{t+j+1}}{R_t^b} - (1 - \tau_{t+j}^s)w_{t+j}^s h_{t+j}^s - (1 - \tau_{t+j}^u)w_{t+j}^u h_{t+j}^u -$$

$$- [(1 - \tau_{t+j}^p) r_{t+j}^p] K_{t+j}^p - [(1 - \tau_{t+j}^e) r_{t+j}^e] K_{t+j}^e - b_{t+j}] +$$

$$+ M_{t+j}[h_{t+j} - g(E_{t+j}^g, e_{t+j})]$$  \hspace{1cm} (6)

where from the time constraint, $l_{t+j} = 1 - h_{t+j}^s - h_{t+j}^u - e_{t+j}$. The representative household chooses $\{C_t, h_t^s, h_t^u, e_t, E_t^g, K_t^p, K_t^e, b_{t+1}\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$ given prices and taxes to maximize equation (6) which gives respectively the following first-order conditions (FOCs):

$$U_{C_t} = -\Lambda_t$$  \hspace{1cm} (7)

$$U_{h_t^s} = \Lambda_t (1 - \tau_{t}^s)w_t^s - M_t$$  \hspace{1cm} (8)

$$U_{h_t^u} = \Lambda_t (1 - \tau_{t}^u)w_t^u$$  \hspace{1cm} (9)

$$U_{e_t} = M_t g_{e_t}$$  \hspace{1cm} (10)

$$g_{E_t^g} = \frac{\Lambda_t}{M_t} (1 - s_t^g)$$  \hspace{1cm} (11)
\[
\Lambda_t = \beta \left\{ \Lambda_{t+1} \left[ r^p_{t+1}(1 - \tau^p_{t+1}) + (1 - \delta^p) \right] \right\} \tag{12}
\]
\[
\Lambda_t = \beta \left\{ \Lambda_{t+1} \left[ (r^c_{t+1}(1 - \tau^c_{t+1}) + (1 - \delta^c) \right] \right\} \tag{13}
\]
\[
\Lambda_t = \beta \Lambda_{t+1} R^b_t \tag{14}
\]

where \( U_x \) and \( g_x \) are the derivatives of the utility and skill accumulation functions with respect to the relevant variable denoted generically as \( x \); and \( \Lambda_t \) and \( M_t \) are the Lagrange multipliers associated with the budget constraint and the skill acquisition equation, respectively.

These equilibrium conditions imply first, that the marginal utility of consumption, \( U_C \), is equal to the shadow price of the budget constraint, \( \Lambda_t \), which measures the change in maximised utility, when the constraint is relaxed by a unit. Second, the marginal disutility of skilled/unskilled work time, \( U_{h^s} \) and \( U_{h^u} \), are equal to the net of tax return to skilled/unskilled work, \( (1 - \tau^s_t)w^s_t \) and \( (1 - \tau^u_t)w^u_t \) respectively valued by the shadow price, \( \Lambda_t \). Additionally, the return to skilled work is also net of the shadow price, \( M_t \), of the skilled employment constraint, capturing the valuation, in utility terms, of the cost of creating skill. Third, the marginal disutility of education, \( U_e \), is equal to the marginal increase in skilled employment due to a unit increase in education time, \( g_e \), valued by the shadow price, \( M_t \). Fourth, the marginal increase in skilled employment for a unit increase in goods expenditure, \( g_E \), is equal to the ratio of shadow prices, \( \frac{\Lambda_t}{M_t} \), net of the subsidy to goods invested to create skill, \( (1 - s^g_t) \). Finally the last three conditions, equate the marginal utility of consumption in period \( t \), \( \Lambda_t \), with discounted marginal utility of consumption due to saving in plant/equipment capital net of taxes and depreciation, and bonds.

By combining equation (8) with equation (9), and noting that \( U_{h^s} = U_{h^u} \), we see that the return to skilled labour net of tax and the cost for skill acquisition, must equal in equilibrium, the net of tax return to unskilled labour:

\[
(1 - \tau^s_t)w^s_t - \frac{M_t}{\Lambda_t} = (1 - \tau^u_t)w^u_t. \tag{15}
\]

In other words, wage parity requires that the net returns to an hour in either skilled or unskilled labour are equalised. Therefore, in an economy without market failures, the skill premium is the compensation to skilled labour for the opportunity cost of acquiring skills.

We next substitute the condition relating to the return to bonds (14) into equations (12) and (13) to obtain:

\[
R^b_t = r^p_{t+1}(1 - \tau^p_{t+1}) + (1 - \delta^p) \tag{16}
\]
\[
R^b_t = r^c_{t+1}(1 - \tau^c_{t+1}) + (1 - \delta^c). \tag{17}
\]
These define the no-arbitrage conditions for capital and bonds ensuring that the three assets have the same rate of return in equilibrium. Finally, the following transversality conditions for \( i \in \{ p, e \} \), excluding Ponzi games, must hold for the economy to reach a stationary equilibrium (see also e.g. Ljungqvist and Sargent (2011, ch. 16) on transversality conditions with government debt):

$$
\lim_{t \to \infty} \beta^l U_c C_t b_{t+1}^t = 0 \quad (18)
$$

$$
\lim_{t \to \infty} \beta^l U_c K_t^i = 0. \quad (19)
$$

### 2.2 The representative firm

The representative firm produces a homogeneous consumption good, \( Y_t \), using skilled, \( \tilde{h}_t^s \), and unskilled, \( \tilde{h}_t^u \), labour as well as plant, \( \tilde{K}_t^p \), and equipment, \( \tilde{K}_t^e \), capital. Acting in perfectly competitive factor markets, taking prices, policy and exogenous variables as given, the firm maximises its profits, \( \Pi_t \):

$$
\max_{\tilde{h}_t^s, \tilde{h}_t^u, \tilde{K}_t^p, \tilde{K}_t^e} \Pi_t = Y_t - w_t^s \tilde{h}_t^s - w_t^u \tilde{h}_t^u - r_t^p \tilde{K}_t^p - r_t^e \tilde{K}_t^e \quad (20)
$$

subject to a Krusell et al. (2000) type production function:

$$
Y_t = f \left( \tilde{h}_t^s, \tilde{h}_t^u, \tilde{K}_t^p, \tilde{K}_t^e \right) \quad (21)
$$

where \( f(\cdot) \) is homogenous of degree one; a tilde over a variable denotes firm quantities; \( w_t^s \) and \( w_t^u \) are the returns to skilled and unskilled labour respectively; and \( r_t^p \) and \( r_t^e \) are the returns to capital holdings in equipment and structures respectively.

Choosing the optimal amount of hours of skilled and unskilled labour to hire and the optimal quantity of plant and equipment capital to rent yields the following first-order conditions:

$$
w_t^s - f_{\tilde{h}_t^s} = 0 \quad (22)
$$

$$
w_t^u - f_{\tilde{h}_t^u} = 0 \quad (23)
$$

$$
r_t^p - f_{\tilde{K}_t^p} = 0 \quad (24)
$$

$$
r_t^e - f_{\tilde{K}_t^e} = 0 \quad (25)
$$

equating the returns on each factor to their respective marginal products. Given the structure employed, profits are zero in equilibrium.
2.3 Government budget constraint

The government’s budget constraint in each period is:

\[ G^c + s_t^g E^g_t + b_t = \tau_t^s w_t^s h_t^s + \tau_t^u w_t^u h_t^u + \tau_t^P r_t^P K_t^p + \tau_t^e r_t^e K_t^e + \frac{b_{t+1}}{R_t^b} \]  \(26\)

and states that expenditure on public consumption, \(G^c\), the subsidy to spending on education and repayments on existing debt (issued at the start of period \(t-1\)) must be equal to the revenues from taxing labour and capital income plus the discounted value of new debt issued at the start of period \(t\).

2.4 Market clearing conditions

Output can be used for public and private consumption, plant and equipment investment as well as goods spending to acquire skills, implying the following aggregate resource constraint:

\[ Y_t = G^c + C_t + I_t^p + I_t^e + E^g_t. \]  \(27\)

Additionally, the market clearing conditions in the capital and labour markets are given by:

\[ \tilde{K}_t^p = K_t^p \]  \(28\)
\[ \tilde{K}_t^e = K_t^e \]  \(29\)
\[ \tilde{h}_t^s = h_t^s \]  \(30\)
\[ \tilde{h}_t^u = h_t^u. \]  \(31\)

2.5 Decentralised competitive equilibrium

The decentralised competitive equilibrium (DCE) with exogenous policy is summarized by a sequence of allocations \(\{C_t, h_t^s, h_t^u, e_t, E_t^g, K_t^p, K_t^e, \tilde{h}_t^s, \tilde{h}_t^u, \tilde{K}_t^p, \tilde{K}_t^e\}_{t=0}^{\infty}\), the residual policy instrument \(\{b_{t+1}\}_{t=0}^{\infty}\) and prices \(\{w_t^s, w_t^u, r_t^p, r_t^e\}_{t=0}^{\infty}\) such that the representative household solves its optimisation problem and the firm maximises profits, taking prices, tax rates, initial conditions for capital and debt, and fixed \(G^c\) as given; the government budget constraint is satisfied and all markets clear. The DCE system is presented in the Appendix, see equations (58)-(69).
3 Quantitative analysis exogenous policy

In this section we first specify the functional forms for production, utility and skill acquisition. We then calibrate the exogenous policy model using annual U.S. data for the period 1970-2011 and solve for the steady-state.

3.1 Functional forms

The production function follows the CES form as in Krusell et al. (2000):

\[ Y_t = A \left( \tilde{K}_t^\alpha \right)^{\lambda} \left\{ \nu \left( A^e \tilde{K}_t^\rho \right)^{\rho} + (1 - \nu) \left( \tilde{h}_t^{se} \right)^{\varphi/\rho} \right\}^{1 - \frac{\varphi}{\rho}} + (1 - \lambda) \left( \tilde{h}_t^u \right)^{\varphi} \]  \tag{32}

where, \(-\infty < \varphi, \rho < 1; 0 < a, \lambda, \nu < 1\). The parameters \(\varphi\) and \(\rho\) determine the factor elasticities, i.e. \(1/(1 - \varphi)\) is the elasticity of substitution between equipment capital and unskilled labour and between skilled and unskilled labour. The elasticity of substitution between equipment capital and skilled labour is given by \(1/(1 - \rho)\).\(^5\) The parameters \(a, \lambda, \nu\) denote the factor shares and finally, \(A > 0\) and \(A^e > 0\) are the total factor productivity and capital equipment augmenting technology parameters respectively.

The utility function follows the CRRA form in Chari et al. (1994):

\[ u(C_t, l_t) = \frac{(C_t^\gamma l_t^{1-\gamma})^{1-\sigma}}{1 - \sigma} \]  \tag{33}

where \((\sigma, \gamma) > 0\) represent the preference parameters of the representative household. Specifically, \(\gamma\) determines the weight given to consumption, and \(\sigma\) is the relative risk aversion coefficient.

Finally, the skill acquisition equation is a variant of the form used in He and Liu (2008):

\[ h_t^s = g(E_t^g, e_t) = S \left[ (E_t^g)^{\phi} (e_t)^{1-\phi} \right]^{\xi} \]  \tag{34}

where the shares of goods and time in the creation of skills are given by \(\phi\) and \(1 - \phi\) respectively, with \(0 < \phi < 1\). The parameter \(S > 0\) determines the efficiency of the skill-creation process. Finally, \(0 < \xi < 1\) is a measure of the returns to scale and is positive but less than unity to ensure that the model has a unique solution (see, e.g. He and Liu (2008)).

\(^5\)Note that capital-skill complementarity maintains if \(1/(1 - \rho) < 1/(1 - \varphi)\).
3.2 Calibration and steady-state

We calibrate the model under exogenous fiscal policy to target the key great-ratios using U.S. annual data for the period 1970-2011. Table 2.1 below reports the model’s quantitative parameters and Table 5 in the Appendix the sources for the data used for the calibration and referred to below. Starting with the share of leisure in utility, $(1 - \gamma)$, we calibrate it to 0.65 so that, in the steady-state, the household devotes about one third of its time to labour and education. The relative risk aversion parameter, $\sigma = 2$, is set to the value commonly employed in the literature (see, e.g. Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007) and the references reported in their paper).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1: Calibration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Definitions</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\delta^p$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\delta^e$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\beta$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\gamma$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\phi$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$S$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\xi$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\frac{1}{1-\rho}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\frac{1}{1-\varphi}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\lambda$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\nu$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\tau^s$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\tau^u$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\tau^p$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\tau^e$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$s^g$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$A$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$A^e$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The elasticities of substitution between skilled labour and capital and between unskilled labour and capital (or skilled labour) have been estimated by Krusell et al. (2000). Following the literature (see e.g. Lindquist (2004), and Pourpourides (2011)), we also use these estimates, to set $\varphi = 0.401$ and $\rho = -0.495$. Moreover, the income share of capital structures, $a$, is set to 0.12, as in Lindquist (2004). The remaining parameters in the production function are calibrated to ensure that the steady-state predictions of the
The model in asset and labour markets are consistent with the data. More specifically, the unskilled labour weight in composite input share, \((1 - \lambda) = 0.3\), is calibrated to obtain a skilled to unskilled labour ratio of about 79% (see Acemoglu and Autor (2011)) and the capital equipment weight share in composite input, \(\nu = 0.47\), is set to obtain a skill premium of approximately 1.64 using U.S. Census data. We also normalize the steady-state values of TFP and capital equipment efficiency to unity (i.e. \(A = A^e = 1\)).

The depreciation rates of capital structures and capital equipment, \(\delta^p = 0.08\) and \(\delta^c = 0.1\), are calibrated to obtain an annual capital to output ratio of about 1.94, which is consistent with the annual data reported by the BEA on capital stocks. These values are also in line with the works of Greenwood et al. (1997) and Krusell et al. (2000). The time discount factor, \(\beta = 0.96\), is set to obtain a post-tax post-depreciation annual real rate of return on capital of roughly 4.17%, which coheres with the value of 4.19% obtained from the World Bank.

The returns to scale parameter, \(\zeta\), in the skill acquisition equation is calibrated to be equal to 0.425, to obtain an investment in education to output ratio of about 1.8% which is similar to the average private expenditure on education in the U.S. using data from the Digest of Education Statistics. The weight on education time, \(1 - \phi\), is set equal to 0.45 to target average time in education as a share of total non-leisure time of about 5%. The efficiency of skills transformation, \(B\), is normalised to unity.

Finally, we follow the methodology in Martinez-Mongay (2000) and data from OECD and AMECO to construct series on effective capital and labour tax rates and obtain an average tax rate for capital and labour. Therefore, we set the tax rate for both capital income \(\tau^p = \tau^e = 0.31\) and the two labour income tax rates \(\tau^u = 0.20\) and \(\tau^s = 0.25\). Given that it is difficult to obtain data for the education investment subsidy, \(s^p\), we set it to zero under the exogenous fiscal policy. We finally set the value of government expenditures, \(G^c = 0.0320\), to obtain a steady-state debt to output ratio, \(b/Y = 53\%\), which is equal to the average debt to GDP ratio obtained using

\[\text{To obtain this value we assume that the total time spent in higher education is on average 4 years. Note that the average years of working is 35. Therefore, the percentage of time spent in education is } \frac{4}{35} = 0.1143. \text{ Taking into account that on average, 40-45\% of the overall population in the U.S. are college educated using data from the Census Bureau, we obtain: } \frac{4}{35} \times 0.45 = 0.0514.\]

\[\text{Note that the parameters in the skill acquisition equation are within the range suggested in the related literature (i.e. Heckman (1976) and Stokey (1996)).}\]

\[\text{Note that the calculation of the effective labour income tax rate is equal to 0.22. But since we assume that the skilled and unskilled labour income is taxed differently we decompose the labour income tax into skilled and unskilled tax so that the weighted average of the two tax rates equals 0.22.}\]
data from FRED.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2: Steady-state model</th>
<th>data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$C/Y$</td>
<td>0.563</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$K/Y$</td>
<td>1.945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$I/Y$</td>
<td>0.181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$E^s/Y$</td>
<td>0.018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$b/Y$</td>
<td>0.530</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$h^s/h^u$</td>
<td>0.798</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$G^c/Y$</td>
<td>0.238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$w^s/w^u$</td>
<td>1.640</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\bar{w}^s/\bar{w}^u$</td>
<td>1.538</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\tau$</td>
<td>0.042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\frac{e^{s+h^u+c}}{\delta}$</td>
<td>0.053</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Under exogenous fiscal policy we solve the decentralized competitive equilibrium system of equations (58)-(69) in the Appendix keeping the tax rates at their calibrated values in Table 1. Table 2 presents the steady-state results of the exogenous fiscal policy model together with the U.S. data averages for 1970-2011 (see Table 5 in the Appendix the sources for the data).

The steady-state presented in table 2 confirms that the model is close to the data as described above.\(^9\)

4 Optimal fiscal policy

In this section we derive the optimal Ramsey plan, where it is assumed that the government chooses the series of taxes, subsidies and debt to finance exogenously determined public spending, with the objective to maximise the welfare of the household.\(^10\) The government, in other words, wishes to minimise the welfare costs of taxation. To obtain the second-best allocations, it is assumed that the government has access to a commitment technology. To solve the Ramsey problem we use the primal approach and first derive the present discounted value (PDV) of the household’s lifetime budget constraint making use of the no-arbitrage and transversality conditions for the

\(^9\)Note that the barred values in Table 2 are defined as follows: $\bar{w}^s = (1 - \tau^s) w^s$, $\bar{w}^u = (1 - \tau^u) w^u$ and $\tau = (1 - \tau^1) r^1 + (1 - \delta^i) = R^b$, where $i = s, u$.

\(^10\)Note that following the optimal tax policy literature, we keep the level of $G^c$ fixed over time to the value obtained under exogenous fiscal policy. Note also that the subsidy to skill creation expenditure is added to ensure that all margins relating to the household’s decision making are taxed/subsidised, implying that the tax instrument set is complete (see e.g. Chari and Kehoe (1999)).
three assets as well as the Arrow-Debreu price of the bond. Second, we derive the implementability constraint by substituting out prices and tax rates from the household’s PDV budget constraint using the household’s and firm’s first-order conditions. Finally, we derive the optimal Ramsey plan by maximising the planner’s objective function subject to the implementability, skill acquisition and aggregate resource constraint.

4.1 Implementability constraint

Summing the household’s budget constraint (5) successively forward from $t = 0$ to $t = 1$ and imposing the no-arbitrage (16)-(17) and transversality conditions (18)-(19) gives the household’s PDV or lifetime budget constraint:

$$\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \left[ \prod_{i=0}^{t-1} (R_i^0)^{-1} \right] [C_t + (1 - s_t^0) E_t^0] = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \left[ \prod_{i=0}^{t-1} (R_i^0)^{-1} \right] \times \{ (1 - \tau_t^s) w_t^s h_t^s + (1 - \tau_t^u) w_t^u h_t^u \} + b_0 + \{ (1 - \tau_0^p) r_0^p + (1 - \delta^p) \} K_0^p + \{ (1 - \tau_0^r) r_0^r + (1 - \delta^r) \} K_0^r. \quad (35)$$

Following Ljungqvist and Sargent (2012), the Arrow-Debreu price is defined as:

$$q_t^0 = \prod_{i=0}^{t-1} (R_i^0)^{-1}, \forall t \geq 1, \text{ with } q_0^0 = 1, \text{ which implies that equation } (35) \text{ can be rewritten as:}$$

$$\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} q_t^0 [C_t + (1 - s_t^0) E_t^0] = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} q_t^0 \{ (1 - \tau_t^s) w_t^s h_t^s + (1 - \tau_t^u) w_t^u h_t^u \} + b_0 + \{ (1 - \tau_0^p) r_0^p + (1 - \delta^p) \} K_0^p + \{ (1 - \tau_0^r) r_0^r + (1 - \delta^r) \} K_0^r. \quad (36)$$

Notice that the Arrow-Debreu price satisfies the recursion:

$$q_{t+1}^0 = (R_t^0)^{-1} q_t^0. \quad (37)$$

Using the first-order conditions (7) and (14), the above recursion can be written as:

$$q_{t+1}^0 = \beta^{t+1} \frac{U_{C_t+1}}{U_{C_0}} \Rightarrow q_t^0 = \beta^t \frac{U_{C_t}}{U_{C_0}}. \quad (38)$$

Substituting: (i) equation (38) into equation (36) for $q_t^0$; (ii) the first-order conditions of the firm, (24)-(25) into equation (36) for $r_0^p$ and $r_0^r$ respectively; and (iii) the first-order conditions of the household, (7)-(11) into equation
(36) for \((1 - \tau_t^s)w_t^s\), \((1 - \tau_t^u)w_t^u\) and \((1 - s_t^g)\) gives the household’s implementability constraint:

\[
\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \left[ U_{C_t} C_t - \left( \frac{U_{C_t}}{g_{C_t}} \right) E_t^g + \left( \frac{U_{h_t^s}}{g_{h_t^s}} \right) h_t^s + U_{h_t^u} h_t^u \right] = A_0
\]  

(39)

where, \(A_0 = U + \left(1 - \tau_0^g\right) f_{K_0^p} + \left(1 - \delta^g\right) K_0^c + \left(1 - \tau_0^e\right) f_{K_0^e} + 1 - \delta^e\) \(K_0^c\). Note that \(f_{K_0^p}\) and \(f_{K_0^e}\) are obtained by substituting the market clearing conditions (28)-(29) into \(f_{\bar{K}_t^p}\) and \(f_{\bar{K}_t^e}\) respectively.

### 4.2 The primal approach

Under the primal approach the government maximises the following objective function:

\[
\max \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t U(C_t, l_t)  
\]  

subject to the skill acquisition (3), the aggregate resource (27) and the implementability (39) constraints by choosing: \(\{C_t, h_t^s, h_t^u, l_t, E_t^g, K_{t+1}^p, K_t^e\}_{t=0}^{\infty}\) given \(\{\tau_0^g, \tau_0^e, b_0, K_0^p, K_0^c\}\). Following Ljungqvist and Sargent (2012) we define a pseudo-value function and assume that \(\Phi\) is the Lagrange multiplier with respect to the implementability constraint:

\[
V(C_t, h_{s,t}, h_{u,t}, l_t; \Phi) = U(C_t, l_t) + \Phi \{U_{C_t} C_t - \left( \frac{U_{C_t}}{g_{C_t}} \right) E_t^g + \left( \frac{U_{h_t^s}}{g_{h_t^s}} \right) h_t^s + U_{h_t^u} h_t^u\}. 
\]  

(41)

We can then write the Lagrangian under the primal approach as:

\[
J = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t V(C_t, h_{s,t}, h_{u,t}, l_t; \Phi) + \theta_t[Y_t - G_t^c - C_t - E_t^g - K_{t+1}^p] 
+ (1 - \delta^p) K_t^p - K_{t+1}^c + (1 - \delta^e) K_t^e] + \zeta_t[h_t^s - g(E_t^g, e_t)] - \Phi A_0
\]  

(42)

where \(Y_t\) is given by equation (32) above and \(\theta_t, \zeta_t \geq 0 \ \forall t\), are sequences of Lagrange multipliers with respect to the aggregate resource constraint and the skill acquisition constraint respectively. Given the initial values of capital taxes, debt and the two stocks of capital, equation \(J\) is maximised with respect to \(\{C_t, h_t^s, h_t^u, l_t, E_t^g, K_{t+1}^p, K_t^e\}_{t=1}^{\infty}\) and for \(t = 0\) equation \(J\) is maximised with respect to \(\{C_0, h_0^s, h_0^u, e_0, l_0^g\}\) yielding the following first-order conditions respectively:

\[
V_{C_t} = \theta_t, \ t \geq 1
\]  

(43)

\[\text{Following the literature, we do not examine the problem of initial capital taxation and thus not allow the government to optimally choose the capital income taxes at } t = 0.\]
\[ V_{h_t} = -\theta_t Y_{h_t} - \zeta_t, \quad t \geq 1 \]  
(44)

\[ V_{h^u_t} = -\theta_t Y_{h^u_t}, \quad t \geq 1 \]  
(45)

\[ V_{e_t} = \zeta_t g_{e_t}, \quad t \geq 1 \]  
(46)

\[ V_{E_t^p} = \theta_t + \zeta_t g_{E_t^p}, \quad t \geq 0 \]  
(47)

\[ \theta_t = \beta \theta_{t+1} \left[ Y_{K_t^{p+1}} + 1 - \delta^p \right], \quad t \geq 0 \]  
(48)

\[ \theta_t = \beta \theta_{t+1} \left[ Y_{K_t^{u+1}} + 1 - \delta^u \right], \quad t \geq 0 \]  
(49)

\[ V_{c_0} = \theta_0 + \Phi A_C \]  
(50)

\[ V_{h_0^s} = -\theta_0 Y_{h_0^s} - \zeta_0 + \Phi A_{h_s} \]  
(51)

\[ V_{h_0^u} = -\theta_0 Y_{h_0^u} + \Phi A_{h_u} \]  
(52)

\[ V_{e_0} = \zeta_0 g_{e_0} + \Phi A_e \]  
(53)

where \( Y_{x,t} \) is the derivative of \( Y_t \), given by equation (32), with respect to the relevant variable \( x \) at time \( t \).

The above system of first-order conditions implies that the system to be solved will be different for \( t = 0 \) and \( t = 1, 2, 3...T - 1 \) and \( t = T \). This is reflected in equations (70)-(93) reported in the Appendix. To solve this system, we initially guess a value for \( \Phi \) and solve equations (70)-(93) for an allocation \( \{C_t, h_t^s, h_t^u, e_t, E_t^p, \zeta_t, K_{t+1}^p, K_{t+1}^u\}_t \) \( \ldots \) \( \infty \). The system has \((8 \times T) + 1\) equations and is solved using standard non-linear numerical methods (see, e.g. Garcia-Milà et al. (2010) and Adjemian et al. (2011)). Then we test if the implementability constraint (39) is binding and we increase or decrease accordingly the value of \( \Phi \) until the implementability constraint is satisfied.

We set the initial conditions for debt, the two stocks of capital and the two capital income taxes equal to their exogenous steady-state, to calculate the dynamic transition path from the exogenous to optimal fiscal policy steady-state. To ensure that the variables converge to the optimal fiscal policy steady-state, we set the value of \( T = 250 \). The results indicate that model convergence is achieved after 150 periods.

### 4.3 Optimal allocations and policy

We first analyse the steady-state under optimal policy and compare outcomes with the current economy. We then evaluate the transition paths that the policymaker would choose if, starting from the current economy, economic policy was chosen optimally by working as described in the previous subsection.

\footnote{Note that the multiplier \( \theta_t \) has been substituted out of the system presented in the Appendix.}
4.3.1 Ramsey policy in the steady-state

In table 3, we present the Ramsey optimal resource allocations and policy choices in the steady-state. Table 3 also includes the steady-state outcomes of the economy under exogenous policy that is calibrated to the data averages as explained in the previous section. The first result which can be confirmed in table 3 is that, consistent with the literature on optimal taxation (see e.g. Ljungqvist and Sargent (2012, ch. 16) for a review), capital taxes are zero in the long-run, for both capital stocks.\footnote{As is well known in the literature of optimal taxation, the optimal zero capital tax result is a special case applying only to the asymptotic steady state, under specific assumptions in the neoclassical model and is very sensitive to a number of realistic extensions that allow for various forms of market and/or policy failures (see, e.g. Guo and Lansing (1999), Correia (1996), Klein et al. (2008), Lansing (1999), Conesa et al. (2009)). Given that the optimal capital tax has been the focus of an extensive literature, we do not pursue this further here and focus instead on labour income taxes under capital-skill complementarity and skill-acquisition.} In contrast, labour income taxes, are positive and, in fact, significantly more progressive compared with the calibrated economy under exogenous policy. In particular, in the steady-state, skilled labour income is taxed about 40% more than unskilled labour income. The tax revenue generated by these taxes, in addition to the revenue from the assets that the government holds optimally in the steady-state, finance the exogenous stream of public spending as well as optimal subsidies to skill acquisition expenditure.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Exogenous policy</th>
<th>Ramsey policy</th>
<th>Exogenous policy</th>
<th>Ramsey policy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$Y$</td>
<td>0.134</td>
<td>0.169</td>
<td>$w^s/w^u$</td>
<td>1.538</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$C$</td>
<td>0.076</td>
<td>0.090</td>
<td>$\tau^p$</td>
<td>0.310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$K^p$</td>
<td>0.091</td>
<td>0.167</td>
<td>$\tau^e$</td>
<td>0.310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$K^e$</td>
<td>0.170</td>
<td>0.289</td>
<td>$\tau^s$</td>
<td>0.250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$h^s$</td>
<td>0.118</td>
<td>0.135</td>
<td>$\tau^u$</td>
<td>0.200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$h^u$</td>
<td>0.148</td>
<td>0.133</td>
<td>$s^g$</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$e$</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>$b/Y$</td>
<td>0.530</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$E^g$</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>$U$</td>
<td>-76.438</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$w^s/w^u$</td>
<td>1.640</td>
<td>1.638</td>
<td>$\psi$</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The optimal allocations in turn reflect the changes in the policy instruments compared with the calibrated economy under exogenous policy. In particular, capital accumulation increases, following the elimination of the capital taxes. The rise in skill-biased capital stock tends to increase the skill
premium, which acts to raise the relative skill supply. The latter is further supported by the subsidy to skill acquisition expenditure. As a result, the relative skill supply increases, so that the skill premium under Ramsey policy is effectively the same as the skill premium under exogenous policy. However, the increase in the progressivity of labour income taxation implies that wage inequality, as captured by the skill premium net of taxes, is reduced. Overall, optimal policy reduces the distortions associated with the tax system. This is evident by the increase in output and consumption under Ramsey policy and by the welfare gains, in terms of consumption, obtained by moving from exogenous to optimal policy. In particular, the welfare gains measured by the compensating consumption supplement, $\psi$, are roughly 5.2\%.

### 4.3.2 Optimal progressive labour income taxes

The most striking result regarding optimal policy in table 3 is that the labour income taxes should optimally be progressive. What makes this result notable is that it is obtained in an economy without market failures and without redistribution incentives for the policymaker. To understand this finding, we start by considering the main principle of Ramsey taxation, which suggests that, to minimise efficiency distortions, taxes should be higher for more inelastic tax bases. Our finding, that skilled labour income should be taxed more than unskilled, is consistent with this principle, since we find that skilled work time is more inelastic than unskilled work time. To demonstrate this, in figure 1 we plot the percent deviations for $h^s$ and $h^u$ from their steady-state under exogenous policy in table 3, after a permanent 1\% change in either $\tau^s$ (solid lines) or $\tau^u$ (dashed lines). Subplots (1,1) and (1,2) respectively show the elasticities of skilled and unskilled work time and the elasticities of skilled and unskilled labour income with respect to the tax rates. As can be seen, skilled work time and income are more inelastic with respect to the relevant income tax rate, compared with unskilled work time and labour income.

---

14The welfare gains are obtained as the compensating consumption supplement that would make the economy under exogenous policy as well off as the economy under optimal policy.

15Note that optimal labour income progressivity is not driven by the subsidy to expenditure on skill acquisition, although the latter does affect its magnitude. In particular, if we restrict the government from having access to this policy instrument, $\tau^s$ is still higher than $\tau^u$, but the difference is smaller.

16The importance of the elasticities for labour income tax progressivity has been highlighted in the recent optimal taxation literature (see e.g. Diamond (1998) and Saez (2001)). These studies also demonstrate the importance of the shape of the income (or skills) distribution and of the social weights in the objective function of the planner in setups with heterogeneous households.
cordingly, the policymaker finds it optimal to tax skilled labour income more than unskilled, so that labour income taxation is progressive.

Note that in this economy, the opportunity cost of skilled work time is foregone: (i) utility-augmenting leisure; (ii) income from unskilled work time; and (iii) income due to higher education expenditure to compensate for the loss in education time required for skill creation (see 15)). Therefore, the elasticity of skilled work time with respect to the tax rate on skilled labour income is defined as

\[ e^s = \frac{dh^s}{dt^s} \tau^s \]  

and the functional forms for the utility function assumed above, we have:

\[ h_t^s = 1 - h_t^u - \epsilon_t - \frac{(1 - \gamma) + \frac{(1-\gamma)}{g_{e_t}} C_t}{\gamma(1 - \tau_t^u)w_t^u} \] (54)

which implies that the total derivative \( \frac{dh^s}{dt^s} \) is given by:

\[
\frac{dh^s}{dt^s} = \frac{\partial h^s}{\partial t^s} + \frac{\partial h^s}{\partial C_t} \frac{dC_t}{dt^s} + \frac{\partial h^s}{\partial w_t^u} \frac{dw_t^u}{dt^s} + \frac{\partial h^s}{\partial \tau_t^u} \frac{d\tau_t^u}{dt^s} + \frac{\partial h^s}{\partial E_t^u} \frac{dE_t^u}{dt^s} + \frac{\partial h^s}{\partial \epsilon_t} \frac{d\epsilon_t}{dt^s}
\]

\[ = -\frac{(1-\gamma)(1+\frac{1}{\gamma w_t^u(1-\tau_t^u)})}{C_t(1-\tau_t^u)w_t^u} + \frac{dC_t}{dt^s} - \frac{C_t}{\gamma(1-\tau_t^u)w_t^u} - \frac{dE_t^u}{dt^s} - \frac{\partial h^s}{\partial \epsilon_t} \frac{d\epsilon_t}{dt^s} \]

(55)

where \( g_{e_t} > 0, g_{e_t+e_t} < 0 \) and \( g_{e_t} E_t^u > 0 \) denote the respective first-partial, second-partial and cross-partial derivatives of the skill acquisition function.

The elasticity of unskilled work time with respect to the tax rate on unskilled labour income is defined as \( e^u = \frac{dh^u}{dt^u} \tau^u \). Using the household’s optimality conditions and the functional forms for the utility function assumed above, we have:

\[ h_t^u = 1 - h_t^s - \frac{(1 - \gamma) C_t}{\gamma(1 - \tau_t^u)w_t^u} \] (56)

which implies that the total derivative \( \frac{dh^u}{dt^u} \) is given by:

\[
\frac{dh^u}{dt^u} = \frac{\partial h^u}{\partial t^u} + \frac{\partial h^u}{\partial C_t} \frac{dC_t}{dt^u} + \frac{\partial h^u}{\partial w_t^u} \frac{dw_t^u}{dt^u} + \frac{\partial h^u}{\partial \tau_t^u} \frac{d\tau_t^u}{dt^u} + \frac{\partial h^u}{\partial E_t^u} \frac{dE_t^u}{dt^u} + \frac{\partial h^u}{\partial \epsilon_t} \frac{d\epsilon_t}{dt^u} \]

\[ = -\frac{(1-\gamma)(1+\frac{1}{\gamma w_t^u(1-\tau_t^u)})}{C_t(1-\tau_t^u)w_t^u} + \frac{dC_t}{dt^u} - \frac{C_t}{\gamma(1-\tau_t^u)w_t^u} - \frac{dE_t^u}{dt^u} - \frac{\partial h^u}{\partial \epsilon_t} \frac{d\epsilon_t}{dt^u} \]

(57)
Equation (55) shows that there are six terms determining the responsiveness of skilled work time to the tax rate on skilled labour income. These terms incorporate the following marginal effects of $\tau^s_t$: $\frac{\partial h^s_t}{\partial \tau^s_t}$, $\frac{\partial C^s_t}{\partial \tau^s_t}$, $\frac{\partial d^s_t}{\partial \tau^s_t}$, $\frac{\partial h^u_t}{\partial \tau^s_t}$, $\frac{\partial E^g_t}{\partial \tau^s_t}$ and $\frac{\partial e^t}{\partial \tau^s_t}$. To facilitate the analysis we plot these derivatives in Figure 2 for a permanent 1% increase in $\tau^s_t$.

![Figure 2 here](image)

With the aid of Figure 2 we can sign the effect of each term in (55) on $\frac{\partial h^s_t}{\partial \tau^s_t}$. These include the:

(i) substitution effect: $-\frac{(1-\gamma)[1+\frac{1}{\gamma w^s_t}]C^s_t}{\gamma w^s_t(1-\gamma)^2} < 0$, capturing the reduction in the net return to an hour of work, due to a higher $\tau^s_t$, which tends to decrease $h^s_t$;

(ii) consumption (income) effect: $-\frac{(1-\gamma)[1+\frac{1}{\gamma w^s_t}]C^s_t}{\gamma(1-\gamma)w^s_t} \frac{\partial C^s_t}{\partial \tau^s_t} > 0$, since $\frac{\partial C^s_t}{\partial \tau^s_t} < 0$ (see subplot (1,2)), capturing the reduction in consumption, due to a higher $\tau^s_t$, which tends to increase $h^s_t$ to compensate for the loss in income;

(iii) wage effect: $\frac{(1-\gamma)[1+\frac{1}{\gamma w^s_t}]C^s_t}{\gamma(1-\gamma)^2(1-\gamma)} \frac{\partial w^s_t}{\partial \tau^s_t} > 0$, since $\frac{\partial w^s_t}{\partial \tau^s_t} > 0$ (see subplot (2,1)), capturing the higher gross equilibrium wage rate, due to the higher $\tau^s_t$, which tends to increase $h^s_t$;

(iv) cross-work time effect: $-\frac{\partial h^u_t}{\partial \tau^s_t} < 0$, since $\frac{\partial h^u_t}{\partial \tau^s_t} > 0$ (see subplot (2,2)), capturing the increase in the supply of unskilled labour, due the fall in the return of skilled relative to unskilled labour, which tends to decrease $h^s_t$.

(v) resource allocation effect from $E^g_t$: $\frac{\partial (1-\gamma)[1+\frac{1}{\gamma w^s_t}]C^g_t}{\gamma(1-\gamma)^2w^s_t} \frac{\partial E^g_t}{\partial \tau^s_t} < 0$, since $\frac{\partial E^g_t}{\partial \tau^s_t} < 0$ (see subplot (3,1)), capturing the reduction in expenditure for skill acquisition, due to the fall in the net return to skilled labour, which tends to decrease $h^s_t$ because of the increase in disposable income;

(vi) resource allocation effect from $e^t$: $\left[\frac{(1-\gamma)[1+\frac{1}{\gamma w^s_t}]C^g_t}{\gamma(1-\gamma)^2w^s_t} - 1\right] \frac{\partial e^t}{\partial \tau^s_t} > 0$ since $\frac{\partial e^t}{\partial \tau^s_t} < 0$ (see subplot (3,2)), capturing the reduction in education time for skill acquisition, due to the fall in the net return to skilled labour, which tends to increase $h^s_t$ since there is more time available to work.

Note that the derivatives for a permanent 1% increase in $\tau^s_t$ are also plotted in Figure 2 to help sign derivative terms in (57).
To understand why the response of skilled labour to a tax change is smaller than that of unskilled labour, i.e. $|\epsilon^s| < |\epsilon^u|$, we next consider the elasticity of unskilled work time with respect to the tax rate on unskilled labour income in (57). In particular, note that the two resource allocation effects from skill creation, i.e. (v) and (vi) are absent from the total derivative expression for unskilled work time. Referring to figure 1, it can be seen that the total effect on unskilled work time in the presence of effects (i)-(iv) only is strongly negative. Figure 2 also confirms that each of the derivatives in equation (57) has the same signs as the respective derivatives in the skilled labour elasticity equation (55). Hence, it appears that the additional effects associated with skill creation in equation (55) play an important role in decreasing $|\epsilon^s|$ relative to $|\epsilon^u|$, since the positive resource allocation effect from $e_t$ dominates that from $E^v_t$.

4.3.3 Optimal transition paths

We next consider a reform of the tax system that leaves fiscal expenditure unchanged. In particular, we assume that the current policy regime is one where tax and debt policy are constant and given by an exogenous policy regime, calibrated to match the data averages. We then consider a change in the policy regime, such that the government optimally chooses the time path of taxes and debt. We therefore examine the optimal transition of the economy from the steady-state of exogenous policy, as summarised in table 3, to the optimal steady-state under Ramsey policy in the same table. We plot the optimal transition paths for the policy instruments and the economic allocations in figure 3.

Consistent with the analysis of optimal capital income taxes (see e.g. Chamley (1986) and Chari et al. (1994)), the capital taxes, $\tau^p_t$ and $\tau^e_t$, are set very high in the first period, switch to zero in the second period and remain at this level. This tax policy allows the government to generate high tax revenue in the first period, accumulate assets by lending to the household and thus generate a stream of revenue from the returns to these assets in the future (see path of $b_t/Y_t$). The pattern of the capital tax rates is reflected on the dynamics of the capital stocks, $K^p_t$ and $K^e_t$, which initially decrease and then increase. In turn, these dynamics influence the movements of the wage rates, since the marginal products of labour are positive functions of the capital stocks. However, given the skill-biased role of equipment capital, the skill premium, $w^s_t/w^u_t$, increases initially, before returning effectively, in the long-run, to its original steady-state.

21
The initial rise in capital taxes (and fall in capital stocks) is met by a reduction in both labour income taxes, $\tau^s_t$ and $\tau^u_t$, (which become subsidies in the first period) and a subsidy to skill expenditure, $s^g_t$, which help to increase work time, $h^s_t$ and $h^u_t$, despite the fall in marginal labour productivity. This policy mediates the negative effects on the economy in the very short-run brought about by the capital tax and capital stock movements. Both labour income taxes return to positive magnitudes after the first period, but it is interesting to note that the labour tax system is optimally progressive from the first period onwards. This progressivity in turn works to reduce post-tax wage inequality, $\frac{\bar{w}^s_t}{\bar{w}^u_t}$.

Note that the response of skilled labour hours to optimal policy is much smoother than the response of unskilled labour hours, despite the higher volatility in the skilled wage rate compared with that of the unskilled. This is consistent with a more inelastic skilled work time, as discussed above. Moreover, it is consistent with empirical evidence which suggests that in the U.S., over 1979-2002, the standard deviation of unskilled labour hours was on average 1.3 times higher than the standard deviation of skilled labour hours, despite the standard deviation of the skilled wage being 1.2 times higher than the standard deviation of the unskilled wage.\(^{18}\) A more inelastic skill labour supply is further supported by evidence from Blau and Khan (2007) and Kimball and Shapiro (2008), who find that workers with a college degree have lower labour supply elasticity compared with workers with some or no college education.

Optimal policy leads to a more efficient economy with higher output, $Y_t$, and consumption, $C_t$. Hence, the implicit relative cost of goods versus time in creating skill is lower for the Ramsey planner, relative to the exogenous policy case. This, in turn, results in a subsidy for skill acquisition expenditure, making it cheaper for the household to use goods relative to time when creating skill, and this is reflected in the movements of education time, $e_t$, and skill expenditure, $E^g_t$, which decrease and increase respectively.

### 4.4 Non-zero capital taxes

We next consider the effects on optimal labour income taxation and optimal allocations when the tax rates on plant and equipment capital are held constant at their data average values. This is motivated by the difficulty, in practice, of setting capital taxes to be very high in the short-run and equal to zero in the long-run, which is what the Ramsey plan dictates. Therefore,

\(^{18}\)These statistics are obtained using the quarterly data on skilled and unskilled hours and wages in Lindquist (2004). We thank Matthew Lindquist for making these series available to us.
we repeat the policy experiment of the switch from exogenous to optimal policy above by letting the government choose only the labour income taxes, education subsidy and debt to maximise welfare for the economy, starting from the exogenous steady-state. The steady-state results are summarised in Table 4 and the optimal transition path in Figure 4.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Exogenous policy</th>
<th>Optimal policy</th>
<th>Exogenous policy</th>
<th>Optimal policy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$Y$</td>
<td>0.134</td>
<td>0.137</td>
<td>$w^s/w^u$</td>
<td>1.640</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$C$</td>
<td>0.076</td>
<td>0.075</td>
<td>$\bar{w}^s/\bar{w}^u$</td>
<td>1.538</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$K^p$</td>
<td>0.091</td>
<td>0.093</td>
<td>$\tau^s$</td>
<td>0.250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$K^c$</td>
<td>0.170</td>
<td>0.178</td>
<td>$\tau^u$</td>
<td>0.200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$h^s$</td>
<td>0.118</td>
<td>0.128</td>
<td>$s^g$</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$h^u$</td>
<td>0.148</td>
<td>0.133</td>
<td>$b/Y$</td>
<td>0.530</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$e$</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>$G^c/Y$</td>
<td>0.238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$E^g$</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>$U$</td>
<td>-76.438</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The results in Table 4 indicate that the labour income taxes remain optimally progressive in this case. However, the progressivity is lower because a lower skilled relative to unskilled income tax, which acts to increase skilled labour supply, also works to stimulate capital accumulation. The latter cannot be increased in this case by reductions in the capital tax, which creates incentives for the government to use labour income taxation to boost capital accumulation.\(^{19}\) It is also interesting to note in Figure 4 that labour income tax progressivity is significantly higher in the short-run after the switch to optimal policy, compared with the long-run, where it is relatively smaller. This pattern reflects the incentives of the government to partially use labour income tax progressivity as a substitute for capital tax policy. In particular, recall that capital taxes would optimally be at their lowest (i.e. zero) in the long-run. For the same reasons, the subsidy for spending on goods for skill acquisition is higher in Table 4 than in Table 3.

\[\text{[Figure 4 here]}\]

Further note that the lower labour income tax progressivity implies that the pre- and post-tax skill premium are similar, hence wage inequality is reduced in both gross and net of tax terms. The decrease in the pre-tax skill premium is also consistent with the small increase in capital supply, in

\(^{19}\) This is a result of the incompleteness of the tax policy menu, which implies that there are more margins of choice than policy instruments.
the face of an increase in the relative skill supply, compared with the case where capital taxes are set to zero. Moreover, as the government is not able to generate big surpluses in the first period, because it cannot increase the capital tax, optimal policy now implies debt, as opposed to assets, in the long-run. Finally, given that this optimal policy problem is restricted compared with the Ramsey problem analysed earlier, the welfare gains from the switch to optimal policy are lower, amounting to a compensating consumption gain of 1.343%.

5 Conclusions

To consider reforms of the public sector which will lead to an improvement in the allocation of resources, this paper evaluated quantitatively the extent of the progressivity of optimal labour income taxation, under skill heterogeneity, endogenous skill acquisition and a production sector characterised by capital-skill complementarity. We isolated optimal taxation from incentives for income redistribution by working with a representative agent framework and considered the problem of a Ramsey planner, who had access to a complete instrument set to minimise the distortions associated with taxation in an economy with perfect capital and labour markets.

In this framework, the household decided how to allocate its expenditure into investment in the two types of capital stock and into goods for creating skilled labour. Moreover, it decided how to allocate its time endowment into leisure, work time in skill and unskilled jobs, as well as in education for creating skilled labour. The resource requirements associated with skill acquisition in turn implied that there was a wage premium accruing to skilled labour to compensate for these costs.

We found that wage inequality in this setup implied progressive labour income taxation, because the work time elasticity for skilled labour was lower relative to that of unskilled. The resource implications for creating skilled labour implied effects on the skilled work time elasticity which were driven by changes in the household’s disposable income and in its available total time. These effects worked to increase and decrease, respectively, the elasticity of skilled work time with respect to the tax rate. When the model was calibrated to U.S. data, the skilled work time elasticity was lower relative to that for unskilled labour, thus leading to optimal progressive labour income taxes.

We further found that a reform that implements the Ramsey plan starting from the current economy required that capital taxes were set very high in the first period and then rapidly decreased towards zero, as is common in the literature on optimal capital taxation. Moreover, the government
ran big surpluses in the first period, which allowed it to create a stock of assets, which were in turn used to finance primary deficits in the future. The changes in taxation along the optimal path implied a sharp increase in wage inequality in the first periods, before the skill premium returned effectively to its initial level. However, since the tax system became progressive from the first period, net wage inequality was reduced under Ramsey policy over the entire transition path.

We next found that when the capital taxes were fixed, optimal policy still implied progressive labour taxes but less so than when a complete instrument set was available to the government. Without the ability to change capital taxes, the tax rate on skilled labour, due to its complementarity with equipment capital, needs to fall to encourage capital accumulation. Finally, wage inequality is reduced in both gross and net of tax terms.

References


6 Appendix

6.1 DCE system of equations

Given initial conditions for capital and debt and the transversality conditions in (18) - (19), the system of equations characterising the DCE can be written as follows:

\[ \frac{U_{ht}}{U_{Ct}} - (1 - \tau^s_t)w^s_t - \frac{U_{et}}{U_{Ct}g_{et}} = 0 \]  \hspace{1cm} (58)

\[ \frac{U_{ht}}{U_{Ct}} - (1 - \tau^u_t)w^u_t = 0 \]  \hspace{1cm} (59)

\[ \frac{U_{et}}{U_{Ct}} - (1 - s^q_t) \frac{g_{et}}{g_{Et}^q} = 0 \]  \hspace{1cm} (60)

\[ \frac{U_{Cl}}{\beta U_{Ct+1}} - \tau^p_{t+1}(1 - \tau^p_{t+1}) - (1 - \delta^p) = 0 \]  \hspace{1cm} (61)

\[ \frac{U_{Cl}}{\beta U_{Ct+1}} - \tau^e_{t+1}(1 - \tau^e_{t+1}) - (1 - \delta^e) = 0 \]  \hspace{1cm} (62)

\[ \frac{U_{Cl}}{\beta U_{Ct+1}} - R^p_t = 0 \]  \hspace{1cm} (63)

\[ w^s_t - f^h_t = 0 \]  \hspace{1cm} (64)

\[ w^u_t - f^h_t = 0 \]  \hspace{1cm} (65)

\[ r^p_t - f^K_t = 0 \]  \hspace{1cm} (66)

\[ r^e_t - f^K_t = 0 \]  \hspace{1cm} (67)

\[ G_t^c + s^q_t E_t^q + b_t - \tau^s_t w^s_t h^s_t - \tau^u_t w^u_t h^u_t - \tau^p_t r^p_t K^p_t - \tau^e_t r^e_t K^e_t - \frac{b_{t+1}}{R^p_t} = 0 \]  \hspace{1cm} (68)

\[ Y_t - G^c - C_t - I^p_t - I^e_t - E_t^q = 0. \]  \hspace{1cm} (69)

Note that in the above representation, the Lagrange multipliers \( \Lambda_t \), and \( M_t \) have been substituted using the appropriate first-order conditions of the household.
6.2 First order conditions of optimal policy

The first order conditions for the government’s problem are:

- for $t = 0$:
  \begin{align*}
  V_{h_0'} &= -(V_C - \Phi A_C)Y_{h_0'} - \zeta_0 + \Phi A_{h_s} \\
  V_{h_0''} &= -(V_C - \Phi A_C)Y_{h_0''} + \Phi A_{h_u} \\
  V_{e_0} &= \zeta_0 g_{e_0} + \Phi A_e \\
  V_{E_0'} &= \zeta_0 g_{E_0'} + V_C - \Phi A_C \\
  V_C_0 - \Phi A_C &= \beta V_{C_t} \left[ Y_{K_T^p + 1} - \delta^p \right] \\
  V_C_0 - \Phi A_C &= \beta V_{C_t} \left[ Y_{K_T^p + 1} - \delta^c \right] \\
  Y_0 &= G^c + C_0 + I_0^p + I_0^e + E_0^g \\
  h_0^s &= g(E_0^g, e_0)
  \end{align*}

- for $t = 1, 2, 3...T - 1$:
  \begin{align*}
  V_{h_t'} &= -V_{C_t} Y_{h_t'} - \zeta_t \\
  V_{h_t''} &= -V_{C_t} Y_{h_t''} \\
  V_{e_t} &= \zeta_t g_{e_t} \\
  V_{E_t'} &= \zeta_t g_{E_t'} + V_{C_t} \\
  V_{C_t} &= \beta V_{C_{t+1}} \left[ Y_{K_{T+1}^p + 1} - \delta^p \right] \\
  V_{C_t} &= \beta V_{C_{t+1}} \left[ Y_{K_{T+1}^p + 1} - \delta^c \right] \\
  Y_t &= G^c + C_t + I_t^p + I_t^e + E_t^g \\
  h_t^s &= g(E_t^g, e_t)
  \end{align*}

- for $t = T$:
  \begin{align*}
  V_{k_T'} &= -V_{C_T} Y_{k_T'} - \zeta_T \\
  V_{k_T''} &= -V_{C_T} Y_{k_T''} \\
  V_{e_T} &= \zeta_T g_{e_T} \\
  V_{E_T'} &= \zeta_T g_{E_T'} + V_{C_T} \\
  1 &= \beta \left[ Y_{K_T^p + 1} - \delta^p \right] \\
  1 &= \beta \left[ Y_{K_T^p + 1} - \delta^c \right] \\
  Y_T &= G^c + C_T + I_T^p + I_T^e + E_T^g \\
  h_T^s &= g(E_T^g, e_T)
  \end{align*}
### Data sources for calibration

Table 5: Data Sources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Skilled to unskilled labour ratio</td>
<td>Acemoglu and Autor (2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skill premium</td>
<td>U.S. Census Bureau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital to output ratio</td>
<td>U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real rate of return on capital</td>
<td>World Bank Indicators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education Invest. to output ratio</td>
<td>U.S. Digest of Education Statistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College educated share</td>
<td>U.S. Census Bureau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour and capital tax rates</td>
<td>Constructed following Martinez-Mongay (2000) using ECFIN data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debt to output ratio</td>
<td>Federal Reserve Economic Data</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 1: Impulse responses for work time and income

Solid lines are for 1% perm. shock to $\tau_t^s$ and dashed lines are for 1% perm. shock to $\tau_t^d$. 

Elasticity
Figure 2: Impulse responses derivatives

Solid lines are for 1% perm. shock to $\tau_s$ and dashed lines are for 1% perm. shock to $\tau_u$. 
Figure 3: Transition paths from exogenous to optimal steady-state.
Figure 4: Transition paths from exogenous to optimal steady-state ($\tau_t^{eq} - \tau_t^{st} = 31\%$)