An axiomatization of multiple-choice test scoring

Zapechelnyuk, A. (2015) An axiomatization of multiple-choice test scoring. Economics Letters, 132, pp. 24-27. (doi: 10.1016/j.econlet.2015.03.042)

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Abstract

This note axiomatically justifies a simple scoring rule for multiplechoice tests. The rule permits choosing any number, k, of available options and grants 1/k-th of the maximum score if one of the chosen options is correct, and zero otherwise. This rule satisfies a few desirable properties: simplicity of implementation, non-negative scores, discouragement of random guessing, and rewards for partial answers. This is a novel rule that has not been discussed or empirically tested in the literature.

Item Type:Articles
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Zapechelnyuk, Professor Andriy
Authors: Zapechelnyuk, A.
College/School:College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics
Journal Name:Economics Letters
Publisher:Elsevier
ISSN:0165-1765
ISSN (Online):1873-7374
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2015 Elsevier B.V.
First Published:First published in Economics Letters 132:24-27
Publisher Policy:Reproduced in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher

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