Pareto optimal matchings in many-to-many markets with ties

Cechlárová, K., Eirinakis, P., Fleiner, T., Magos, D., Manlove, D., Mourtos, I., Ocel’áková, E. and Rastegari, B. (2015) Pareto optimal matchings in many-to-many markets with ties. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 9347, pp. 27-39. (doi:10.1007/978-3-662-48433-3_3)

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Abstract

We consider Pareto-optimal matchings (POMs) in a manyto- many market of applicants and courses where applicants have preferences, which may include ties, over individual courses and lexicographic preferences over sets of courses. Since this is the most general setting examined so far in the literature, our work unifies and generalizes several known results. Specifically, we characterize POMs and introduce the Generalized Serial Dictatorship Mechanism with Ties (GSDT) that effectively handles ties via properties of network ows. We show that GSDT can generate all POMs using different priority orderings over the applicants, but it satisfies truthfulness only for certain such orderings. This shortcoming is not specific to our mechanism; we show that any mechanism generating all POMs in our setting is prone to strategic manipulation. This is in contrast to the one-to-one case (with or without ties), for which truthful mechanisms generating all POMs do exist.

Item Type:Articles
Additional Information:Presented at SAGT 2015: the 8th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, Saarbrücken, Germany, 28- 30 Sept. 2015.
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Manlove, Dr David and Rastegari, Dr Baharak and Cechlarova, Professor Katarina and Fleiner, Dr Tamas
Authors: Cechlárová, K., Eirinakis, P., Fleiner, T., Magos, D., Manlove, D., Mourtos, I., Ocel’áková, E., and Rastegari, B.
College/School:College of Science and Engineering > School of Computing Science
Journal Name:Lecture Notes in Computer Science
Publisher:Springer
ISSN:0302-9743
ISSN (Online):1611-3349
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2015 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
First Published:First published in Lecture Notes in Computer Science 9347:27-39
Publisher Policy:Reproduced in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher
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Project CodeAward NoProject NamePrincipal InvestigatorFunder's NameFunder RefLead Dept
607071Efficient Algorithms for Mechanism Design Without Monetary Transfer.David ManloveEngineering & Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC)EP/K010042/1COM - COMPUTING SCIENCE