From drug war to culture war: Russia’s growing role in the global drug debate.¹

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Key Points

• The securitisation of drug policy discourse in the Russian Federation since 2003 has played an important role in the both the relative internal realignment of prominent ‘power ministries’ within the Russian government, and in the attempted conceptualisation of a new ‘national ideology’ since 2012.

• The development of the ‘drug discourse’ in Russia post-Communism can be classified in approximately three phases: a health and psychiatric-dominated discourse up until approximately 2003, an increasingly prevalent securitisation discourse after 2007, and today a conservative cultural discourse.

• Russia has utilized the general drug war discourse to both increase the levers of influence available to it on the international arena, and to press for greater convergence and harmonisation of drug policies within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

• The imminent departure of NATO from Afghanistan has led to further reform of Russia’s attempted outreach to other states within the framework of the ‘war on drugs’; the Russian model of ‘alternative development’ via ‘rapid industrialization’ is now explicitly held up as both more productive, and of greater utility, than Western-sponsored crop substitution schemes.

• Russia in toto has implemented a relatively complex set of policies that appear set to present an explicit alternative agenda to proposals favouring greater harm reduction or decriminalisation at the next UNGASS summit in 2016.

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‘It is evident that it is impossible to move forward without spiritual, cultural and national self-determination. [...] We can see how many of the Euro-Atlantic countries are actually rejecting their roots, including the Christian values that constitute the basis of Western civilisation. They are denying moral principles and all traditional identities: national, cultural, religious and even sexual. They are implementing policies that equate large families with same-sex partnerships, belief in God with belief in Satan. And people are aggressively trying to export this model all over the world. I am convinced that this opens a direct path to degradation and primitivism, resulting in a profound demographic and moral crisis.’

President Putin addressing the Valdai club, September 2013

‘The drugs trade has become a global challenge to the entire international community, and for some countries has become a national tragedy. The drugs trade is a breeding ground for organised crime, smuggling, and illegal migration. Even sadder and more dangerous, it is also a breeding ground for terrorism. We therefore believe it essential to fight all types of drugs, and we are worried by the more ‘relaxed laws’ that some countries have passed, and that lead to legalisation of so-called ‘soft’ drugs. This is a very dangerous path! It is extremely important to support and strengthen the current international legal framework in this area, which rests above all on the three basic UN conventions.’

President Putin addressing delegates at the International Drug Enforcement Conference, 2013

The case of Russia presents a dramatic example of the ‘unintended consequences’ of implementing the current UN drug control regime within the international system. This system, created by three successive UN drug law conventions observed by all UN member states since 1961, is itself the product of periodic review by the UN General Assembly Special Session (UNGASS). The next major UNGASS meeting of UN member states in 2016 appears destined to see major conflict within the existing drug control system, or in other words a growing ‘fractured consensus’, as some countries pursue ever more radical forms of decriminalisation of consumption or legalisation of production. It will also however highlight the potentially more prominent role of Russia as a conservative global actor on the drug control issue. In 2008, reviewing the ‘UNGASS decade’ that marked the ten years since the 1998 UN declaration calling for intensified international cooperation against illicit drugs in the field of both supply and demand reduction, prominent figures within the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) had already begun to list five ‘unintended consequences’ (UCs) of the current global drug prohibition and control regime created by the three main (1961, 1971, 1988) UN drug conventions. These five UCs, which were then repeated verbatim in many subsequent reports and publications, were:

- The creation of criminal black markets;
- Policy displacement (the propensity of a law-enforcement approach to crowd out the public-health dimension of counter-narcotics);
- Geographical displacement, otherwise known as the ‘balloon effect’
• Substance displacement, whereby consumers move from one drug to another depending on fluctuations in availability and price; and

• The social exclusion and marginalisation of drug users.4

Each of these alleged unintended consequences merits problematising and questioning on its own terms. As Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy has recently argued, the creation of a criminal black market arguably fails any discriminating test of ‘unintended’ consequences, being a consequence that arises inevitably from prohibition itself, rather than from a specific policy intervention.5 The causes and occurrence mechanisms behind each of these alleged ‘unintended consequences’, which are themselves frequently entirely unmeasured, remains amongst the most underdeveloped parts of the existing global drug policy literature, even amongst those who use the framework as a proxy argument for decriminalisation and regulation.6 In addition however, there is no need to regard the UNODC’s own list of ‘unintended consequences’ as either exhaustive or comprehensive7, particularly since it also largely excludes the insights that can potentially be gained from both international relations theory and political economy.8 The extent to which the drug control system since 1961 has been used indirectly as a means of international pressure and influence, in ways that go beyond mere attempts at intensified law enforcement, has, as a general research topic, usually only been applied to relations between the US, Mexico, and Latin America, where the US de-certification process has historically also been accompanied by trade boycotts, the cutting off of non-related economic aid, public censure, and other sanctions.9 However since at least 2003, if not indeed before, the ‘securitisation’ of the illicit drug debate in the Russian Federation, with its accompanying ‘new moralism’, has fed directly into both a reshaping of the Russian domestic narrative around national identity, and into a progressively more activist Russian foreign policy towards both Central Asia and Latin America. This briefing paper seeks to examine Russia’s own evolving position within the context of an increasingly ‘fractured consensus’ around the interpretation and implementation of the existing UN conventions. The 2010 ‘Rainbow-2’ plan announced by Russia for eradicating opium production in Afghanistan, justified by framing this as a threat not just to the state, but to ‘global peace and security’, in particular marked a recent sharp escalation in the securitisation of drugs as an existential threat at the international level, via a specific ‘speech act’.10 Prior to the Ukraine crisis in 2014, Russia also placed rollback of what it perceived as the threatening ‘liberalisation’ of the international narcotics control regime as one of the central agenda points in its upcoming G8 presidency.11 This same process, however, has also fuelled a growing ‘culture war’ between the Russian Federation and the EU, due to an EU drugs policy that continues to emphasise both interdiction and harm reduction (the latter being aimed, amongst other things, at reducing the prevalent infection rate of HIV/AIDS, and to this end incorporating opioid substitution treatment (OST), needle exchange programmes, and in some countries safe injection rooms).12 The growing rift with EU trends in particular appears destined to figure significantly in the now increasingly fractured consensus over the future direction of global drug policy that the 2016 UNGASS summit will undoubtedly reveal.13

The current Russian attitude to the ‘drug threat’ as a domestic security issue, one that then overlaps with wider issues of international security and foreign policy, has itself emerged against a historical backdrop that is more complex than is commonly appreciated. Historically, based on the Soviet experience, explosions in domestic drug use are inextricably connected in the Russian national consciousness with wider periods
of societal breakdown, political stagnation, and the collapse of pre-existing values. This phenomenon was most recently visible during the period of the Soviet collapse. Indeed, if in 1989, across the whole of the USSR, there were officially recorded some 131,000 ‘drug users’, then by 1997 across the Russian Federation alone, between 2.5 to 6 million citizens were estimated to be regularly using illegal drugs.\(^\text{14}\) This increase is no doubt due, in no small part, to the collapse of the Soviet Union’s own highly policed frontiers, and the corresponding increasing integration of Russia into global trade flows, of which heroin via the ‘northern route’ from Afghanistan has become a major one.\(^\text{15}\) However as we shall see, in Russian governmental discourse this has also become associated with a perceived threat of ‘moral decline’, to a collapse in social solidarity fostered by the end of the Soviet Union, and to the growing perceived threat of contamination from the West’s ‘genderless and infertile’ liberal values. The drug discourse in Russia has thus become fascinatingly intertwined with a conscious effort by the government itself to generate a new national ideology, one that embodies what President Putin by 2013 had defined as the true values of a ‘very conservative country.’\(^\text{16}\) For the purposes of this policy brief, the start of this latest shift will be approximately dated to the appointment of Vladimir Medinskii in May 2012 to head the Russian Ministry of Culture. Medinskii, a noted anti-Communist perhaps most famous to date for proclaiming that the time has come to close the mausoleum on Red Square and bury Lenin, has been associated with a more general conservative turn in recent Russian cultural politics, one which has also seen President Putin himself make increasingly conservative and explicitly anti-Communist remarks (certainly when compared to his first term). The rejection of Communism and socialism as a ‘wrong path’ has in turn also led to the promotion of more ‘traditional’ Russian conservative religious values, such as those associated with the nineteenth and early twentieth century Russian philosophers Ivan Il’in and Vladimir Berdiaev.

Prior to this most recent evolution however, the development of the securitised drug discourse in Russia, with its most recent interweaving with wider narratives of threatened national decline and the corresponding need for moral-based rejuvenation, is also framed through the experience of how Russians have historically experienced ‘drug epidemics’ in the past. The last similar ‘drug epidemic’ to that which occurred post-1991 took place during the collapse of the Tsarist Empire and emergence of the early Soviet regime.\(^\text{17}\) Prior to 1917, drug use in the Russian Empire had been best known as a widespread social phenomenon only in Primor’e oblast in the Russian Far East and in Tsarist Central Asia, where both opium and hashish use were relatively widespread. Following the Russian Civil War of 1917–21 however, Soviet clinics in European Russia during the early 1920s reported an epidemic of drug use amongst the underage orphans left destitute by the conflict, with cocaine use—whether snorted, smoked, or administered orally—reportedly a particular problem. During the interwar years, Soviet laws prohibiting drugs then began to be re-centralised, culminating in both tighter border controls, and by 1934 this had led to a union-wide ban on the cultivation of opium and ‘Indian cannabis [konopli]’ for anything except medical use.\(^\text{18}\)

Treatment for drug addiction in the Soviet Union between the 1920s and 1950s was meanwhile remarkably mixed, with individual clinics experimenting with both ‘abrupt’ and ‘gradual’ withdrawal strategies towards addicts, and even (in the case of World War Two veterans who had become addicted to morphine), with maintenance treatment.\(^\text{19}\) By the 1960s however, as concerns over domestic drug use began to rise again, Soviet narcology rapidly assumed a more monolithic aspect, one dominated by the psychiatric
profession, and embodied in the 1965 text on addiction treatment of Eduard Babaian [often transliterated as Babayan], whose professional views on this subject remained influential well into the 1990s, and who also headed the Russian delegation to the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) between 1964 and 1993. During this period in general, the problem of perceived drug addiction was again growing-if, according to the official statistics of the Soviet Ministry of Health, there were 23,714 drug addicts in 1965, then by the end of 1971 there were already more than 50,000 officially recorded cases undergoing treatment. Though still not on the scale of the problem occurring in the contemporary United States at the time, this phenomenon was sufficiently alarming as to attract renewed medical and legislative attention. This backdrop framed the introduction what many have characterized as the Soviet Union’s first true ‘drug law’, the 1974 law on ‘strengthening the struggle with drug addiction’.

When it came to evolving a unified Soviet approach towards addiction treatment, Babaian in 1964 meanwhile advocated a symptom-based three step approach, based upon initial total abstinence, detoxification, and finally psychological reinforcement, with the first two stages implemented within a specialist medical clinic. Treatments to relieve withdrawal symptoms during stage two included a daily injection of insulin, followed by glucose, retinol, and a range of vitamins. Another Soviet text from 1973 endorsed electrotherapy in cases of extreme withdrawal, whilst also making the argument that ‘[w]e do not have amongst us the social roots either for alcoholism or other forms of drug addiction [narkomania]. Drug addiction is deeply foreign to the socialist order. In our conditions it is evidence of the insufficient culture of a person, their hooliganism [raspushchennosti], or the result of bad education, bad examples, and customs acquired from the past...’ Repeat offenders who continued to abuse drugs or alcohol under this system risked being committed to special work camps known as LTPs (lechebno-trudovye profilaktorii) for between six months to two years, where they would undergo ‘re-education through labour’. Core to the approach adopted by Soviet psychiatry towards drug and alcohol addiction in general during this period was the legacy of Ivan Pavlov and the notion of ‘conditioned reflexes’. This approach legitimised both hypnosis therapy [kodirovanie], and measuring dependence based upon the exhibition of specific visible symptoms (for example in using the absence of the vomit reflex as a diagnosis of alcoholism).

As late as 2002, reviews of addiction treatment in the Russian Federation acknowledged the long shadow still cast by such older views, with an ongoing tendency to diagnose addiction by exhibited symptoms. Therefore, whilst acknowledgement of the importance of social conditions always formed a part of Soviet and later Russian assessments of effective therapy and treatment of drug addiction, textbooks themselves continued to focus predominantly on medical means of detoxification. The practice of measuring apparent effectiveness based purely on observation of the physical symptoms meanwhile frequently lead to premature release from treatment, and to high remission rates amongst addicts.

This background left the post-Soviet space peculiarly vulnerable to a ‘drug epidemic’, since the wider social conditions, generally taken for granted, which ameliorated the shortcomings of Soviet-style detoxification treatment prior to 1991-conditions such as family support networks, guaranteed employment, and secure territorial frontiers reducing the actual quantity and variety of illicit drugs available-underwent radical decay during the Yeltsin years. At the same time the severe shortcomings of Soviet forms of addiction treatment as they had evolved after 1964, including the absence of Western-style social services or rehabilitation therapy, and the criminalisation and stigmatization of drug
addicts themselves, with associated increased mortality rates and threats of epidemic disease, came into sharp focus during the 1990s and 2000s, as drug use within the Russian Federation exploded. Stigmatisation, lack of needle exchange programmes, an ongoing ban on opioid substitution treatment, a cultural proclivity for injecting rather than smoking heroin, and the poor record of existing programmes in actually breaking the cycle of drug use, have contributed indirectly, for example, to the fact that 80 percent of the people infected with HIV/AIDS in the Russian Federation are intravenous drug users. According to Russian academics working in the Institute for Demography, Migration and Regional Development, the lowering in street price of Afghan heroin to $5 for a single dose also produced two clear spikes in Russian heroin addiction rates, in 1997–98 and 2003–04 respectively, generating a heroin addicted community conservatively estimated at 2.5 million today. This process has also fostered what is unquestionably a general ‘health crisis’ on a demographic scale, with heroin-related Russian mortality rates currently thought to run at about 30,000 deaths a year, higher than the comparable annual Soviet death toll from military action in 1980s Afghanistan.

The securitisation of drug discourse in Russia in response to this growing social crisis can in general be dated back to two main events, namely President Putin’s ‘speech act’ designating drugs a national security threat on September 4th 2002, wherein he proclaimed the existing situation a ‘calamity’, and demanded ‘new proposals that will lead to a significant change in the fight against drugs’, and secondly, the emergence of new national security agencies charged with tackling the problem, most notably the Federal Service for the Control of the Drugs Trade (FSKN) established in 2003, and the State Anti-Narcotics Committee (GAK) set up in 2007. The FSKN quickly rose in the ranks to become, by 2006, one of the twelve official ‘power ministries’ within the Russian state, a situation for which there is no direct Soviet or Tsarist precedent. The reason for its rapid elevation undoubtedly relates both to internal bureaucratic politics, and to the success the organisation has so far enjoyed in carving out a fiefdom as a separate tool of influence and control within the CIS. At the international level meanwhile, Russia’s growing prioritisation of the issue as both a national security threat, and as an ongoing lever of regional and even international influence when used to rigidly interpret the existing UN conventions was symbolised by ongoing efforts to retain or appoint Russians to prominent posts in the UNODC and to the thirteen-member International Narcotics Control Board (INCB). Eduard Babaian, founding father of the 1960s school of Soviet narcology, and long-time delegate to the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs, became a member of the INCB in 1995, was made vice-president in 2003, and following his death in 2005 (at the age of 85) was effectively replaced by former Russian Health Minister Professor Tatiana Dmitrieva, who herself was already a prominent opponent of methadone-based addiction treatment within the Russian context. Significant donations to the UNODC’s general-purpose (voluntary) funds, including a $7 million donation in 2010, also accompanied the appointment of a prominent Russian diplomat, Yurii Fedotov, to head the UNODC in 2010.

The first step in the securitisation process of the drug problem in the Russian domestic context was meanwhile the perceived need to develop a specifically sovereign Russian approach to the problem. Whilst the Soviet legacy initially continued to cast a long shadow here, and can still be felt in Russian opposition to methadone, harm reduction programmes, or any talk of decriminalisation, the classifying of the ‘drug threat’ as a national security issue has also seen the Russian state agencies concerned undertake a rethink of
what strategy they do wish to endorse and enact, particularly as the status quo looked increasingly unsustainable. Russian drug policy has, therefore, been more adaptive than it is sometimes given credit for, even whilst that adaptation has also been shaped by an ever more strident desire to articulate this evolving policy in terms of, firstly, a securitisation discourse, and latterly within a discourse of conservative social values and the upholding of national sovereignty (becoming increasingly defined, in short, by an ‘othering’ of the drug problem, the natural by-product perhaps of what President Putin in September 2013 defined as Russia’s essential goal of establishing a fully sovereign ‘state – civilization’ as a model of national development).

Reconsideration of the existing legal regime in Russia arguably began in 2003–04, when the Russian government effectively decriminalised possession of small amounts of drugs. Prior to this law being enacted, between 1996 and 2004, ‘drug tables’ drawn up by Babaian himself had established the right to legally imprison somebody for between five to seven years for possession of as little as 0.005 of a gram of heroin (regardless of purity). Such classifications were arrived at in order to simplify prosecutions for the purchase or sale of illegal drugs on a ‘large scale’. In 1997, ‘large scale’ constituted 0.1 gram of opium or any amount of heroin; only in 1998, in fact, had the bar for heroin been lowered to 0.005 of a gram. These grades were arrived at not based upon the quantity necessary for a single dose, but upon the drugs’ perceived ‘social dangerousness’. The 2003 amendments to the Criminal Code redefined prosecution as valid if the accused possessed ‘large’ or ‘exceptionally large’ quantities of drugs, where ‘large’ for example was set at in excess of ten average minimum doses. The minimum average dose was initially set at 0.0001 gram, before in 2004 finally being reclassified to the (more realistic) 0.1 of a gram. This policy was intended to facilitate a shift towards prosecuting dealers rather than users. Resistance from within the FSKN and amongst other Russian lobby groups to these proposed changes forced a repeal of the law in 2006 however, in the process restoring the definition of ‘large’ and ‘especially large’ to being an absolute amount, rather than a multiple of single doses. Under these amendments, a ‘large’ amount was reclassified as 0.5 gram-still a more liberal regime than that pertaining in 1996, when this had been set at 0.1 of a gram, but a retreat from the 2004 amendment which had defined a ‘large quantity’ as 1 gram. Under the leadership of its first director, Viktor Cherkesov, the focus of the FSKN during these years also remained strongly punitive in intent-Cherkesov himself continued to oppose methadone treatment for addicts, as well as any talk of the legalisation of ‘soft’ drugs. Russian drug law as a result of these cumulative changes nonetheless ironically liberalised its position earlier than, for example, Poland, a European Union member state (since 2004) where possession of any quantity of illicit drugs up until 2011 nonetheless still remained strictly illegal—resulting in about 30,000 arrests a year, and a 1,648 percent increase in prosecutions for possession between 1999 and 2007. In 2010 however, further evidence also began to emerge of an ongoing rethink of Russia’s own demand-reduction strategies in relation to addiction, fuelled both by the anarchic diversity of existing strategies, and by the publication of an official ‘Strategy of state anti-narcotics policy of the Russian Federation out to 2020.’

Whilst the overarching state attitude to illicit drug use and drug addiction in the Russian Federation remains strongly punitive and repressive in orientation, under an official umbrella of zero tolerance, there has in fact also emerged a substantial diversity of addiction treatment therapies at the non-state level (church, civil society and NGO groups), filling the vacuum left by the obvious shortcomings of state-sponsored detoxification
programmes, even as state health care itself has also become more decentralised (See Box 1). This position was partially also driven by the fact that, up until 2011, Russia remained eligible for Global Fund grants to combat HIV/AIDS; this fund disbursed $38,400,000 between 2002 and 2010 on programmes targeting people who inject drugs.37 Up until 2010 the Russian government’s own attitude to these programmes was relatively *laissez faire*, akin, if anything, to Chairman Mao’s policy of ‘let a hundred flowers bloom’, though advocates of harm reduction continued to experience harassment, and OST treatment remained banned. Non-state supported treatments accordingly still range from those that would be normal in many West European countries, such as needle exchange programmes in Kazan, to church programmes that rely on little more than isolation in remote rural regions and collective prayer, to programmes such as that followed by Evgenii Roizman’s foundation ‘City without Drugs’, based upon abstinence, the use of physical constraints (chaining addicts to beds), and physical punishment. In June 2012 the death of an addict undergoing treatment at one of Roizman’s centres in Sverdlovsk *oblast* led to the centre being closed, and a police investigation. However, the scandal appears not to have harmed Roizman’s growing popularity and political profile, since in 2013 he won the post of mayor in Ekaterinburg, becoming one of the members of the ‘official opposition’ to Putin’s United Russia party.38

Despite a diversification of measures to treat addiction, one of the biggest gaps in existing capacity remains at the level of social rehabilitation; state efforts to create rehabilitation centres only began in 2000, and in 2006 they still only existed in 26 regions.39 Most strikingly, this fact was also acknowledged in 2011 by the current serving head of the FSKN, Viktor Ivanov, as the area where most change needed to occur. In connection with a new law of 23 August 2011 allowing state support to non-commercial organisations engaged in drug rehabilitation, Ivanov publicly recognized catastrophically high existing remission rates amongst addicts undergoing treatment, as a result of which ‘existing models of treatment are simply not

![Diagram 1. Ivanov’s proposed ‘Scheme of organizing work with drug users’ from 2011, incorporating 14 day detoxification, 2 months psychological support, and up to a year of rehabilitation leading to ‘re-socialization’](image)
attaining their goals’, and under which the existing assumption of releasing addicts on the principle that ‘on Monday, after detoxification, I will begin a new life’ was clearly grossly inadequate. What Ivanov identified was the need to instead offer a fundamentally new set of surroundings and social support networks—a rehabilitation programme in the full sense of the word, lasting up to a year (see diagram 1)—which would entail the ‘organization of a national system of rehabilitation as a whole’. The rolling out of a more centralised and state-wide drug rehabilitation programme, if Ivanov’s scheme is realised, therefore represents both a further evolution of Russian drug policy, and an ever more urgent search for better answers that will at the same time also fit a wider narrative over both Russian identity and sovereignty in general, and the permissible limits of drug reform in particular. This scheme at another level may therefore also be perceived as Russia’s homegrown answer to the European agenda of ‘harm reduction’, which appears destined to cause increased friction at UNGASS in 2016.

As models to follow for Russia’s new rehabilitation programme, Ivanov drew from observations made of the ‘Haymarket’ rehabilitation centre in Chicago, kibbutzim in Israel, work communes for drug addicts in Italy, and existing centres in St. Petersburg, Siberia, and the North Caucasus, whilst also underlining his view that the eradication of the old Soviet system of work camps (LTPs), however flawed, given that it had occurred ‘without [creating an adequate alternative]’, represented a fundamental mistake. This in short was to be a reform of existing drug treatment, but one that retained a traditional Russian flavour—drawing upon both best practice (from the Russian perspective) elsewhere, but also, for example, on the memory of Soviet educationalist A. S. Makarenko. The latter’s programmes in the 1920s for rehabilitating child-criminals psychologically damaged in the Russian Civil War had worked on the principle of making the individual answerable to the collective. The FSKN’s appropriation of the rehabilitation programme at the same time also to a certain degree marked its internal institutional ascendancy over the Russian Ministry of Health; the fact that Ivanov simultaneously chairs both the FSKN and the State Anti-Narcotics Committee (GAK) has in this context arguably been critical in moving the drugs debate from a Soviet-era public health and psychiatric-dominated field to a securitised discourse. In November 2012 President Putin ordered the formal creation of a state programme for the rehabilitation of drug addicts, a programme projected to involve expenditure of 179 billion roubles (nearly US $5.5 billion) and due to unroll over 2013–20, but disagreements over funding have to date nonetheless delayed its full implementation down to the present. Russian critics of the programme meanwhile continue to point to ongoing shortcomings over lack of guaranteed anonymity for participants, or the failure of the official authorities to identify or discriminate between first time, experimental drug users and long-term addiction or problematic drug use. At the same time, in November 2013 President Putin nonetheless also signed into effect a law, tellingly developed by the FSKN, which for the first time allowed Russian courts to sentence drug addicts to compulsory addiction treatment, with financial penalties of around 5,000 roubles or 30 days incarceration for non-compliance. At the same time, the securitisation of the drug discourse that intensified after 2003 was already taking, by 2010, an ever clearer external direction as well; the increasing foregrounding of the ‘war on drugs’ as a keystone of Russian foreign policy in the near abroad, in the first place in regard to Central Asia and Afghanistan.
Box 1. View from the Ground: Russian domestic drug policy

Interview with Anya Sarang, Andrei Rylkov Foundation, Moscow*

The situation with regard to drug use in Russia has changed dramatically in the past few years. As Sarang notes ‘It seems to me that compared with the 1990s open access to illicit drugs such as heroin has reduced – in the 1990s access was as free as you please…you want heroin, you want khanka [Russian slang: a home-made opium derivative, normally injected], go ahead – compared to this the situation has completely changed… it’s become more closed and less accessible, and also that people have started using synthetic drugs and pharmaceutical substitutes, for example last year we had a string of cases of people using prescription drugs without prescription, and we had a three year epidemic of krokodil [the street name for desomorphine]....’

Within this shifting market there remains, however, a lack of appropriate rehabilitation centres and access to harm reduction interventions: ‘The most harmful consequences are in the areas of health, in particular the high mortality rates amongst people, of which a significant part is the high prevalence rate of HIV/AIDS, all of this would be avoidable if we had a harm reduction programme, according to UNAIDS we have half a million with HIV/AIDS infections but this estimate is already five years old, right now a minimum of 2 million people are living with this disease, and frequently a condition for them receiving treatment is that they abstain from drug use, which they can’t do due to the absence of rehabilitation programs or substitution treatment, so the mortality rate here is high’.

Moreover, as Sarang points out, ‘A huge number of these people end up in prison, 70% of people in prison are drug users, and there the combination of tuberculosis and drug addiction means that a prison term is practically a death sentence. The courts don’t think about this, and might say this person will sit in jail two years and then will be free, but in fact they’re sentencing them to death, if this person already has AIDS and then acquires tuberculosis in jail they will almost definitely die. We started a project three years ago looking at the prevalence of tuberculosis in Russia. The tuberculosis in jails is untreatable and the tuberculosis treatment centres in the regions are simply morgues. The consequences are therefore in actual fact catastrophic, but they’re also completely invisible to wider society as a whole.’

*President of the Andrei Rylkov Foundation for the past 11 years, Anya Sarang has focused on developing and supporting the emerging harm reduction movement in Russia through various training and networking activities.

A full transcript of the interview is available here [blog.swansea.ac.uk/gdpo/?p=307](http://blog.swansea.ac.uk/gdpo/?p=307)
RUSSIA AND AFGHANISTAN: OPERATIONALISING THE NEW SECURITY PARADIGM IN RUSSIA’S ‘NEAR ABROAD.’

For the Russian Federation, the state of highest concern in the international arena from the drug securitisation perspective has for some considerable time been Afghanistan. Illicit drug crop production in Afghanistan (predominantly opium, but including cannabis, of which today Afghanistan is allegedly the largest global supplier) assumed a significant (but unmeasured) scale in the 1980s during the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, before coming more and more to international attention in the 1990s, and then coming to dominate discussion at the international level since 2001. To a significant degree the scale of opium cultivation in Afghanistan has grown in concentration even as it has shrunk (in relative terms) in geographical scope across the country since 2001 (with 15 provinces declared ‘poppy free’ today, compared to just four reportedly poppy-free provinces in 2003). Controversially, the period of the biggest boom in Afghan domestic opium production, by some considerable margin, has occurred during the period of most recent and intense international involvement in the country. Though UNODC figures still remain only estimates, by even the most conservative interpretation Afghan illicit opium production has undergone historically unprecedented growth since 2001, reaching an estimated peak of 8,200 metric tonnes in 2007, before suffering a collapse in 2010 down to 3,600 tonnes due to crop blight affecting field yields and a spike in world food prices, amongst other factors. Cultivation since then however has also shown some evidence of rebounding as market prices rose four fold (with the acreage devoted to cultivation increasing 18 percent between 2011 and 2012), despite redoubled eradication efforts in 2012. Bad weather and disease led the estimated overall 2012 Afghan opium harvest to still be lower than that of 2011, but farm gate opium prices remained relatively high, continuing to provide an incentive for farmers to grow. Concentration of production meanwhile continued, with 90 percent of opium production in 2013 estimated to have occurred in just nine Afghan provinces. The most recent estimate on the scale of the Afghan opium crop cultivation has seen dramatic estimated increases in both cultivation (up by 36 percent) and production. 209,000 hectares were reportedly devoted to poppy cultivation in 2013, higher than in even 2007, though still with a lower final production figure, possibly due to a combination of weather and ecological constraints – for 2013 there was an estimated 5,500 tonne harvest. This in turn has led to speculation that the illicit economy in general will rebound as economic uncertainty in the licit sector increases during the international withdrawal in 2014. Casualties incurred by Afghan police and Counter-Narcotics Ministry officials associated with attempted interdiction and crop eradication efforts have meanwhile also seen a sharp rise in the past three years.

The division of effort with regard to trafficking of illicit drugs from Afghanistan meanwhile remains disputed in the existing literature, and reflects the high degree of art involved in reaching approximations about regional trafficking patterns (see Map 1). In 2003, the UN estimated that 65 percent of Afghan opiates passed through Central Asia and on into Russia, but this was subsequently radically revised downwards to 15 percent, before then being revised up again in 2010 to 25 percent. The Iranian route by contrast is held in the latest relevant UNODC report to account for 35 percent of the heroin traffic, and Pakistan for the remaining 40 percent. Trafficking through Turkmenistan appears to feed the ‘Balkan route’ via Turkey, rather than the Russian ‘Northern Route’. Trafficking in general is also considered to be the area where the greatest profits are made; the UNODC in 2008 estimated that Afghan heroin traffickers accrued about 79 percent of total profits in the industry, whilst farmers by contrast garnered 21 percent.
The Northern Route itself has of course then also fed a blossoming drug addiction problem in both Central Asia and the Russian Federation itself. In 2010 Central Asian users were calculated to use as much as one third per capita of heroin as Russian users, with an estimated 280,000 heroin users in Central Asia. The Central Asian states mainly appear to remain transit countries however, with local consumption highly concentrated and apparently supported from tapping into overflows from the trafficking process itself – it being now often accepted that global heroin supply regularly exceeds demand in most regional markets, with all the associated questions that then arise around potential stockpiling and product dumping. Russia itself has by contrast predominantly evolved into a site of heroin consumption, with relatively little spill-over into the rest of Eastern Europe. Even accepting the lower-end official government estimate of some 2.5 million Russian heroin addicts, the UNODC in 2009 estimated that Russia the previous year accounted for 21 percent (70 tons of ‘pure’ heroin) of global heroin consumption, as against a European market share (Europe being here taken to exclude both Russia and Turkey) of 26 percent (87 tons) of ‘pure’ heroin. By this estimate, Russia comes second only to Europe in terms of global heroin consumption, with the per capita ratio of addicts in Russia being even higher than in Europe, and with Russia, when considered on a state-to-state basis, coming first in the world in terms of total heroin consumption.
In order to facilitate combating this security threat, Russia firstly became a leading participant in the Paris Pact initiative founded in May 2003, whose Rainbow Strategy aims at ‘a regional solution to an Afghan challenge’, via coordinating the anti-narcotics activities of the regional countries most affected by Afghan drug trafficking. In the process of surveying drug trends in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia, the Paris Pact also produced a short report on illicit drug trends in the Russian Federation itself. However perhaps the largest official initial successes in the Paris Pact’s ‘Rainbow Strategy’ were ‘Operation Transhipment’ and ‘Operation Tarcket’, successive coordinated enforcement operations mounted jointly by Russia, the Central Asian states and Pakistan, which between 2006 and 2009 targeted the traffic in chemical precursors (including acetic anhydride) necessary for heroin production (such substances were added to the list of controlled substances under the third UN convention of 1988). Such an initiative was far from pointless, since in 2008 alone, 12,000 tons of these chemical precursors were estimated to be required to be trafficked into Afghanistan in order to process the 66 percent of the opium harvest which was thought to be refined in-country. These efforts contributed to an overall 250 percent increase in acetic anhydride seizures in 2008, with a particularly large increase in such seizures also occurring in Slovenia and Hungary, and cumulatively appear to have had some market impact. The price for acetic anhydride in Afghanistan reached $300–400 a litre in 2009 (licit purchases of acetic anhydride costs less than $1 per litre) compared to $65 a litre locally in 2005, or $13–34 a litre in 1998, suggesting a significant degree of recent supply disruption. In 2009, the UNODC also estimated that only two thirds of Afghanistan’s opiate exports were now refined as opposed to raw opium, down from three quarters a few years before. This operation however was conducted without review as to whether the effort could be sustained or was regionally coherent, with China, a notable non-participant in the programme, being an obvious potential alternative supplier of chemical precursors. That same year an increase in reported trafficking of chemical precursors into Afghanistan was again being reported, organised via both new routes and the co-option of legal commerce and ‘grey’ markets.

Difficulties in targeting trafficking in general meanwhile have been increased by the completion in 2010 of a major free trade agreement between Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, as part of Russia’s ‘Eurasian Customs Union’ project. Kazakhstan remains the main hub of trafficking routes into Russia itself, a position reflected by the establishment there of the UNODC-affiliated Central Asia Regional Information Coordination Centre (CARICC) for coordinating anti-trafficking efforts in Central Asia. The new customs agreement aims at dramatically lowering trade costs in general, and abolishes both visa requirements and customs posts within the territory of the customs union, meaning that goods (licit, and by proxy of course illicit) can now be traded within the borders of the union along any road or rail route, rather than by pre-designated pathways. This situation has then been further complicated by the increasingly efficient logistic networks (rails and ports) that emerged as a result of the Northern Distribution Network (NDN), constructed in Central Asia to help supply NATO forces in Afghanistan—the latter designed to avoid over-dependence on access routes via Pakistan, an acknowledged existing strategic vulnerability. These technical developments, combined with new political agreements, have led to a steadily increasing volume of trade in general between Afghanistan and its northern neighbours, increasing illicit trafficking opportunities, and leading many to fear that increasing volumes of trade are now outpacing the capacity of local security organs to mount and maintain effective surveillance.
Despite the apparent success of regional cooperation in targeting chemical precursor trafficking, the limited overall effect of such efforts, particularly taking into account the increasingly strong countervailing trends noted above, also meant that the Russian Federation remained during this same time period deeply discontent with the measures undertaken within Afghanistan itself to curb opium production. The declaration in 2009 by US special envoy to Afghanistan Richard Holbrooke that the US would no longer pursue poppy eradication, due to its counter-productive economic consequences – a declaration intended to mark a shift towards tackling mid-to-high level traffickers and Afghan drug laboratories s instead – led in particular to a high-profile clash between Holbrooke and head of the Russian FSKN Viktor Ivanov. The alternative seven point ‘Rainbow-2’ plan proposed in 2010 by Russia for Afghanistan (see diagram 2) involved extensive crop eradication activity via aerial fumigation (a proposal in fact first explored by the U.S. authorities in 2004), together with economic aid for alternative development.

Diagram 2 - Rainbow 2
Russia in fact proposed this plan to be the basis of a joint Russian-EU effort for a common Eurasian anti-narcotics strategy, with Ivanov, allied with Italian MEP (and former head of the UNODC) Pino Arlacchi, suggesting ‘Rainbow-2’ be consolidated with the EU’s own 2010 strategy paper, ‘A New Strategy for Afghanistan’. Such was Ivanov’s discontent at the lack of support this proposal in practice received from both Kabul and EU member states however, that on the 28th November 2013 he suggested that the ‘Rainbow-2’ plan be re-submitted to NATO countries by the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Since aerial crop eradication was and remains rejected by Russia’s potential partners, however, Russia since 2011 has also re-emphasized the second main component of the plan, namely the need for greater economic development to tackle the drug industry in Afghanistan. The Russian pressure for more ‘alternative development’, which they emphasize as requiring complete national development rather than temporary and unsustainable local crop substitution, has also been accompanied by a strengthening in bilateral Russian-Afghan trade. Writing off, in 2007, more than $11 billion of Afghanistan’s Soviet-era debt, the Russian government has more recently undertaken projects to reconstruct and get working again large quantities of Soviet-era infrastructure in Afghanistan, amongst them a prefabricated house factory and the Jabul-Saraj cement plant. Russian proposals of ‘security through development’ have come in general to emphasize ‘accelerated industrialization’ as their own ‘alternative development’ plan for Afghanistan, with a 2014 study emphasizing prioritisation to construction of a chain of hydroelectric power stations on the river Panj, an electrified railway connecting Tajikistan through Afghanistan with Pakistan, a major chemical manufacturing facility, and a ‘dry port’ at the Afghan-Pakistan border-an investment package totalling $17.5 billion for realisation of its first stage. At the same time, both the CSTO in general, and Russia in particular, have explicitly ruled out being drawn into security operations in Afghanistan post-2014.Russia has instead focused ever more intently on converting the CSTO into an effective anti-trafficking alliance, a step that implies the full-scale ‘militarization’ of Russian drug policy in its ‘near abroad’. The Inter-Parliamentary Assembly of the CIS in both 1996 and 2006 paved the way for this effort by adopting two model laws on drugs, which were then officially disseminated as the template upon which CIS member states should model their own national legislation. Pressure to unify legislation via this route within the CIS-in practice leading to a toughening of drug laws in some member states-appears to have been a regular feature of CIS and CSTO meetings ever since, with the rhetoric of ‘narcoaggression’ and the ‘war on drugs’ regularly used in internal policy documents on the subject. Against this backdrop, individual Central Asian states continue to pursue and support harm reduction programmes, including OST programmes that remain banned in Russia itself; however Kazakhstan has toughened its drug laws in recent years in line with Russia’s own harmonisation objectives. In this same spirit Viktor Ivanov in November 2013, increasingly dismissive of the possibility of collaboration with the EU, also underlined during a CSTO meeting in Minsk (which coincided with an EU ‘Eastern Partnership’ meeting in Vilnius) the CSTO’s role as ‘the main, and in essence, only guarantee of anti-narcotic security in Eurasia.’
RUSSIA, “RAINBOW-3” AND LATIN AMERICA: OPERATIONALISING THE NEW SECURITY PARADIGM AT THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL.

The growing concerns expressed by Russian security officials over the perceived weakening of the international drug control regime in general, combined perhaps with a desire to expand operations and raise its profile in America’s own geopolitical backyard, found reflection in 2010 when head of the FSKN Viktor Ivanov undertook a high profile trip to California to condemn proposals being advanced there for the legalisation of marijuana.\(^{67}\) In 2012, however, the real core of Russia’s new agenda with regard to advancing its own perspective in the evolving ‘fractured consensus’ in global drug strategy was fully unveiled during Ivanov’s visit to Central America, meeting foreign ministers, policemen and policymakers in Mexico, Cuba, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Panama and Brazil on an official mission to increase transnational cooperation against drug trafficking. Given the low level of penetration of Latin American cocaine into the Russian drugs market, Ivanov’s visit must in fact be seen within the context of the ‘third wave’ of Russia’s own securitisation discourse in the ‘war on drugs’; the ‘Rainbow-3’ initiative formally unveiled that same year to coordinate a ‘global alliance’ to combat drug trafficking and promote alternative development.\(^{68}\) ‘Rainbow-3’ was orientated around nothing less than attempting to forge a unified approach towards targeting the ‘planetary centres’ of drug production, namely Latin America and Afghanistan, with Ivanov emphasising to his foreign counterparts the superiority of the Russian approach of focusing on unemployment and poverty over North American methods.\(^{69}\) To his Mexican counterparts, Ivanov for example expanded on ‘Rainbow 3’ as a ‘complex and balanced approach’, allowing both the construction of new industrial capacity and infrastructure, and generating an alternative to increasingly prevalent but irresponsible proposals for the decriminalisation or legalisation of all drugs.\(^{70}\) Prior to its ejection from the G8 in 2014, Russia made clear its intent to place the issue of fighting the ‘planetary drug threat’ at the core of its own upcoming presidency of that organisation. This Russian proposal, with accompanying high profile trips to Latin America, therefore undoubtedly reflected both a more general Russian desire to intensify its contacts and relationships with Latin America, and more particularly a further Russian effort at ‘rollback’ against any threatening liberalisation of the ‘war on drugs’, particularly given the reforms in domestic drug policy being advanced or already undertaken by Latin American states like Uruguay and Guatemala. This process was itself however after 2012 already being overtaken by a ‘cultural’ discourse which merged the domestic and internationalised securitisation discourses into yet a further, specifically Russian form-the ‘drug war’ as a symptom of the wider ‘culture war’; a discourse that the Putin administration in its third term began to utilise more and more often in an effort to frame a new draft of Russian national identity.

CONCLUSION: RUSSIA, GLOBAL DRUG POLICY, AND THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF POLICY DISPLACEMENT

A review of the evolution of Russian drug policy reveals two striking overarching phenomena, both of which can be considered ‘unintended consequences’ of the current drug control regime. First, Russian drug policy in terms of both form and content has been less monolithic than it is often portrayed, despite becoming increasingly monopolised by a major power ministry since 2003. Prior to the 1960s, Soviet drug treatment policy was if anything rather pluralistic in its approach, whilst within Russia today advocates of harm reduction measures remain active, albeit often in difficult
circumstances. The moves taken by the state itself after 2003 to legalise possession of small quantities of drugs, and the more recent moves to roll out a nationwide system of state sponsored drug rehabilitation centres, reveal a framework that, within the parameters of its own particular paradigm, continues to adapt. However, the often unspoken but persistent need to create just such a ‘national paradigm’ – of edges and boundaries to the frame – remains the greatest unintended consequence of the drug control system itself, in Russia just as much as elsewhere. The implementation of a drug control regime in Russia, as in other countries, has in reality therefore been marked less by the dry implementation of laws, and more by a wider ongoing debate over what constitutes the ‘good society’, and what moral order the state is seeking to establish and defend. This has led, in the recent past, to both the USSR and Russia adopting stricter measures of control over drug prohibition and treatment than the UN conventions themselves require. Contrary to the probable intent of those who designed and constructed the three UN conventions, this therefore remains an ongoing and evolving process, which bleeds out into wider debates over the relative balance between individual human rights and the public good in every society.

At least in the Russian case, the (often neglected) cause of such displacement also inevitably reflects upon the ongoing attempted development of a coherent ‘national ideology’ since the Soviet collapse, just as much as (perhaps even more) it does the relative budgetary profile and institutional heft of the main power ministries concerned. In Russia the securitisation of the drug issue since 2003 has therefore certainly had a very strong policy displacement effect, with police, intelligence cooperation, and even military action continuing to be frequently given greater priority than a health-care based approach. Most notably, individual health care treatments such as OST remain banned, with one consequence of the most recent Russian annexation of the Crimea being, for example, the ending of provision of methadone to the more than 800 patients previously receiving such treatment there. Since 2012 however the securitisation discourse has itself become overshadowed by an ever more prevalent ‘cultural discourse’ around deviant behaviour in general, reflected with increasing frequency in the public statements of President Putin, and in the rising role and pronouncements of the Russian Ministry of Culture under Vladimir Medinskii. The very fact that the perceived need to develop a truly sovereign drug policy model has grown so dramatically within the context of a fracturing consensus has therefore clearly also fed into the wider debate of what Russia herself as a ‘state-civilization’ should stand for. After 2012 one can argue that the securitisation discourse that has evolved within Russia since 2003 has therefore actually been increasingly suborned to a third, yet more general discourse over cultural contamination by foreign liberal values. This year has for example seen leaked reports on the Russian Ministry of Culture’s planning document on the ‘Base of State Cultural Policy’, whose foundation stone is reportedly that ‘Russia is not Europe’, and which will designate ‘alien values’ as to blame for ‘increased crime, alcoholism, drug addiction [emphasis added] and a rise in suicides.’ In short, the policy displacement generated by the manner that the Russian government has chosen to implement the drug control regime has now bled out significantly into a wider national narrative, one condemning ‘multiculturalism’ and decadent moral equivalence, and one that now sits to some extent already outside and beyond debate and discussion over drug control itself.

This observation informs assessment of the second clearly visible observation one can make about the policy displacement effect, namely the increasing incorporation by Russia of its drug control views into
a more activist foreign policy in general, whether through visits to Latin America, more intense work within the CSTO, or promises of greater economic support and ‘alternative development’ to Afghanistan – where the outgoing President Karzai has, in return, recently quickly moved to recognize Russian annexation of the Crimea.\textsuperscript{74} Russia’s instrumentalisation of the drug war narrative to both build closer regional and international alliances, and to increase its number of external bases and training centres, has become a significant part of the more general ‘great game’ for diplomatic and political influence being fought ought between the United States and Russia, both in Central Asia and abroad.\textsuperscript{75} The FSKN has in the process become a true ‘power ministry’ less because of its abstract purpose, and more due to the additional leverage and diplomatic power it has come to be seen as granting the Russian government, both within the CIS, and on the international stage. On the run-up to the UNGASS summit of 2016 Russia has therefore clearly staked out an increasingly far-reaching position on the shaping of future global drug policy reform, one whose most recent ‘new moralism’ apparently threatens to (intentionally) convert the necessary drug policy debate that needs to occur into a wider (and artificial) ‘clash of civilizations’.

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ENDNOTES

1 Funding: This article is part of the EU FP7 Framework LINKSCH Research Project, and is work funded by the European Commission. Details of the project may be found at: www.linksch.gla.ac.uk

2 http://valdaiclub.com/politics/62880.html

3 http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/5533

4 The original document can still be found at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/commissions/CND-Session51/CND-UNGASS-CRPs/ECN72008CRP17.pdf


9 E. Herschinger, Constructing global enemies: Hegemony and identity in international discourses on terrorism and drug prohibition. Abingdon/New York: Taylor and Francis, 2011


11 David Bewley-Taylor, private communication.


13 On the growth of the ‘fractured consensus’ since 1998, see: David R. Bewley-Taylor, International Drug Control. Consensus Fractured. Cambridge: CUP, 2012. The trend towards harm reduction within the EU is itself of course very unevenly developed and still contested within the EU itself, with individual EU member states themselves being visibly divided over, for example, the utility and acceptability of drug consumption rooms. Until recently the biggest split was nonetheless seen to be that between the US and EU. Under the Obama administration, and with individual US states now also legislating into effect legalized marijuana, this is nonetheless to some extent changing. On the former position, see for example: Luke Baker, ‘U.S. and Europe split on Drugs Policy’ Jan 30th 2009, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2009/01/30/uk-drugs-us-policy-exclusive-idUKTRE50T3AK20090130


21 Yurii Fedotov became Executive Director of the UNODC in 2010


26 For a highly critical review, see: Human Rights Watch, Volume 19 No 7 ‘Rehabilitation Required.’


29 Carolina Vendil Pallin, ‘The Russian Power Ministries: Tool and Insurance of Power.’ The Journal of Slavic Military Studies 20:1 (2007) pp.4, 17–19. This article speculates that the creation of the FSKN arose as a favour, and desire to find a position, for Viktor Cherkesov. It therefore does not take account of the considerable expansion of activity undertaken by the FSKN under Cherkesov’s successor, Viktor Ivanov.


32 http://voiceofrussia.com/2013_09_21/We-have-left-behind-Soviet-ideology-and-there-will-be-no-return-Putin-5419/

34 Orlova, ‘The Russian “War on Drugs”. A Kinder, Gentler Approach?’, p.27.
36 http://drogriporter.hu/en/Drug_policy_in_numbers_poland
39 Human Rights Watch, Volume 19 No 7 ‘Rehabilitation Required’, p.21
41 LTP: lechebno-trudovye profilaktorii, see earlier reference.
45 A province is considered poppy-free by the UNODC when it is estimated to have less than 100 hectares of opium cultivation, not where opium cultivation is completely absent. The actual number of provinces officially registered in Afghanistan has also changed during this time, with 34 provinces today compared to 32 in 2003.
Stockpiling of both opium and heroin (the latter of which demands stable-meaning dry, cool, and dark-controlled conditions, and which steadily loses potency anyway) would appear to have only limited utility however, and the other explanation for both reported shortages and apparent over-production may lie in changing routes and under-estimates of existing consumption levels in states such as Russia, the Central Asian states, China, Iran, and the Middle East. The truth may of course also lie in a combination of all these factors. This paradox is explored at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/legacy/thereporters/markeaston/2008/10/map_of_the_week_the_mystery_of.html and at: Peter Simonson & Max Daly, ‘The Great Heroin Crash’, Druglink March/April 2011 http://www.drugscope.org.uk/Resources/Drugscope/Documents/PDF/Publications/GreatHeroinCrash.pdf

52 In 2003 the UNODC estimated that half of the heroin smuggled into Russia was intended for the European market, with the other half intended for domestic use. There is little evidence to suggest that this is now the case, even assuming this was true before 2011 the UNODC estimated that just 3.9 tons of heroin that reached Northern and Eastern Europe in 2009, or just 5 percent of the heroin initially entering Russia via Central Asia, were trafficked on. UNODC, ‘The Global Afghan Opium Trade. A Threat Assessment,’ July 2011, Vienna, pp.50–51. For the earlier estimate, see: UNODC, ‘Global Illicit Drug Trends’, 2003. Head of the FSKN Viktor Ivanov in 2012 himself strenuously rejected the charge that Russia transited drugs into Europe: Afghan Narcotrafficking. A Joint Threat Assessment. New York: East-West Institute, 2013, p.58


61 What Viktor Ivanov felt were obvious points of agreement between the two proposals are underlined in his speech of 5th September 2011 at a regional anti-narcotic conference in Kabul, available at: http://www.fskn.gov.ru/includes/periodics/speeches_last/2011/0905/002114380/detail.shtml


67 http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/10/22/interview_viktor_ivanov

68 ‘Russian anti-drug chief urges new plan to combat Afghanistan drug threat.’ Available at: http://rt.com/politics/russia-drugs-afghanistan-threat-069/


70 Ivanov speech 21/2/12 in Mexico at: http://www.fskn.gov.ru/includes/periodics/speeches_last/2012/0221/054317459/detail.shtml


72 On which, in particular on the shift from the still largely secular notion of a ‘sovereign democracy’ to, in President Putin’s third term, a conservative, explicitly Orthodox ‘state civilization’, see for example: Alfred B. Evans, ‘Power and Ideology: Vladimir Putin and the Russian Political System.’ The Carl Beck Papers No.1902 (2008), Max Fisher, ‘The new Putinism’, and Aleksandr Sergunin, ‘Has Putin the pragmatist turned into Putin the ideologue?’ Russia Direct, April 14th 2014, at: http://www.russia-direct.org/content/has-putin-pragmatist-turned-putin-ideologue

73 http://www.infox.ru/authority/state/2014/04/03/V_Minkultye_pryedlag.phtml


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The Global Drug Policy Observatory aims to promote evidence and human rights based drug policy through the comprehensive and rigorous reporting, monitoring and analysis of policy developments at national and international levels. Acting as a platform from which to reach out to and engage with broad and diverse audiences, the initiative aims to help improve the sophistication and horizons of the current policy debate among the media and elite opinion formers as well as within law enforcement and policy making communities. The Observatory engages in a range of research activities that explore not only the dynamics and implications of existing and emerging policy issues, but also the processes behind policy shifts at various levels of governance.

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