Size versus fairness in the assignment problem

Bogomolnaia, A. and Moulin, H. (2015) Size versus fairness in the assignment problem. Games and Economic Behavior, 90, pp. 119-127. (doi:10.1016/j.geb.2014.11.006)

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Abstract

When not all objects are acceptable to all agents, maximizing the number of objects actually assigned is an important design concern. We compute the guaranteed size ratio of the Probabilistic Serial mechanism, i.e., the worst ratio of the actual expected size to the maximal feasible size. It converges decreasingly to 1 − 1 e 63.2% as the maximal size increases. It is the best ratio of any Envy-Free assignment mechanism.

Item Type:Articles
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Moulin, Professor Herve and Bogomolnaia, Professor Anna
Authors: Bogomolnaia, A., and Moulin, H.
College/School:College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics
Journal Name:Games and Economic Behavior
Publisher:Elsevier Inc.
ISSN:0899-8256
ISSN (Online):1090-2473
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2015 Elsevier Inc.
First Published:First published in Games and Economic Behavior 90:119-127
Publisher Policy:Reproduced in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher.

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Project CodeAward NoProject NamePrincipal InvestigatorFunder's NameFunder RefLead Dept
607071Efficient Algorithms for Mechanism Design Without Monetary Transfer.David ManloveEngineering & Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC)EP/K010042/1COM - COMPUTING SCIENCE